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Merged
merged 339 commits into from
Oct 16, 2023
Merged

merge #1

merged 339 commits into from
Oct 16, 2023

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honjow
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@honjow honjow commented Oct 16, 2023

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stonezdm and others added 30 commits October 4, 2023 19:26
The synchronize_irq(c->irq) will not return until the IRQ handler
mtk_uart_apdma_irq_handler() is completed. If the synchronize_irq()
holds a spin_lock and waits the IRQ handler to complete, but the
IRQ handler also needs the same spin_lock. The deadlock will happen.
The process is shown below:

          cpu0                        cpu1
mtk_uart_apdma_device_pause() | mtk_uart_apdma_irq_handler()
  spin_lock_irqsave()         |
                              |   spin_lock_irqsave()
  //hold the lock to wait     |
  synchronize_irq()           |

This patch reorders the synchronize_irq(c->irq) outside the spin_lock
in order to mitigate the bug.

Fixes: 9135408 ("dmaengine: mediatek: Add MediaTek UART APDMA support")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eugen Hristev <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
In the initial boot stage the integrated keyboard of Fujitsu Lifebook E5411
refuses to work and it's not possible to type for example a dm-crypt
passphrase without the help of an external keyboard.

i8042.nomux kernel parameter resolves this issue but using that a PS/2
mouse is detected. This input device is unused even when the i2c-hid-acpi
kernel module is blacklisted making the integrated ELAN touchpad
(04F3:308A) not working at all.

Since the integrated touchpad is managed by the i2c_designware input
driver in the Linux kernel and you can't find a PS/2 mouse port on the
computer I think it's safe to not use the PS/2 mouse port at all.

Signed-off-by: Szilard Fabian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
…io_int_idx == 0 case

Add a special case for gpio_count == 1 && gpio_int_idx == 0 to
goodix_add_acpi_gpio_mappings().

It seems that on newer x86/ACPI devices the reset and irq GPIOs are no
longer listed as GPIO resources instead there is only 1 GpioInt resource
and _PS0 does the whole reset sequence for us.

This means that we must call acpi_device_fix_up_power() on these devices
to ensure that the chip is reset before we try to use it.

This part was already fixed in commit 3de93e6 ("Input: goodix - call
acpi_device_fix_up_power() in some cases") by adding a call to
acpi_device_fix_up_power() to the generic "Unexpected ACPI resources"
catch all.

But it turns out that this case on some hw needs some more special
handling. Specifically the firmware may bootup with the IRQ pin in
output mode. The reset sequence from ACPI _PS0 (executed by
acpi_device_fix_up_power()) should put the pin in input mode,
but the GPIO subsystem has cached the direction at bootup, causing
request_irq() to fail due to gpiochip_lock_as_irq() failure:

[    9.119864] Goodix-TS i2c-GDIX1002:00: Unexpected ACPI resources: gpio_count 1, gpio_int_idx 0
[    9.317443] Goodix-TS i2c-GDIX1002:00: ID 911, version: 1060
[    9.321902] input: Goodix Capacitive TouchScreen as /devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:17.0/i2c_designware.4/i2c-5/i2c-GDIX1002:00/input/input8
[    9.327840] gpio gpiochip0: (INT3453:00): gpiochip_lock_as_irq: tried to flag a GPIO set as output for IRQ
[    9.327856] gpio gpiochip0: (INT3453:00): unable to lock HW IRQ 26 for IRQ
[    9.327861] genirq: Failed to request resources for GDIX1002:00 (irq 131) on irqchip intel-gpio
[    9.327912] Goodix-TS i2c-GDIX1002:00: request IRQ failed: -5

Fix this by adding a special case for gpio_count == 1 && gpio_int_idx == 0
which adds an ACPI GPIO lookup table for the int GPIO even though we cannot
use it for reset purposes (as there is no reset GPIO).

Adding the lookup will make the gpiod_int = gpiod_get(..., GPIOD_IN) call
succeed, which will explicitly set the direction to input fixing the issue.

Note this re-uses the acpi_goodix_int_first_gpios[] lookup table, since
there is only 1 GPIO in the ACPI resources the reset entry in that
lookup table will amount to a no-op.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Smith <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Currently, for UNBOUND wq, if the apply_wqattrs_prepare() return error,
the apply_wqattr_cleanup() will be called and use the pwq_release_worker
kthread to release resources asynchronously. however, the kfree(wq) is
invoked directly in failure path of alloc_workqueue(), if the kfree(wq)
has been executed and when the pwq_release_workfn() accesses wq, this
leads to the following scenario:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pwq_release_workfn+0x339/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:4124
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888027b831c0 by task pool_workqueue_/3

CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: pool_workqueue_ Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-next-20230825-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
 print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:475
 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
 pwq_release_workfn+0x339/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:4124
 kthread_worker_fn+0x2fc/0xa80 kernel/kthread.c:823
 kthread+0x33a/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5054:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa2/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:383
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:599 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
 alloc_workqueue+0x16f/0x1490 kernel/workqueue.c:4684
 kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu+0x23/0x100 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:19
 kvm_mmu_init_vm+0x248/0x2e0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:6180
 kvm_arch_init_vm+0x39/0x720 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12311
 kvm_create_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1222 [inline]
 kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5089 [inline]
 kvm_dev_ioctl+0xa31/0x1c20 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5131
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 5054:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x15b/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1800 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:1826
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3809 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3822
 alloc_workqueue+0xe76/0x1490 kernel/workqueue.c:4746
 kvm_mmu_init_tdp_mmu+0x23/0x100 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c:19
 kvm_mmu_init_vm+0x248/0x2e0 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:6180
 kvm_arch_init_vm+0x39/0x720 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12311
 kvm_create_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1222 [inline]
 kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5089 [inline]
 kvm_dev_ioctl+0xa31/0x1c20 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5131
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18f/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:857
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

This commit therefore flush pwq_release_worker in the alloc_and_link_pwqs()
before invoke kfree(wq).

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60db9f652c92d5bacba4
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Per "dt-bindings/firmware/imx/rsrc.h", `IMX_SC_R_DMA_2_CH0 + 5` not
equals to IMX_SC_R_DMA_2_CH5, so there should be two entries in
imx8qxp_scu_pd_ranges, otherwise the imx_scu_add_pm_domain may filter
out wrong power domains.

Fixes: 927b7d1 ("genpd: imx: scu-pd: enlarge PD range")
Reported-by: Dong Aisheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
When calling mcb_bus_add_devices(), both mcb devices and the mcb
bus will attempt to attach a device to a driver because they share
the same bus_type. This causes an issue when trying to cast the
container of the device to mcb_device struct using to_mcb_device(),
leading to a wrong cast when the mcb_bus is added. A crash occurs
when freing the ida resources as the bus numbering of mcb_bus gets
confused with the is_added flag on the mcb_device struct.

The only reason for this cast was to keep an is_added flag on the
mcb_device struct that does not seem necessary. The function
device_attach() handles already bound devices and the mcb subsystem
does nothing special with this is_added flag so remove it completely.

Fixes: 18d2881 ("mcb: Correctly initialize the bus's device")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jorge Sanjuan Garcia <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jose Javier Rodriguez Barbarin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jose Javier Rodriguez Barbarin <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
When a fence signals there is a very small race window where the timestamp
isn't updated yet. sync_file solves this by busy waiting for the
timestamp to appear, but on other ocassions didn't handled this
correctly.

Provide a dma_fence_timestamp() helper function for this and use it in
all appropriate cases.

Another alternative would be to grab the spinlock when that happens.

v2 by teddy: add a wait parameter to wait for the timestamp to show up, in case
   the accurate timestamp is needed and/or the timestamp is not based on
   ktime (e.g. hw timestamp)
v3 chk: drop the parameter again for unified handling

Signed-off-by: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1774baa ("drm/scheduler: Change scheduled fence track v2")
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
There has been a repeated misunderstanding about what the hardware embargo
list is for. Clarify the language in the process so that it is clear
that only fixes are coordinated. There is explicitly no prenotification
process. The list members are also expected to keep total radio silence
during embargoes.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Update the firmware_loader documentation and corresponding section
in the MAINTAINERs file with a new email address.

Signed-off-by: Russ Weight <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
A transaction complete work is allocated and queued for each
transaction. Under certain conditions the work->type might be marked as
BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT to notify userspace about
potential spamming threads or as BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_PENDING when
the target is currently frozen.

However, these work types are not being handled in binder_release_work()
so they will leak during a cleanup. This was reported by syzkaller with
the following kmemleak dump:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810e2d6de0 (size 32):
  comm "syz-executor338", pid 5046, jiffies 4294968230 (age 13.590s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    e0 6d 2d 0e 81 88 ff ff e0 6d 2d 0e 81 88 ff ff  .m-......m-.....
    04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff81573b75>] kmalloc_trace+0x25/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1114
    [<ffffffff83d41873>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:599 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83d41873>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83d41873>] binder_transaction+0x573/0x4050 drivers/android/binder.c:3152
    [<ffffffff83d45a05>] binder_thread_write+0x6b5/0x1860 drivers/android/binder.c:4010
    [<ffffffff83d486dc>] binder_ioctl_write_read drivers/android/binder.c:5066 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83d486dc>] binder_ioctl+0x1b2c/0x3cf0 drivers/android/binder.c:5352
    [<ffffffff816b25f2>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    [<ffffffff816b25f2>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline]
    [<ffffffff816b25f2>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:857 [inline]
    [<ffffffff816b25f2>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xf2/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:857
    [<ffffffff84b30008>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    [<ffffffff84b30008>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    [<ffffffff84c0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fix the leaks by kfreeing these work types in binder_release_work() and
handle them as a BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE cleanup.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 0567461 ("binder: return pending info for frozen async txns")
Fixes: a7dc1e6 ("binder: tell userspace to dump current backtrace when detected oneway spamming")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7f10c1653e35933c0f1e
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Drew found "CONFIG_DMA_GLOBAL_POOL=y causes ADMA buffer alloc to fail"
the log looks like:

    mmc0: Unable to allocate ADMA buffers - falling back to standard DMA

The logic is: generic riscv defconfig selects ARCH_RENESAS then
ARCH_R9A07G043 which selects DMA_GLOBAL_POOL, which assumes all
non-dma-coherent riscv platforms have a dma global pool, this assumption
seems not correct. And I believe DMA_GLOBAL_POOL should not be
selected by ARCH_SOCFAMILIY, instead, only ARCH under some specific
conditions can select it globaly, for example NOMMU ARM and so on,
because it's designed for special cases such as "nommu cases where
non-cacheable memory lives in a fixed place in the physical address
map" as pointed out by Robin.

Fix the issue by making ARCH_R9A07G043 (riscv version) depend on
NONPORTABLE, thus generic defconfig won't select ARCH_R9A07G043 by
default. And even for random config case, there will be less debug
effort once we see NONPORTABLE is enabled.

Reported-by: Drew Fustini <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/ZRuamJuShOnvP1pr@x1/
Fixes: 484861e ("soc: renesas: Kconfig: Select the required configs for RZ/Five SoC")
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Drew Fustini <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Bindings require vdd-supply but the example DTS was missing one.  This
fixes dt_binding_check error:

  Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/light/rohm,bu27010.example.dtb: light-sensor@38: 'vdd-supply' is a required property

Fixes: ce2a8c1 ("dt-bindings: iio: ROHM BU27010 RGBC + flickering sensor")
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
When compiling with gcc 13 with -Warray-bounds enabled:

In file included from drivers/iio/proximity/irsd200.c:15:
In function ‘iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp’,
    inlined from ‘irsd200_trigger_handler’ at drivers/iio/proximity/irsd200.c:770:2:
./include/linux/iio/buffer.h:42:46: error: array subscript ‘int64_t {aka long long int}[0]’
is partly outside array bounds of ‘s16[1]’ {aka ‘short int[1]’} [-Werror=array-bounds=]
   42 |                 ((int64_t *)data)[ts_offset] = timestamp;
      |                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/iio/proximity/irsd200.c: In function ‘irsd200_trigger_handler’:
drivers/iio/proximity/irsd200.c:763:13: note: object ‘buf’ of size 2
  763 |         s16 buf = 0;
      |             ^~~

The problem seems to be that irsd200_trigger_handler() is taking a s16
variable as an int64_t buffer. As Jonathan suggested [1], fix it by
extending the buffer to a two-element array of s64.

Link: KSPP#331
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230809181329.46c00a5d@jic23-huawei/ [1]
Fixes: 3db3562 ("iio: Add driver for Murata IRS-D200")
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Waqar Hameed <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Waqar Hameed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
cros_ec_sensors_push_data() reads `indio_dev->active_scan_mask` and
calls iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() without making sure the
`indio_dev` stays in buffer mode.  There is a race if `indio_dev` exits
buffer mode right before cros_ec_sensors_push_data() accesses them.

An use-after-free on `indio_dev->active_scan_mask` was observed.  The
call trace:
[...]
 _find_next_bit
 cros_ec_sensors_push_data
 cros_ec_sensorhub_event
 blocking_notifier_call_chain
 cros_ec_irq_thread

It was caused by a race condition: one thread just freed
`active_scan_mask` at [1]; while another thread tried to access the
memory at [2].

Fix it by calling iio_device_claim_buffer_mode() to ensure the
`indio_dev` can't exit buffer mode during cros_ec_sensors_push_data().

[1]: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.5/source/drivers/iio/industrialio-buffer.c#L1189
[2]: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.5/source/drivers/iio/common/cros_ec_sensors/cros_ec_sensors_core.c#L198

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: aa984f1 ("iio: cros_ec: Register to cros_ec_sensorhub when EC supports FIFO")
Signed-off-by: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
The ADC Command Buffer Register high and low are currently pointing to
the wrong address and makes it impossible to perform correct
ADC measurements over all channels.

According to the datasheet of the imx8qxp the ADC_CMDL register starts
at address 0x100 and the ADC_CMDH register starts at address 0x104.

This bug seems to be in the kernel since the introduction of this
driver.

This can be observed by checking all raw voltages of the adc and they
are all nearly identical:

cat /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio\:device0/in_voltage*_raw
3498
3494
3491
3491
3489
3490
3490
3490

Fixes: 1e23dca ("iio: imx8qxp-adc: Add driver support for NXP IMX8QXP ADC")
Signed-off-by: Philipp Rossak <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Haibo Chen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
This driver uses IIO triggered buffers so it needs to select them in
Kconfig.

on riscv-32bit:

/opt/crosstool/gcc-13.2.0-nolibc/riscv32-linux/bin/riscv32-linux-ld: drivers/iio/imu/bno055/bno055.o: in function `.L367':
bno055.c:(.text+0x2c96): undefined reference to `devm_iio_triggered_buffer_setup_ext'

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/[email protected]/
Fixes: 4aefe1c ("iio: imu: add Bosch Sensortec BNO055 core driver")
Cc: Andrea Merello <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
The DPS310 sensor chip has been encountering intermittent errors while
reading the sensor device across various system designs. This issue causes
the chip to become "stuck," preventing the indication of "ready" status
for pressure and temperature measurements in the MEAS_CFG register.

To address this issue, this commit fixes the timeout settings to improve
sensor stability:
- After sending a reset command to the chip, the timeout has been extended
  from 2.5 ms to 15 ms, aligning with the DPS310 specification.
- The read timeout value of the MEAS_CFG register has been adjusted from
  20ms to 30ms to match the specification.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Yadlapati <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7b4ab4a ("iio: pressure: dps310: Reset chip after timeout")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Building ad74413r without selecting IIO_BUFFER and
IIO_TRIGGERED_BUFFER generates error with respect to the iio trigger
functions that are used within the driver.
Update the Kconfig accordingly.

Fixes: fea251b ("iio: addac: add AD74413R driver")
Signed-off-by: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
After enabling/disabling interrupts on the vcnl4040 chip the als and/or
ps sensor is powered on or off depending on the interrupt enable bits.
This is made as a last step in write_event_config.

But there is no reason to do this as the runtime PM handles the power
state of the sensors. Interfering with this may impact sensor readings.

Consider the following:
 1. Userspace makes sensor data reading which triggers RPM resume
    (sensor powered on) and a RPM suspend timeout. The timeout is 2000ms
    before RPM suspend powers the sensor off if no new reading is made
    within the timeout period.
 2. Userspace disables interrupts => powers sensor off
 3. Userspace reads sensor data = 0 because sensor is off and the
    suspend timeout has not passed. For each new reading made within the
    timeout period the timeout is renewed with 2000ms and RPM will not
    make a new resume (device was not suspended). So the sensor will
    not be powered on.
 4. No further userspace reading for 2000ms ends RPM suspend timeout and
    triggers suspend (powers off already powered off sensor).

Powering sensor off in (2) makes all consecutive readings made within
2000ms to the previous reading (3) return invalid data.

Skip setting power state when writing new event config.

Fixes: 5466761 ("iio: light: vcnl4000: Add interrupt support for vcnl4040")
Fixes: bc292aa ("iio: light: vcnl4000: add illuminance irq vcnl4040/4200")
Signed-off-by: Mårten Lindahl <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
The avdd and the reference voltage are two different sources but the
reference voltage was assigned according to the avdd supply.

Add vref regulator structure and set the reference voltage according to
the vref supply from the devicetree.

In case vref supply is missing, reference voltage is set according to
the avdd supply for compatibility with old devicetrees.

Fixes: b581f74 ("staging: iio: adc: ad7192: move out of staging")
Signed-off-by: Alisa-Dariana Roman <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
…l nodes

"additionalProperties: true" is only for incomplete schemas such as bus
child nodes in a bus's schema. That doesn't apply to the "channel" nodes
in the adi,ad7292 binding, so fix additionalProperties to be false.

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Schmitt <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
The ms5611 driver falsely rejects lots of MS5607-02BA03-50 chips
with "PROM integrity check failed" because it doesn't accept a prom crc
value of zero as legitimate.

According to the datasheet for this chip (and the manufacturer's
application note about the PROM CRC), none of the possible values for the
CRC are excluded - but the current code in ms5611_prom_is_valid() ends with

return crc_orig != 0x0000 && crc == crc_orig

Discussed with the driver author (Tomasz Duszynski) and he indicated that
at that time (2015) he was dealing with some faulty chip samples which
returned blank data under some circumstances and/or followed example code
which indicated CRC zero being bad.

As far as I can tell this exception should not be applied anymore; We've
got a few hundred custom boards here with this chip where large numbers
of the prom have a legitimate CRC value 0, and do work fine, but which the
current driver code wrongly rejects.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Zangerl <[email protected]>
Fixes: c064416 ("iio: pressure: add support for MS5611 pressure and temperature sensor")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Currently, dpu_plane_atomic_check() does not check whether the
plane can process the image without exceeding the per chipset
limits for MDP clock. This leads to underflow issues because the
SSPP is not able to complete the processing for the data rate of
the display.

Fail the dpu_plane_atomic_check() if the SSPP cannot process the
image without exceeding the MDP clock limits.

changes in v2:
	- use crtc_state's adjusted_mode instead of mode

Fixes: 25fdd59 ("drm/msm: Add SDM845 DPU support")
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Kumar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/556819/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
A skcipher_request object is made up of struct skcipher_request
followed by a variable-sized trailer.  The allocation of the
skcipher_request and IV in crypt_iv_eboiv_gen is missing the
memory for struct skcipher_request.  Fix it by adding it to
reqsize.

Fixes: e302309 ("dm crypt: Avoid using MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE")
Cc: <[email protected]> #6.5+
Reported-by: Tatu Heikkilä <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
A recent commit reordered probe so that the interrupt line is now
requested before making sure that the device exists.

This breaks machines like the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s which rely on the
HID driver to probe second-source devices and only register the variant
that is actually populated. Specifically, the interrupt line may now
already be (temporarily) claimed when doing asynchronous probing of the
touchpad:

	genirq: Flags mismatch irq 191. 00082008 (hid-over-i2c) vs. 00082008 (hid-over-i2c)
	i2c_hid_of 21-0015: Could not register for hid-over-i2c interrupt, irq = 191, ret = -16
	i2c_hid_of: probe of 21-0015 failed with error -16

Fix this by restoring the old behaviour of first making sure the device
exists before requesting the interrupt line.

Note that something like this should probably be implemented also for
"panel followers", whose actual probe is currently effectively deferred
until the DRM panel is probed (e.g. by powering down the device after
making sure it exists and only then register it as a follower).

Fixes: 675cd87 ("HID: i2c-hid: Rearrange probe() to power things up later")
Cc: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dennis Gilmore <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Eric has reported that commit dabc8b2 ("quota: fix dqput() to
follow the guarantees dquot_srcu should provide") heavily increases
runtime of generic/270 xfstest for ext4 in nojournal mode. The reason
for this is that ext4 in nojournal mode leaves dquots dirty until the last
dqput() and thus the cleanup done in quota_release_workfn() has to write
them all. Due to the way quota_release_workfn() is written this results
in synchronize_srcu() call for each dirty dquot which makes the dquot
cleanup when turning quotas off extremely slow.

To be able to avoid synchronize_srcu() for each dirty dquot we need to
rework how we track dquots to be cleaned up. Instead of keeping the last
dquot reference while it is on releasing_dquots list, we drop it right
away and mark the dquot with new DQ_RELEASING_B bit instead. This way we
can we can remove dquot from releasing_dquots list when new reference to
it is acquired and thus there's no need to call synchronize_srcu() each
time we drop dq_list_lock.

References: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZRytn6CxFK2oECUt@debian-BULLSEYE-live-builder-AMD64
Reported-by: Eric Whitney <[email protected]>
Fixes: dabc8b2 ("quota: fix dqput() to follow the guarantees dquot_srcu should provide")
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
There is an unlikely but possible double free when loading firmware,
and a missing free calls if a firmware is successfully requested but
the coefficient file request fails, leading to the fallback firmware
request occurring without clearing the previously loaded firmware.

Fixes: cd40dad ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Ensure firmware/tuning pairs are always loaded")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Stefan Binding <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
When a Opencomm2 Headset is connected to a Bluetooth USB dongle,
the audio playback functions properly, but the microphone does not work.

In the dmesg logs, there are messages indicating that the init_pitch
function fails when the capture process begins.

The microphone only functions when the ep pitch control is not set.

Toggling the pitch control off bypasses the init_piatch function
and allows the microphone to work.

Signed-off-by: WhaleChang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Intel RVP board (0x12cc) has Headset Mic issue for reboot.
If system plugged headset when system reboot the headset Mic was gone.

Fixes: 1a93f10 ("ALSA: hda/realtek: Add "Intel Reference board" and "NUC 13" SSID in the ALC256")
Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
The blamed commit added the CDR check work item but didn't cancel it on
the remove path. Fix this by adding a remove function which takes care
of it.

Fixes: 8f73b37 ("phy: add support for the Layerscape SerDes 28G")
Signed-off-by: Ioana Ciornei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
[ Upstream commit 52323ed ]

syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below).

The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor"
conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock
when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock.

To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use
mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and
return -EBUSY when it fails.

Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling
mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going
to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system
suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user
space.

syzbot report:

syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline]
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> ChimeraOS#3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline]
       rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline]
       ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015
       ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531
       mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558
       init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910
       do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257
       do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline]
       do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline]
       do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline]
       kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568
       kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457
       ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

-> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline]
       wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64
       notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
       notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
       pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
       snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
       misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
       chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
       do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
       vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
       do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
       path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
       do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
       do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
       __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
       down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
       pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
       snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
       misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
       chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
       do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
       vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
       do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
       path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
       do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
       do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
       __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
       lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56
       hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452
       param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588
       module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924
       sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334
       new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
       vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679
       ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(param_lock);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(param_lock);
  lock(system_transition_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
[ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
[ Upstream commit b61e69b ]

syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1]

When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4,
which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the
mounted loop device to be invalidated.

When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(),
read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the
metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be
assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately
causes a deadlock when entering diFree().

To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode.

[1]
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
  lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309:
 #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515
 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline]
 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026
 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
 ChimeraOS#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline]
 ChimeraOS#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 ChimeraOS#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
 ChimeraOS#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline]
 ChimeraOS#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 ChimeraOS#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037
 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891
 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725
 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline]
 duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022
 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline]
 diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590
 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56
 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225
 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline]
 __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
[ Upstream commit 27b9180 ]

With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:

[    1.211455] ============================================
[    1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[    1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty ChimeraOS#5 Not tainted
[    1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[    1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[    1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[    1.212207]
[    1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[    1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[    1.212487]
[    1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[    1.212626]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[    1.212626]
[    1.212751]        CPU0
[    1.212815]        ----
[    1.212871]   lock(&dev->lock);
[    1.212944]   lock(&dev->lock);
[    1.213016]
[    1.213016]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[    1.213016]
[    1.213143]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[    1.213143]
[    1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[    1.213371]  #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[    1.213543]  #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[    1.213727]  #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[    1.213895]
[    1.213895] stack backtrace:
[    1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty ChimeraOS#5
[    1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[    1.213994] Call Trace:
[    1.213995]  <TASK>
[    1.213996]  dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[    1.214000]  print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[    1.214020]  lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[    1.214027]  __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[    1.214038]  dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[    1.214040]  vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[    1.214042]  __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[    1.214046]  __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[    1.214051]  netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[    1.214053]  dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[    1.214055]  vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[    1.214058]  notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[    1.214062]  netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[    1.214064]  dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[    1.214066]  bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[    1.214075]  do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[    1.214077]  do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[    1.214094]  rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[    1.214132]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[    1.214144]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[    1.214150]  netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[    1.214153]  netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[    1.214157]  __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[    1.214160]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[    1.214164]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[    1.214179]  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[    1.214184]  do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[    1.214190]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[    1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56

Device setup:

     netdevsim0 (down)
     ^        ^
  bond        netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)

When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.

Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.

Reproducer:

  echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device

  dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
  dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)

  ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 up

  ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
  ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allmulticast on down
  ip link add name bond1 type bond mode 802.3ad
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 down
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 master bond1
  ip link set dev bond1 up
  ip link show

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z9CfXjLMKn6VLG5d@mini-arch/T/#m15ba130f53227c883e79fb969687d69d670337a0
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
commit 93ae6e6 upstream.

We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings
on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
   at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
   at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> ChimeraOS#6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> ChimeraOS#5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        down_read+0x43/0x1d0
        enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110
        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870
        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
        irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0
        apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110
        x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40
        start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> ChimeraOS#4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
        mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0
        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> ChimeraOS#3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
        __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220
        iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280
        iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710
        iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710
        iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0
        probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50
        bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0
        iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810
        lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70
        intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock -->
     &device->physical_node_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&device->physical_node_lock);
                                lock(dmar_global_lock);
                                lock(&device->physical_node_lock);
   lock(iommu_probe_device_lock);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA
remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic
addition and removal of remapping units at runtime.

Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list:

- Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to
  register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework
  and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit.
- Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list
  to apply configuration changes.

The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This
caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning
by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for
device registration.

Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/
Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
commit 0bb2f7a upstream.

When I ran the repro [0] and waited a few seconds, I observed two
LOCKDEP splats: a warning immediately followed by a null-ptr-deref. [1]

Reproduction Steps:

  1) Mount CIFS
  2) Add an iptables rule to drop incoming FIN packets for CIFS
  3) Unmount CIFS
  4) Unload the CIFS module
  5) Remove the iptables rule

At step 3), the CIFS module calls sock_release() for the underlying
TCP socket, and it returns quickly.  However, the socket remains in
FIN_WAIT_1 because incoming FIN packets are dropped.

At this point, the module's refcnt is 0 while the socket is still
alive, so the following rmmod command succeeds.

  # ss -tan
  State      Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port  Peer Address:Port
  FIN-WAIT-1 0      477        10.0.2.15:51062   10.0.0.137:445

  # lsmod | grep cifs
  cifs                 1159168  0

This highlights a discrepancy between the lifetime of the CIFS module
and the underlying TCP socket.  Even after CIFS calls sock_release()
and it returns, the TCP socket does not die immediately in order to
close the connection gracefully.

While this is generally fine, it causes an issue with LOCKDEP because
CIFS assigns a different lock class to the TCP socket's sk->sk_lock
using sock_lock_init_class_and_name().

Once an incoming packet is processed for the socket or a timer fires,
sk->sk_lock is acquired.

Then, LOCKDEP checks the lock context in check_wait_context(), where
hlock_class() is called to retrieve the lock class.  However, since
the module has already been unloaded, hlock_class() logs a warning
and returns NULL, triggering the null-ptr-deref.

If LOCKDEP is enabled, we must ensure that a module calling
sock_lock_init_class_and_name() (CIFS, NFS, etc) cannot be unloaded
while such a socket is still alive to prevent this issue.

Let's hold the module reference in sock_lock_init_class_and_name()
and release it when the socket is freed in sk_prot_free().

Note that sock_lock_init() clears sk->sk_owner for svc_create_socket()
that calls sock_lock_init_class_and_name() for a listening socket,
which clones a socket by sk_clone_lock() without GFP_ZERO.

[0]:
CIFS_SERVER="10.0.0.137"
CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_SERVER}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST"
DEV="enp0s3"
CRED="/root/WindowsCredential.txt"

MNT=$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXX)
mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${MNT} -o vers=3.0,credentials=${CRED},cache=none,echo_interval=1

iptables -A INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP

for i in $(seq 10);
do
    umount ${MNT}
    rmmod cifs
    sleep 1
done

rm -r ${MNT}

iptables -D INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP

[1]:
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223)
Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs]
CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Not tainted 6.14.0 torvalds#36
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223)
...
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178)
 lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816)
 _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379)
 tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350)
...

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c4
 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Tainted: G        W          6.14.0 torvalds#36
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4852 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178)
Code: 15 41 09 c7 41 8b 44 24 20 25 ff 1f 00 00 41 09 c7 8b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 45 89 7c 24 20 41 89 44 24 24 e8 e1 bc ff ff 4c 89 e7 <44> 0f b6 b8 c4 00 00 00 e8 d1 bc ff ff 0f b6 80 c5 00 00 00 88 44
RSP: 0018:ffa0000000468a10 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1100010091cc38 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ff1100081f09ca48 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ff1100010091cc88
RBP: ff1100010091c200 R08: ff1100083fe6e228 R09: 00000000ffffbfff
R10: ff1100081eca0000 R11: ff1100083fe10dc0 R12: ff1100010091cc88
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000424b1
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1100081f080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c4 CR3: 0000000002c4a003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816)
 _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379)
 tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350)
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 (discriminator 1))
 ip_local_deliver_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:878 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
 ip_sublist_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:576)
 ip_list_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:628)
 ip_list_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:670)
 __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5939 net/core/dev.c:5986)
 netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:6040 net/core/dev.c:6129)
 napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37 ./include/net/gro.h:519 ./include/net/gro.h:514 net/core/dev.c:6496)
 e1000_clean (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3815)
 __napi_poll.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:7191)
 net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7262 net/core/dev.c:7382)
 handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)
 __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:596 kernel/softirq.c:435 kernel/softirq.c:662)
 irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:680)
 common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:280 (discriminator 14))
  </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693)
RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:744)
Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa eb 07 0f 00 2d c3 2b 15 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffa00000000ffee8 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 000000000000640b RBX: ff1100010091c200 RCX: 0000000000061aa4
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff812f30c5
RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 ? do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325)
 default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118)
 do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325)
 cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:422 (discriminator 1))
 start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:315)
 common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:421)
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs]
CR2: 00000000000000c4

Fixes: ed07536 ("[PATCH] lockdep: annotate nfs/nfsd in-kernel sockets")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
commit 691ee97 upstream.

Patch series "Fix lazy mmu mode", v2.

I'm planning to implement lazy mmu mode for arm64 to optimize vmalloc.  As
part of that, I will extend lazy mmu mode to cover kernel mappings in
vmalloc table walkers.  While lazy mmu mode is already used for kernel
mappings in a few places, this will extend it's use significantly.

Having reviewed the existing lazy mmu implementations in powerpc, sparc
and x86, it looks like there are a bunch of bugs, some of which may be
more likely to trigger once I extend the use of lazy mmu.  So this series
attempts to clarify the requirements and fix all the bugs in advance of
that series.  See patch #1 commit log for all the details.


This patch (of 5):

The docs, implementations and use of arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() is
a bit of a mess (to put it politely).  There are a number of issues
related to nesting of lazy mmu regions and confusion over whether the
task, when in a lazy mmu region, is preemptible or not.  Fix all the
issues relating to the core-mm.  Follow up commits will fix the
arch-specific implementations.  3 arches implement lazy mmu; powerpc,
sparc and x86.

When arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() was first introduced by commit
6606c3e ("[PATCH] paravirt: lazy mmu mode hooks.patch"), it was
expected that lazy mmu regions would never nest and that the appropriate
page table lock(s) would be held while in the region, thus ensuring the
region is non-preemptible.  Additionally lazy mmu regions were only used
during manipulation of user mappings.

Commit 38e0edb ("mm/apply_to_range: call pte function with lazy
updates") started invoking the lazy mmu mode in apply_to_pte_range(),
which is used for both user and kernel mappings.  For kernel mappings the
region is no longer protected by any lock so there is no longer any
guarantee about non-preemptibility.  Additionally, for RT configs, the
holding the PTL only implies no CPU migration, it doesn't prevent
preemption.

Commit bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()") added
arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() to the default implementation of
set_ptes(), used by x86.  So after this commit, lazy mmu regions can be
nested.  Additionally commit 1a10a44 ("sparc64: implement the new
page table range API") and commit 9fee28b ("powerpc: implement the
new page table range API") did the same for the sparc and powerpc
set_ptes() overrides.

powerpc couldn't deal with preemption so avoids it in commit b9ef323
("powerpc/64s: Disable preemption in hash lazy mmu mode"), which
explicitly disables preemption for the whole region in its implementation.
x86 can support preemption (or at least it could until it tried to add
support nesting; more on this below).  Sparc looks to be totally broken in
the face of preemption, as far as I can tell.

powerpc can't deal with nesting, so avoids it in commit 47b8def
("powerpc/mm: Avoid calling arch_enter/leave_lazy_mmu() in set_ptes"),
which removes the lazy mmu calls from its implementation of set_ptes().
x86 attempted to support nesting in commit 49147be ("x86/xen: allow
nesting of same lazy mode") but as far as I can tell, this breaks its
support for preemption.

In short, it's all a mess; the semantics for
arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() are not clearly defined and as a result
the implementations all have different expectations, sticking plasters and
bugs.

arm64 is aiming to start using these hooks, so let's clean everything up
before adding an arm64 implementation.  Update the documentation to state
that lazy mmu regions can never be nested, must not be called in interrupt
context and preemption may or may not be enabled for the duration of the
region.  And fix the generic implementation of set_ptes() to avoid
nesting.

arch-specific fixes to conform to the new spec will proceed this one.

These issues were spotted by code review and I have no evidence of issues
being reported in the wild.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Juegren Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcow (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
[ Upstream commit 378677e ]

After ieee80211_do_stop() SKB from vif's txq could still be processed.
Indeed another concurrent vif schedule_and_wake_txq call could cause
those packets to be dequeued (see ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue())
without checking the sdata current state.

Because vif.drv_priv is now cleared in this function, this could lead to
driver crash.

For example in ath12k, ahvif is store in vif.drv_priv. Thus if
ath12k_mac_op_tx() is called after ieee80211_do_stop(), ahvif->ah can be
NULL, leading the ath12k_warn(ahvif->ah,...) call in this function to
trigger the NULL deref below.

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffffc000000001
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
  batman_adv: bat0: Interface deactivated: brbh1337
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x0000000096000004
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
    FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
    CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
    GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
  [dfffffc000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 978 Comm: lbd Not tainted 6.13.0-g633f875b8f1e torvalds#114
  Hardware name: HW (DT)
  pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k]
  lr : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x174/0x29b8 [ath12k]
  sp : ffffffc086ace450
  x29: ffffffc086ace450 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 1ffffff810d59ca4
  x26: ffffff801d05f7c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 000000004000001e
  x23: ffffff8009ce4926 x22: ffffff801f9c0800 x21: ffffff801d05f7f0
  x20: ffffff8034a19f40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffff801f9c0958
  x17: ffffff800bc0a504 x16: dfffffc000000000 x15: ffffffc086ace4f8
  x14: ffffff801d05f83c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffb003a0bf03
  x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffb003a0bf02 x9 : ffffff8034a19f40
  x8 : ffffff801d05f818 x7 : 1ffffff0069433dc x6 : ffffff8034a19ee0
  x5 : ffffff801d05f7f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008
  Call trace:
   ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] (P)
   ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x16c/0x260
   ieee80211_queue_skb+0xeec/0x1d20
   ieee80211_tx+0x200/0x2c8
   ieee80211_xmit+0x22c/0x338
   __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x7e8/0xc60
   ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc4/0xee0
   __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023.isra.0+0x854/0x17a0
   ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023+0x124/0x488
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120
   br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x120/0x4a8
   __br_forward+0xe4/0x2b0
   deliver_clone+0x5c/0xd0
   br_flood+0x398/0x580
   br_dev_xmit+0x454/0x9f8
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120
   ip6_finish_output2+0xc28/0x1b60
   __ip6_finish_output+0x38c/0x638
   ip6_output+0x1b4/0x338
   ip6_local_out+0x7c/0xa8
   ip6_send_skb+0x7c/0x1b0
   ip6_push_pending_frames+0x94/0xd0
   rawv6_sendmsg+0x1a98/0x2898
   inet_sendmsg+0x94/0xe0
   __sys_sendto+0x1e4/0x308
   __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x140
   do_el0_svc+0x110/0x280
   el0_svc+0x20/0x60
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x138
   el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158

To avoid that, empty vif's txq at ieee80211_do_stop() so no packet could
be dequeued after ieee80211_do_stop() (new packets cannot be queued
because SDATA_STATE_RUNNING is cleared at this point).

Fixes: ba8c3d6 ("mac80211: add an intermediate software queue implementation")
Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ff7849e268562456274213c0476e09481a48f489.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
[ Upstream commit 752e221 ]

SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket.

Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported
a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c
("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC").

  socket(AF_SMC             , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6)
  socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC)

When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to
sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family.  In the IPPROTO_SMC case,
AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock.

The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises
smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC.

  1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds
     smc->clcsock_release_lock.

      sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock
      (sk_lock-AF_SMC)

  2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock
     and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL
     and the kernel socket's lock_sock().

      &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6)

  3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock().

      rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6

Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking,

  .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -.
  `-----------------------------------------------------------------'

but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC.

      sk_lock-AF_SMC   -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6

Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock.

Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6,
we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted

syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903
       smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
       __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline]
       ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573
       ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627
       __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645
       lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline]
       sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline]
       sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124
       do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567
       ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993
       udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850
       do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303
       __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328
       __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline]
       __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline]
       __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
       lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220
       inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485
       __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline]
       sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675
       smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34
       __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301
       smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344
       __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647
       sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398
       __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464
       task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227
       resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
       __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
       syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
       do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock);
                               lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock);
  lock(rtnl_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571:
 #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
 #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646
 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076
 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220
 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485
 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline]
 sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675
 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34
 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301
 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344
 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647
 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398
 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464
 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf
R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac
R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0
 </TASK>

Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit 424eafe upstream.

When i2c-cros-ec-tunnel and the EC driver are built-in, the EC parent
device will not be found, leading to NULL pointer dereference.

That can also be reproduced by unbinding the controller driver and then
loading i2c-cros-ec-tunnel module (or binding the device).

[  271.991245] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
[  271.998215] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  272.003351] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  272.008485] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  272.011022] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  272.015207] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: insmod Tainted: G S                  6.15.0-rc1-00004-g44722359ed83 torvalds#30 PREEMPT(full)  3c7fb39a552e7d949de2ad921a7d6588d3a4fdc5
[  272.030312] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
[  272.034233] Hardware name: HP Berknip/Berknip, BIOS Google_Berknip.13434.356.0 05/17/2021
[  272.042400] RIP: 0010:ec_i2c_probe+0x2b/0x1c0 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel]
[  272.048577] Code: 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 05 06 a0 6c e7 48 89 44 24 08 4c 8d 7f 10 48 8b 47 50 4c 8b 60 78 <49> 83 7c 24 58 00 0f 84 2f 01 00 00 48 89 fb be 30 06 00 00 4c 9
[  272.067317] RSP: 0018:ffffa32082a03940 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  272.072541] RAX: ffff969580b6a810 RBX: ffff969580b68c10 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  272.079672] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff969580b68c00
[  272.086804] RBP: 00000000fffffdfb R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  272.093936] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc0600000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  272.101067] R13: ffffffffa666fbb8 R14: ffffffffc05b5528 R15: ffff969580b68c10
[  272.108198] FS:  00007b930906fc40(0000) GS:ffff969603149000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  272.116282] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  272.122024] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000012631c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
[  272.129155] Call Trace:
[  272.131606]  <TASK>
[  272.133709]  ? acpi_dev_pm_attach+0xdd/0x110
[  272.137985]  platform_probe+0x69/0xa0
[  272.141652]  really_probe+0x152/0x310
[  272.145318]  __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x110
[  272.149678]  driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x190
[  272.153864]  __driver_attach+0x10b/0x1e0
[  272.157790]  ? driver_attach+0x20/0x20
[  272.161542]  bus_for_each_dev+0x107/0x150
[  272.165553]  bus_add_driver+0x15d/0x270
[  272.169392]  driver_register+0x65/0x110
[  272.173232]  ? cleanup_module+0xa80/0xa80 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel 3a00532f3f4af4a9eade753f86b0f8dd4e4e5698]
[  272.182617]  do_one_initcall+0x110/0x350
[  272.186543]  ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0
[  272.191682]  ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240
[  272.195954]  ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0
[  272.201093]  ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240
[  272.205365]  ? kernfs_link_sibling+0x105/0x130
[  272.209810]  ? kernfs_next_descendant_post+0x1c/0xa0
[  272.214773]  ? kernfs_activate+0x57/0x70
[  272.218699]  ? kernfs_add_one+0x118/0x160
[  272.222710]  ? __kernfs_create_file+0x71/0xa0
[  272.227069]  ? sysfs_add_bin_file_mode_ns+0xd6/0x110
[  272.232033]  ? internal_create_group+0x453/0x4a0
[  272.236651]  ? __vunmap_range_noflush+0x214/0x2d0
[  272.241355]  ? __free_frozen_pages+0x1dc/0x420
[  272.245799]  ? free_vmap_area_noflush+0x10a/0x1c0
[  272.250505]  ? load_module+0x1509/0x16f0
[  272.254431]  do_init_module+0x60/0x230
[  272.258181]  __se_sys_finit_module+0x27a/0x370
[  272.262627]  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0
[  272.266206]  ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0
[  272.269956]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90
[  272.274836]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
[  272.279887] RIP: 0033:0x7b9309168d39
[  272.283466] Code: 5b 41 5c 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d af 40 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 8
[  272.302210] RSP: 002b:00007fff50f1a288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[  272.309774] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000058bf9b50f6d0 RCX: 00007b9309168d39
[  272.316905] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000058bf6c103a77 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  272.324036] RBP: 00007fff50f1a2e0 R08: 00007fff50f19218 R09: 0000000021ec4150
[  272.331166] R10: 000058bf9b50f7f0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  272.338296] R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000058bf6c103a77
[  272.345428]  </TASK>
[  272.347617] Modules linked in: i2c_cros_ec_tunnel(+)
[  272.364585] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03

Returning -EPROBE_DEFER will allow the device to be bound once the
controller is bound, in the case of built-in drivers.

Fixes: 9d230c9 ("i2c: ChromeOS EC tunnel driver")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit d2f5819 upstream.

ktest recently reported crashes while running several buffered io tests
with __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook() at the top of the crash call stack.
The signature indicates an invalid address dereference with low bits of
slab->obj_exts being set. The bits were outside of the range used by
page_memcg_data_flags and objext_flags and hence were not masked out
by slab_obj_exts() when obtaining the pointer stored in slab->obj_exts.
The typical crash log looks like this:

00510 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
00510 Mem abort info:
00510   ESR = 0x0000000096000045
00510   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
00510   SET = 0, FnV = 0
00510   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
00510   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
00510 Data abort info:
00510   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045, ISS2 = 0x00000000
00510   CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
00510   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
00510 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000104175000
00510 [0000000000000010] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
00510 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000045 [#1]  SMP
00510 Modules linked in:
00510 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 7692 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-ktest-g189e17946605 #19327 NONE
00510 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
00510 pstate: 20001005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--)
00510 pc : __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190
00510 lr : __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310
00510 sp : ffffff80c87df6c0
00510 x29: ffffff80c87df6c0 x28: 000000000013d1ff x27: 000000000013d200
00510 x26: ffffff80c87df9e0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001
00510 x23: ffffffc08041953c x22: 000000000000004c x21: ffffff80c0002180
00510 x20: fffffffec3120840 x19: ffffff80c4821000 x18: 0000000000000000
00510 x17: fffffffec3d02f00 x16: fffffffec3d02e00 x15: fffffffec3d00700
00510 x14: fffffffec3d00600 x13: 0000000000000200 x12: 0000000000000006
00510 x11: ffffffc080bb86c0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffc080201e58
00510 x8 : ffffff80c4821060 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000055555556
00510 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000010 x3 : 0000000000000060
00510 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc080f50cf8 x0 : ffffff80d801d000
00510 Call trace:
00510  __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190 (P)
00510  __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310
00510  __bch2_folio_create+0x5c/0xf8
00510  bch2_folio_create+0x2c/0x40
00510  bch2_readahead+0xc0/0x460
00510  read_pages+0x7c/0x230
00510  page_cache_ra_order+0x244/0x3a8
00510  page_cache_async_ra+0x124/0x170
00510  filemap_readahead.isra.0+0x58/0xa0
00510  filemap_get_pages+0x454/0x7b0
00510  filemap_read+0xdc/0x418
00510  bch2_read_iter+0x100/0x1b0
00510  vfs_read+0x214/0x300
00510  ksys_read+0x6c/0x108
00510  __arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30
00510  invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8
00510  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8
00510  el0_svc+0x18/0x58
00510  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130
00510  el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158
00510 Code: d5384100 f9401c01 b9401aa3 b40002e1 (f8227881)
00510 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
00510 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
00510 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
00510 Kernel Offset: disabled
00510 CPU features: 0x0000,000000e0,00000410,8240500b
00510 Memory Limit: none

Investigation indicates that these bits are already set when we allocate
slab page and are not zeroed out after allocation. We are not yet sure
why these crashes start happening only recently but regardless of the
reason, not initializing a field that gets used later is wrong. Fix it
by initializing slab->obj_exts during slab page allocation.

Fixes: 21c690a ("mm: introduce slabobj_ext to support slab object extensions")
Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit d54d610 upstream.

Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires
clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the
context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the
firmware, and this manipulation is not possible.

So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one
which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub
may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed
yet.

For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the
decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the
allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called
after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the
EFI stub.

Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support")
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # final submission
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit 366e77c upstream.

Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context
start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said
"All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2".

However, dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() are not protected from their
callers, causing such errors:

 do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 331 Comm: kworker/10:1H Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ ChimeraOS#4
 Workqueue: events_highpri dm_irq_work_func [amdgpu]
 pc ffff800003191eb0 ra ffff800003191e60 tp 9000000107a94000 sp 9000000107a975b0
 a0 9000000140ce4910 a1 0000000000000000 a2 9000000140ce49b0 a3 9000000140ce49a8
 a4 9000000140ce49a8 a5 0000000100000000 a6 0000000000000001 a7 9000000107a97660
 t0 ffff800003790000 t1 9000000140ce5000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000000
 t4 0000000000000004 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000
 t8 0000000100000000 u0 ffff8000031a3b9c s9 9000000130bc0000 s0 9000000132400000
 s1 9000000140ec0000 s2 9000000132400000 s3 9000000140ce0000 s4 90000000057f8b88
 s5 9000000140ec0000 s6 9000000140ce4910 s7 0000000000000001 s8 9000000130d45010
 ra: ffff800003191e60 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x40/0x1140 [amdgpu]
   ERA: ffff800003191eb0 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu]
  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
 ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0)
  PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S)
 Process kworker/10:1H (pid: 331, threadinfo=000000007bf9ddb0, task=00000000cc4ab9f3)
 Stack : 0000000100000000 0000043800000780 0000000100000001 0000000100000001
         0000000000000000 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000
         0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000000100000000
         0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000
         0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000132400000
         ffff800003408000 ffff800003408000 9000000132400000 9000000140ce0000
         9000000140ce0000 ffff800003193850 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000
         9000000132400000 9000000140ec0860 9000000140ec0738 0000000000000001
         90000001405e8000 9000000130bc0000 9000000140ec02a8 ffff8000031b5db8
         0000000000000000 0000043800000780 0000000000000003 ffff8000031b79cc
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<ffff800003191eb0>] dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff80000319384c>] dml21_validate+0xcc/0x520 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031b8948>] dc_validate_global_state+0x2e8/0x460 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e94034>] create_validate_stream_for_sink+0x3d4/0x420 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e940e4>] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x64/0x240 [amdgpu]
 [<900000000441d6b8>] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x38/0x80
 [<900000000441d824>] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0x124/0x3e0
 [<900000000441ddc0>] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2e0/0x620
 [<90000000044050dc>] drm_client_modeset_probe+0x23c/0x1780
 [<9000000004420384>] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x44/0x5a0
 [<9000000004403acc>] drm_client_dev_hotplug+0xcc/0x140
 [<ffff800002e9ab50>] handle_hpd_irq_helper+0x1b0/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
 [<90000000038f5da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300
 [<90000000038f6718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440
 [<9000000003901b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220
 [<90000000038b1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4

Unfortunately, protecting dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() out of DML2
causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them
with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside.

Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dongyan Qian <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit 4408b59 upstream.

Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context
start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said
"All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2".

However, dml21_copy() are not protected from their callers, causing such
errors:

 do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 240 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #1
 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
 pc ffff80000318bd2c ra ffff80000315750c tp 9000000105910000 sp 9000000105913810
 a0 0000000000000000 a1 0000000000000002 a2 900000013140d728 a3 900000013140d720
 a4 0000000000000000 a5 9000000131592d98 a6 0000000000017ae8 a7 00000000001312d0
 t0 9000000130751ff0 t1 ffff800003790000 t2 ffff800003790000 t3 9000000131592e28
 t4 000000000004c6a8 t5 00000000001b7740 t6 0000000000023e38 t7 0000000000249f00
 t8 0000000000000002 u0 0000000000000000 s9 900000012b010000 s0 9000000131400000
 s1 9000000130751fd8 s2 ffff800003408000 s3 9000000130752c78 s4 9000000131592da8
 s5 9000000131592120 s6 9000000130751ff0 s7 9000000131592e28 s8 9000000131400008
    ra: ffff80000315750c dml2_top_soc15_initialize_instance+0x20c/0x300 [amdgpu]
   ERA: ffff80000318bd2c mcg_dcn4_build_min_clock_table+0x14c/0x600 [amdgpu]
  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
 ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0)
  PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S)
 Process kworker/0:5 (pid: 240, threadinfo=00000000f1700428, task=0000000020d2e962)
 Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000130751fd8
         9000000131400000 ffff8000031574e0 9000000130751ff0 0000000000000000
         9000000131592e28 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
         0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 f9175936df5d7fd2
         900000012b00ff08 900000012b000000 ffff800003409000 ffff8000034a1780
         90000001019634c0 900000012b000010 90000001307beeb8 90000001306b0000
         0000000000000001 ffff8000031942b4 9000000130780000 90000001306c0000
         9000000130780000 ffff8000031c276c 900000012b044bd0 ffff800003408000
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<ffff80000318bd2c>] mcg_dcn4_build_min_clock_table+0x14c/0x600 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800003157508>] dml2_top_soc15_initialize_instance+0x208/0x300 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031942b0>] dml21_create_copy+0x30/0x60 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031c2768>] dc_state_create_copy+0x68/0xe0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e98ea0>] amdgpu_dm_init+0x8c0/0x2060 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e9a658>] dm_hw_init+0x18/0x60 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b0a738>] amdgpu_device_init+0x1938/0x27e0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b0ce80>] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x20/0xa0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b008f0>] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b0/0x580 [amdgpu]
 [<9000000003c7eae4>] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xc0
 [<90000000032f2b18>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x18/0x40
 [<90000000032f5da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300
 [<90000000032f6718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440
 [<9000000003301b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220
 [<90000000032b1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4

Unfortunately, protecting dml21_copy() out of DML2 causes "sleeping
function called from invalid context", so protect them with DC_FP_START()
and DC_FP_END() inside.

Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit 8ec0fbb upstream.

Fix an oops in ttm_bo_delayed_delete which results from dererencing a
dangling pointer:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1082 Comm: kworker/u65:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4-00267-g505460b44513-dirty torvalds#216
Hardware name: LENOVO 82N6/LNVNB161216, BIOS GKCN65WW 01/16/2024
Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]
RIP: 0010:dma_resv_iter_first_unlocked+0x55/0x290
Code: 31 f6 48 c7 c7 00 2b fa aa e8 97 bd 52 ff e8 a2 c1 53 00 5a 85 c0 74 48 e9 88 01 00 00 4c 89 63 20 4d 85 e4 0f 84 30 01 00 00 <41> 8b 44 24 10 c6 43 2c 01 48 89 df 89 43 28 e8 97 fd ff ff 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffffbf9383473d60 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffbf9383473d88 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffbf9383473d78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
R13: ffffa003bbf78580 R14: ffffa003a6728040 R15: 00000000000383cc
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa00991c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000758348024dd0 CR3: 000000012c259000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26
 ? die_addr+0x3d/0x70
 ? exc_general_protection+0x159/0x460
 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
 ? dma_resv_iter_first_unlocked+0x55/0x290
 dma_resv_wait_timeout+0x56/0x100
 ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x69/0xb0 [ttm]
 process_one_work+0x217/0x5c0
 worker_thread+0x1c8/0x3d0
 ? apply_wqattrs_cleanup.part.0+0xc0/0xc0
 kthread+0x10b/0x240
 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x140/0x140
 ret_from_fork+0x40/0x70
 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x140/0x140
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>

The cause of this is:

- drm_prime_gem_destroy calls dma_buf_put(dma_buf) which releases the
  reference to the shared dma_buf. The reference count is 0, so the
  dma_buf is destroyed, which in turn decrements the corresponding
  amdgpu_bo reference count to 0, and the amdgpu_bo is destroyed -
  calling drm_gem_object_release then dma_resv_fini (which destroys the
  reservation object), then finally freeing the amdgpu_bo.

- nouveau_bo obj->bo.base.resv is now a dangling pointer to the memory
  formerly allocated to the amdgpu_bo.

- nouveau_gem_object_del calls ttm_bo_put(&nvbo->bo) which calls
  ttm_bo_release, which schedules ttm_bo_delayed_delete.

- ttm_bo_delayed_delete runs and dereferences the dangling resv pointer,
  resulting in a general protection fault.

Fix this by moving the drm_prime_gem_destroy call from
nouveau_gem_object_del to nouveau_bo_del_ttm. This ensures that it will
be run after ttm_bo_delayed_delete.

Signed-off-by: Chris Bainbridge <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Fixes: 22b33e8 ("nouveau: add PRIME support")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3937
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
commit afcdf51 upstream.

Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context
start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said
"All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2".

However, dml2_init()/dml21_init() are not protected from their callers,
causing such errors:

 do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 239 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #2
 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
 pc ffff80000319de80 ra ffff80000319de5c tp 900000010575c000 sp 900000010575f840
 a0 0000000000000000 a1 900000012f210130 a2 900000012f000000 a3 ffff80000357e268
 a4 ffff80000357e260 a5 900000012ea52cf0 a6 0000000400000004 a7 0000012c00001388
 t0 00001900000015e0 t1 ffff80000379d000 t2 0000000010624dd3 t3 0000006400000014
 t4 00000000000003e8 t5 0000005000000018 t6 0000000000000020 t7 0000000f00000064
 t8 000000000000002f u0 5f5e9200f8901912 s9 900000012d380010 s0 900000012ea51fd8
 s1 900000012f000000 s2 9000000109296000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000001fd8
 s5 0000000000000001 s6 ffff800003415000 s7 900000012d390000 s8 ffff800003211f80
    ra: ffff80000319de5c dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x3c/0x960 [amdgpu]
   ERA: ffff80000319de80 dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu]
  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
 ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0)
  PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S)
 Process kworker/0:5 (pid: 239, threadinfo=00000000927eadc6, task=000000008fd31682)
 Stack : 00040dc000003164 0000000000000001 900000012f210130 900000012eabeeb8
         900000012f000000 ffff80000319fe48 900000012f210000 900000012f210130
         900000012f000000 900000012eabeeb8 0000000000000001 ffff8000031a0064
         900000010575f9f0 900000012f210130 900000012eac0000 900000012ea80000
         900000012f000000 ffff8000031cefc4 900000010575f9f0 ffff8000035859c0
         ffff800003414000 900000010575fa78 900000012f000000 ffff8000031b4c50
         0000000000000000 9000000101c9d700 9000000109c40000 5f5e9200f8901912
         900000012d3c4bd0 900000012d3c5000 ffff8000034aed18 900000012d380010
         900000012d3c4bd0 ffff800003414000 900000012d380000 ffff800002ea49dc
         0000000000000001 900000012d3c6000 00000000ffffe423 0000000000010000
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<ffff80000319de80>] dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff80000319fe44>] dml21_init+0xa4/0x280 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031a0060>] dml21_create+0x40/0x80 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031cefc0>] dc_state_create+0x100/0x160 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031b4c4c>] dc_create+0x44c/0x640 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002ea49d8>] amdgpu_dm_init+0x3f8/0x2060 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002ea6658>] dm_hw_init+0x18/0x60 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b16738>] amdgpu_device_init+0x1938/0x27e0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b18e80>] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x20/0xa0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b0c8f0>] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b0/0x580 [amdgpu]
 [<900000000448eae4>] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xc0
 [<9000000003b02b18>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x18/0x40
 [<9000000003b05da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300
 [<9000000003b06718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440
 [<9000000003b11b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220
 [<9000000003ac1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4

Unfortunately, protecting dml2_init()/dml21_init() out of DML2 causes
"sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with
DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside.

Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1b04495 ]

Syzkaller reports a bug as follows:

Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x18b00e at process virtual address 0x20ffd000
Memory failure: 0x18b00e: dirty swapcache page still referenced by 2 users
Memory failure: 0x18b00e: recovery action for dirty swapcache page: Failed
page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x20ffd pfn:0x18b00e
memcg:ffff0000dd6d9000
anon flags: 0x5ffffe00482011(locked|dirty|arch_1|swapbacked|hwpoison|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
raw: 005ffffe00482011 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff0000e232a7c9
raw: 0000000000020ffd 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff ffff0000dd6d9000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:184!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.6.0-gcb097e7de84e ChimeraOS#3
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
lr : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
sp : ffff800087f37340
x29: ffff800087f37340 x28: fffffc00052c0380 x27: ffff800087f37780
x26: ffff800087f37490 x25: ffff800087f37c78 x24: ffff800087f377a0
x23: ffff800087f37c50 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fffffc00052c03b4
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: fffffc00052c0380 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 296f696c6f662865 x16: 7461646f7470755f x15: 747365745f6f696c
x14: 6f6621284f494c4f x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600036d8b97b
x11: 1fffe00036d8b97a x10: ffff600036d8b97a x9 : dfff800000000000
x8 : 00009fffc9274686 x7 : ffff0001b6c5cbd3 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0000c25896c0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000c25896c0 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
 add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158
 shrink_folio_list+0x12ac/0x2648
 shrink_inactive_list+0x318/0x948
 shrink_lruvec+0x450/0x720
 shrink_node_memcgs+0x280/0x4a8
 shrink_node+0x128/0x978
 balance_pgdat+0x4f0/0xb20
 kswapd+0x228/0x438
 kthread+0x214/0x230
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

I can reproduce this issue with the following steps:

1) When a dirty swapcache page is isolated by reclaim process and the
   page isn't locked, inject memory failure for the page.
   me_swapcache_dirty() clears uptodate flag and tries to delete from lru,
   but fails.  Reclaim process will put the hwpoisoned page back to lru.

2) The process that maps the hwpoisoned page exits, the page is deleted
   the page will never be freed and will be in the lru forever.

3) If we trigger a reclaim again and tries to reclaim the page,
   add_to_swap() will trigger VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO due to the uptodate flag is
   cleared.

To fix it, skip the hwpoisoned page in shrink_folio_list().  Besides, the
hwpoison folio may not be unmapped by hwpoison_user_mappings() yet, unmap
it in shrink_folio_list(), otherwise the folio will fail to be unmaped by
hwpoison_user_mappings() since the folio isn't in lru list.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Nanyong Sun <[email protected]>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <stable@vger,kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit b0c26f4 ]

There was a bug report about a NULL pointer dereference in
__btrfs_add_free_space_zoned() that ultimately happens because a
conversion from the default metadata profile DUP to a RAID1 profile on two
disks.

The stack trace has the following signature:

  BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:__btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0
  RSP: 0018:ffffa236b6f3f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96c8132f3400 RCX: 0000000000000001
  RDX: 0000000010000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff96c8132f3410
  RBP: 0000000010000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff96c758f65a40 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000011aac0000000
  FS: 00007fdab1cb2900(0000) GS:ffff96e60ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 00000001a05ae000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
  ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x2f0
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
  ? __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0
  btrfs_add_free_space_async_trimmed+0x34/0x40
  btrfs_add_new_free_space+0x107/0x120
  btrfs_make_block_group+0x104/0x2b0
  btrfs_create_chunk+0x977/0xf20
  btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x174/0x510
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  btrfs_inc_block_group_ro+0x1b1/0x230
  btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x9e/0x410
  btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3f/0x130
  btrfs_balance+0x8ac/0x12b0
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x14c/0x3e0
  btrfs_ioctl+0x2686/0x2a80
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd2/0x120
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x11a/0x170
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3f0/0x450
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
  ? sysfs_emit+0xaf/0xc0
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? seq_read_iter+0x207/0x460
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? vfs_read+0x29c/0x370
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160
  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7fdab1e0ca6d
  RSP: 002b:00007ffeb2b60c80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdab1e0ca6d
  RDX: 00007ffeb2b60d80 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 00007ffeb2b60cd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 00007ffeb2b6343b R14: 00007ffeb2b60d80 R15: 0000000000000001
  </TASK>
  CR2: 0000000000000058
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The 1st line is the most interesting here:

 BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile

When a RAID1 block-group is created and a write pointer mismatch between
the disks in the RAID set is detected, btrfs sets the alloc_offset to the
length of the block group marking it as full. Afterwards the code expects
that a balance operation will evacuate the data in this block-group and
repair the problems.

But before this is possible, the new space of this block-group will be
accounted in the free space cache. But in __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned()
it is being checked if it is a initial creation of a block group and if
not a reclaim decision will be made. But the decision if a block-group's
free space accounting is done for an initial creation depends on if the
size of the added free space is the whole length of the block-group and
the allocation offset is 0.

But as btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info() sets the allocation offset to
the zone capacity (i.e. marking the block-group as full) this initial
decision is not met, and the space_info pointer in the 'struct
btrfs_block_group' has not yet been assigned.

Fail creation of the block group and rely on manual user intervention to
re-balance the filesystem.

Afterwards the filesystem can be unmounted, mounted in degraded mode and
the missing device can be removed after a full balance of the filesystem.

Reported-by: 西木野羰基 <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAB_b4sBhDe3tscz=duVyhc9hNE+gu=B8CrgLO152uMyanR8BEA@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: b1934cd ("btrfs: zoned: handle broken write pointer on zones")
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit d63527e ]

syzbot reported:

tipc: Node number set to 1055423674
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6017 Comm: kworker/3:5 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-syzkaller-00246-g900241a5cc15 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work
RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719
...
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007
R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 tipc_net_finalize+0x10b/0x180 net/tipc/net.c:140
 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238
 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
 worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
 </TASK>
...
RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719
...
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007
R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

There is a racing condition between workqueue created when enabling
bearer and another thread created when disabling bearer right after
that as follow:

enabling_bearer                          | disabling_bearer
---------------                          | ----------------
tipc_disc_timeout()                      |
{                                        | bearer_disable()
 ...                                     | {
 schedule_work(&tn->work);               |  tipc_mon_delete()
 ...                                     |  {
}                                        |   ...
                                         |   write_lock_bh(&mon->lock);
                                         |   mon->self = NULL;
                                         |   write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock);
                                         |   ...
                                         |  }
tipc_net_finalize_work()                 | }
{                                        |
 ...                                     |
 tipc_net_finalize()                     |
 {                                       |
  ...                                    |
  tipc_mon_reinit_self()                 |
  {                                      |
   ...                                   |
   write_lock_bh(&mon->lock);            |
   mon->self->addr = tipc_own_addr(net); |
   write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock);          |
   ...                                   |
  }                                      |
  ...                                    |
 }                                       |
 ...                                     |
}                                        |

'mon->self' is set to NULL in disabling_bearer thread and dereferenced
later in enabling_bearer thread.

This commit fixes this issue by validating 'mon->self' before assigning
node address to it.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 46cb01e ("tipc: update mon's self addr when node addr generated")
Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 285cec3 ]

syzbot reported a NULL pointer dereference in __generic_file_write_iter. [1]

Before the write operation is completed, the user executes ioctl[2] to clear
the compress flag of the file, which causes the is_compressed() judgment to
return 0, further causing the program to enter the wrong process and call the
wrong ops ntfs_aops_cmpr, which triggers the null pointer dereference of
write_begin.

Use inode lock to synchronize ioctl and write to avoid this case.

[1]
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x0000000086000006
  EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000011896d000
[0000000000000000] pgd=0800000118b44403, p4d=0800000118b44403, pud=0800000117517403, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6427 Comm: syz-executor347 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-g573067a5a685 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : 0x0
lr : generic_perform_write+0x29c/0x868 mm/filemap.c:4055
sp : ffff80009d4978a0
x29: ffff80009d4979c0 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff80009d497bc8
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff80009d497960 x24: ffff80008ba71c68
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000c655dac0 x21: 0000000000001000
x20: 000000000000000c x19: 1ffff00013a92f2c x18: ffff0000e183aa1c
x17: 0004060000000014 x16: ffff800083275834 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff0000c655dac0
x11: 0000000000ff0100 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff80009d497980 x4 : ffff80009d497960 x3 : 0000000000001000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000e183a928 x0 : ffff0000d60b0fc0
Call trace:
 0x0 (P)
 __generic_file_write_iter+0xfc/0x204 mm/filemap.c:4156
 ntfs_file_write_iter+0x54c/0x630 fs/ntfs3/file.c:1267
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x920/0xcf4 fs/read_write.c:679
 ksys_write+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:731
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:742 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:739 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:739
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762

[2]
ioctl$FS_IOC_SETFLAGS(r0, 0x40086602, &(0x7f00000000c0)=0x20)

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5d0bdc98770e6c55a0fd
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 461f24b ]

Intel Merrifield SoC uses these endpoints for tracing and they cannot
be re-allocated if being used because the side band flow control signals
are hard wired to certain endpoints:

• 1 High BW Bulk IN (IN#1) (RTIT)
• 1 1KB BW Bulk IN (IN#8) + 1 1KB BW Bulk OUT (Run Control) (OUT#8)

In device mode, since RTIT (EP#1) and EXI/RunControl (EP#8) uses
External Buffer Control (EBC) mode, these endpoints are to be mapped to
EBC mode (to be done by EXI target driver). Additionally TRB for RTIT
and EXI are maintained in STM (System Trace Module) unit and the EXI
target driver will as well configure the TRB location for EP #1 IN
and EP#8 (IN and OUT). Since STM/PTI and EXI hardware blocks manage
these endpoints and interface to OTG3 controller through EBC interface,
there is no need to enable any events (such as XferComplete etc)
for these end points.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ferry Toth <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 40cb48e ]

When testing a special config:

CONFIG_NETFS_SUPPORTS=y
CONFIG_PROC_FS=n

The system crashes with something like:

[    3.766197] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    3.766484] kernel BUG at mm/mempool.c:560!
[    3.766789] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[    3.767123] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W
[    3.767777] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[    3.767968] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
[    3.768523] RIP: 0010:mempool_alloc_slab.cold+0x17/0x19
[    3.768847] Code: 50 fe ff 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 93 95 13 00
[    3.769977] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013998 EFLAGS: 00010286
[    3.770315] RAX: 000000000000002f RBX: ffff888100ba8640 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    3.770749] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[    3.771217] RBP: 0000000000092880 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90000013828
[    3.771664] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000ffffffea R12: 0000000000092cc0
[    3.772117] R13: 0000000000000400 R14: ffff8881004b1620 R15: ffffea0004ef7e40
[    3.772554] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881b5f3c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    3.773061] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    3.773443] CR2: ffffffff830901b4 CR3: 0000000004296001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    3.773884] PKRU: 55555554
[    3.774058] Call Trace:
[    3.774232]  <TASK>
[    3.774371]  mempool_alloc_noprof+0x6a/0x190
[    3.774649]  ? _printk+0x57/0x80
[    3.774862]  netfs_alloc_request+0x85/0x2ce
[    3.775147]  netfs_readahead+0x28/0x170
[    3.775395]  read_pages+0x6c/0x350
[    3.775623]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.775928]  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1bd/0x2a0
[    3.776247]  filemap_get_pages+0x139/0x970
[    3.776510]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.776820]  filemap_read+0xf9/0x580
[    3.777054]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.777368]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.777674]  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
[    3.777929]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x19/0x70
[    3.778221]  ? netfs_start_io_read+0x19/0x70
[    3.778489]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.778800]  ? lock_acquired+0x1e6/0x450
[    3.779054]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    3.779379]  netfs_buffered_read_iter+0x57/0x80
[    3.779670]  __kernel_read+0x158/0x2c0
[    3.779927]  bprm_execve+0x300/0x7a0
[    3.780185]  kernel_execve+0x10c/0x140
[    3.780423]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[    3.780690]  kernel_init+0xd5/0x150
[    3.780910]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[    3.781156]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[    3.781414]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[    3.781677]  </TASK>
[    3.781823] Modules linked in:
[    3.782065] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is caused by the following error path in netfs_init():

        if (!proc_mkdir("fs/netfs", NULL))
                goto error_proc;

Fix this by adding ifdef in netfs_main(), so that /proc/fs/netfs is only
created with CONFIG_PROC_FS.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9b04461 ]

Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the
kernel:

[   31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan]
[   31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT
[   31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[   31.648970] Call trace:
[   31.649345]  show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
[   31.650960]  dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84
[   31.651559]  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[   31.652264]  panic+0x138/0x3b4
[   31.652812]  __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10
[   31.653540]  test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan]
[   31.654388]  init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan]
[   31.655077]  do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280
[   31.655680]  do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4

That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack:
400:   d5384108        mrs     x8, sp_el0
404:   f9426d08        ldr     x8, [x8, torvalds#1240]
408:   f85f83a9        ldur    x9, [x29, #-8]
40c:   eb09011f        cmp     x8, x9
410:   54000301        b.ne    470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154>  // b.any

As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables
as declared in the module:
        volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */
        volatile int arr[4];
        volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */

There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger
than the extra surrounding memory for protection.

So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4.
Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR()

Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
commit fee4d17 upstream.

Commit a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the
spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") added some additional CPUs to the
Spectre-BHB workaround, including some new arrays for designs that
require new 'k' values for the workaround to be effective.

Unfortunately, the new arrays omitted the sentinel entry and so
is_midr_in_range_list() will walk off the end when it doesn't find a
match. With UBSAN enabled, this leads to a crash during boot when
is_midr_in_range_list() is inlined (which was more common prior to
c8c2647 ("arm64: Make  _midr_in_range_list() an exported
function")):

 |  Internal error: aarch64 BRK: 00000000f2000001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 |  pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 |  pc : spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30
 |  lr : is_spectre_bhb_affected+0x170/0x190
 | [...]
 |  Call trace:
 |   spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30
 |   update_cpu_capabilities+0xc0/0x184
 |   init_cpu_features+0x188/0x1a4
 |   cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu+0x4c/0x60
 |   smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x38/0x54
 |   start_kernel+0x8c/0x478
 |   __primary_switched+0xc8/0xd4
 |  Code: 6b09011f 54000061 52801080 d65f03c0 (d4200020)
 |  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 |  Kernel panic - not syncing: aarch64 BRK: Fatal exception

Add the missing sentinel entries.

Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morse <[email protected]>
Cc: Doug Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Shameer Kolothum <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Fixes: a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
commit a3d8f0a upstream.

A BUG was reported as below when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and
try_verify_in_tasklet are enabled.
[  129.444685][  T934] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2421
[  129.444723][  T934] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 934, name: kworker/1:4
[  129.444740][  T934] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
[  129.444756][  T934] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[  129.444781][  T934] Preemption disabled at:
[  129.444789][  T934] [<ffffffd816231900>] shrink_work+0x21c/0x248
[  129.445167][  T934] kernel BUG at kernel/sched/walt/walt_debug.c:16!
[  129.445183][  T934] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[  129.445204][  T934] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0
[  129.447348][  T934] CPU: 1 PID: 934 Comm: kworker/1:4 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.6.56-android15-8-o-g6f82312b30b9-debug #1 1400000003000000474e5500b3187743670464e8
[  129.447362][  T934] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Parrot QRD, Alpha-M (DT)
[  129.447373][  T934] Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache shrink_work
[  129.447394][  T934] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[  129.447406][  T934] pc : android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug]
[  129.447435][  T934] lr : __traceiter_android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c
[  129.447451][  T934] sp : ffffffc0843dbc90
[  129.447459][  T934] x29: ffffffc0843dbc90 x28: ffffffffffffffff x27: 0000000000000c8b
[  129.447479][  T934] x26: 0000000000000040 x25: ffffff804b3d6260 x24: ffffffd816232b68
[  129.447497][  T934] x23: ffffff805171c5b4 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffd816231900
[  129.447517][  T934] x20: ffffff80306ba898 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc084159030
[  129.447535][  T934] x17: 00000000d2b5dd1f x16: 00000000d2b5dd1f x15: ffffffd816720358
[  129.447554][  T934] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff89ef978000 x12: 0000000000000003
[  129.447572][  T934] x11: ffffffd817a823c4 x10: 0000000000000202 x9 : 7e779c5735de9400
[  129.447591][  T934] x8 : ffffffd81560d004 x7 : 205b5d3938373434 x6 : ffffffd8167397c8
[  129.447610][  T934] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc0843db9e0
[  129.447629][  T934] x2 : 0000000000002f15 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[  129.447647][  T934] Call trace:
[  129.447655][  T934]  android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug 1400000003000000474e550080cce8a8a78606b6]
[  129.447681][  T934]  __might_resched+0x190/0x1a8
[  129.447694][  T934]  shrink_work+0x180/0x248
[  129.447706][  T934]  process_one_work+0x260/0x624
[  129.447718][  T934]  worker_thread+0x28c/0x454
[  129.447729][  T934]  kthread+0x118/0x158
[  129.447742][  T934]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[  129.447761][  T934] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? d2b5dd1f (d4210000)
[  129.447772][  T934] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

dm_bufio_lock will call spin_lock_bh when try_verify_in_tasklet
is enabled, and __scan will be called in atomic context.

Fixes: 7cd3267 ("dm bufio: remove dm_bufio_cond_resched()")
Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9cf7e13 ]

A vmemmap altmap is a device-provided region used to provide
backing storage for struct pages. For each namespace, the altmap
should belong to that same namespace. If the namespaces are
created unaligned, there is a chance that the section vmemmap
start address could also be unaligned. If the section vmemmap
start address is unaligned, the altmap page allocated from the
current namespace might be used by the previous namespace also.
During the free operation, since the altmap is shared between two
namespaces, the previous namespace may detect that the page does
not belong to its altmap and incorrectly assume that the page is a
normal page. It then attempts to free the normal page, which leads
to a kernel crash.

Kernel attempted to read user page (18) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000018
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000530c7c
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 32 PID: 2104 Comm: ndctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W
NIP:  c000000000530c7c LR: c000000000530e00 CTR: 0000000000007ffe
REGS: c000000015e57040 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G        W
MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 84482404
CFAR: c000000000530dfc DAR: 0000000000000018 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c000000000530e00 c000000015e572e0 c000000002c5cb00 c00c000101008040
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 000000000000001f
GPR08: 0000000000000005 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 0000000000002000
GPR12: c0000000001d2fb0 c0000060de6b0080 0000000000000000 c0000060dbf90020
GPR16: c00c000101008000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000000125b20f00
GPR20: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff c00c000101007fff
GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR28: 0000000004040201 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c00c000101008040
NIP [c000000000530c7c] get_pfnblock_flags_mask+0x7c/0xd0
LR [c000000000530e00] free_unref_page_prepare+0x130/0x4f0
Call Trace:
free_unref_page+0x50/0x1e0
free_reserved_page+0x40/0x68
free_vmemmap_pages+0x98/0xe0
remove_pte_table+0x164/0x1e8
remove_pmd_table+0x204/0x2c8
remove_pud_table+0x1c4/0x288
remove_pagetable+0x1c8/0x310
vmemmap_free+0x24/0x50
section_deactivate+0x28c/0x2a0
__remove_pages+0x84/0x110
arch_remove_memory+0x38/0x60
memunmap_pages+0x18c/0x3d0
devm_action_release+0x30/0x50
release_nodes+0x68/0x140
devres_release_group+0x100/0x190
dax_pmem_compat_release+0x44/0x80 [dax_pmem_compat]
device_for_each_child+0x8c/0x100
[dax_pmem_compat_remove+0x2c/0x50 [dax_pmem_compat]
nvdimm_bus_remove+0x78/0x140 [libnvdimm]
device_remove+0x70/0xd0

Another issue is that if there is no altmap, a PMD-sized vmemmap
page will be allocated from RAM, regardless of the alignment of
the section start address. If the section start address is not
aligned to the PMD size, a VM_BUG_ON will be triggered when
setting the PMD-sized page to page table.

In this patch, we are aligning the section vmemmap start address
to PAGE_SIZE. After alignment, the start address will not be
part of the current namespace, and a normal page will be allocated
for the vmemmap mapping of the current section. For the remaining
sections, altmaps will be allocated. During the free operation,
the normal page will be correctly freed.

In the same way, a PMD_SIZE vmemmap page will be allocated only if
the section start address is PMD_SIZE-aligned; otherwise, it will
fall back to a PAGE-sized vmemmap allocation.

Without this patch
==================
NS1 start               NS2 start
 _________________________________________________________
|         NS1               |            NS2              |
 ---------------------------------------------------------
| Altmap| Altmap | .....|Altmap| Altmap | ...........
|  NS1  |  NS1   |      | NS2  |  NS2   |

In the above scenario, NS1 and NS2 are two namespaces. The vmemmap
for NS1 comes from Altmap NS1, which belongs to NS1, and the
vmemmap for NS2 comes from Altmap NS2, which belongs to NS2.

The vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned, so Altmap NS2 is shared
by both NS1 and NS2. During the free operation in NS1, Altmap NS2
is not part of NS1's altmap, causing it to attempt to free an
invalid page.

With this patch
===============
NS1 start               NS2 start
 _________________________________________________________
|         NS1               |            NS2              |
 ---------------------------------------------------------
| Altmap| Altmap | .....| Normal | Altmap | Altmap |.......
|  NS1  |  NS1   |      |  Page  |  NS2   |  NS2   |

If the vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned then we are allocating
a normal page. NS1 and NS2 vmemmap will be freed correctly.

Fixes: 368a059 ("powerpc/book3s64/vmemmap: switch radix to use a different vmemmap handling function")
Co-developed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Donet Tom <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8f98ec2b442977c618f7256cec88eb17dde3f2b9.1741609795.git.donettom@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 8e4d3d8 ]

For some SPI flash memory operations, dummy bytes are not mandatory. For
example, in Winbond SPINAND flash memory devices, the `write_cache` and
`update_cache` operation variants have zero dummy bytes. Calculating the
duration for SPI memory operations with zero dummy bytes causes
a divide error when `ncycles` is calculated in the
spi_mem_calc_op_duration().

Add changes to skip the 'ncylcles' calculation for zero dummy bytes.

Following divide error is fixed by this change:

 Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
...

  ? do_trap+0xdb/0x100
  ? do_error_trap+0x75/0xb0
  ? spi_mem_calc_op_duration+0x56/0xb0
  ? exc_divide_error+0x3b/0x70
  ? spi_mem_calc_op_duration+0x56/0xb0
  ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1b/0x20
  ? spi_mem_calc_op_duration+0x56/0xb0
  ? spinand_select_op_variant+0xee/0x190 [spinand]
  spinand_match_and_init+0x13e/0x1a0 [spinand]
  spinand_manufacturer_match+0x6e/0xa0 [spinand]
  spinand_probe+0x357/0x7f0 [spinand]
  ? kernfs_activate+0x87/0xd0
  spi_mem_probe+0x7a/0xb0
  spi_probe+0x7d/0x130

Fixes: 226d6cb ("spi: spi-mem: Estimate the time taken by operations")
Suggested-by: Krishnamoorthi M <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Akshata MukundShetty <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Akshata MukundShetty <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
commit ab680dc upstream.

Fix deadlock in job submission and abort handling.
When a thread aborts currently executing jobs due to a fault,
it first locks the global lock protecting submitted_jobs (#1).

After the last job is destroyed, it proceeds to release the related context
and locks file_priv (#2). Meanwhile, in the job submission thread,
the file_priv lock (#2) is taken first, and then the submitted_jobs
lock (#1) is obtained when a job is added to the submitted jobs list.

       CPU0                            CPU1
       ----                    	       ----
  (for example due to a fault)         (jobs submissions keep coming)

  lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  ivpu_jobs_abort_all()
  job_destroy()
                                      lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2
                                      lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  file_priv_release()
  lock(&vdev->context_list_lock)
  lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2

This order of locking causes a deadlock. To resolve this issue,
change the order of locking in ivpu_job_submit().

Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]>
[ This backport required small adjustments to ivpu_job_submit(),
  which lacks support for explicit command queue creation added in 6.15.  ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 866bafa ]

There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed
in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process
freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because
the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation
to hang forever, blocking the write path.

Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting
the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the
zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> ChimeraOS#3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16){++++}-{0:0}:
        blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500
        blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0
        scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80
        sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470
        sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60
        blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0
        btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs]
        btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs]
        btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs]
        btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs]
        start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs]
        btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs]
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
        down_read+0x9b/0x470
        btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs]
        btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360
        btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
        lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
        __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
        wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
        bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
        del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
        sd_remove+0x85/0x130
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
        scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
        scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
        sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
        sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
        scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
        __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16);
                                lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem);
                                lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16);
   lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 5 locks held by modprobe/1110:
  #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0
  #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  ChimeraOS#3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)ChimeraOS#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  ChimeraOS#4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274
  check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650
  ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0
  ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10
  __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
  bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
  ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10
  ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510
  del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
  ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
  ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110
  sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
  scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
  scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
  sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
  ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
  sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
  scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
  __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
  ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0
  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8
 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> # 6.13+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 48c1d1b ]

[BUG]
There is a bug report that a syzbot reproducer can lead to the following
busy inode at unmount time:

  BTRFS info (device loop1): last unmount of filesystem 1680000e-3c1e-4c46-84b6-56bd3909af50
  VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of loop1 (btrfs)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 48168 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00471-g119009db2674 #2 PREEMPT(full)
  Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x2e9/0x390 fs/super.c:650
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1237
   btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2099
   deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473
   deactivate_super fs/super.c:506 [inline]
   deactivate_super+0xe2/0x100 fs/super.c:502
   cleanup_mnt+0x21f/0x440 fs/namespace.c:1435
   task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227
   resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x269/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:218
   do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>

[CAUSE]
When btrfs_alloc_path() failed, btrfs_iget() directly returned without
releasing the inode already allocated by btrfs_iget_locked().

This results the above busy inode and trigger the kernel BUG.

[FIX]
Fix it by calling iget_failed() if btrfs_alloc_path() failed.

If we hit error inside btrfs_read_locked_inode(), it will properly call
iget_failed(), so nothing to worry about.

Although the iget_failed() cleanup inside btrfs_read_locked_inode() is a
break of the normal error handling scheme, let's fix the obvious bug
and backport first, then rework the error handling later.

Reported-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 7c855e1 ("btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode()")
CC: [email protected] # 6.13+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
honjow pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 19, 2025
commit f1aff4b upstream.

The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv,
instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from
past the old_argv allocated memory.

Following BUG_ON was hit:
[    3.038929][    T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040!
[    3.039147][    T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
...
[    3.056489][    T1] Call trace:
[    3.056591][    T1]  __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P)
[    3.056773][    T1]  dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210
[    3.056942][    T1]  dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360
[    3.057132][    T1]  table_load+0x110/0x3ac
[    3.057292][    T1]  dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c
[    3.057457][    T1]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
[    3.057634][    T1]  invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c
[    3.057804][    T1]  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
[    3.057970][    T1]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[    3.058123][    T1]  el0_svc+0x50/0xac
[    3.058266][    T1]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4
[    3.058452][    T1]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4
[    3.058620][    T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000)
[    3.058897][    T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    3.059083][    T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception

Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was.

Fixes: 5a2a6c4 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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