[5.4] Track Steam patches #1

kakra · 2020-09-06T09:03:06Z

Download: https://github.com/kakra/linux/pull/1.patch

split the futex key setup from the queue locking and key reading. This is useful to support the setup of multiple keys at the same time, like what is done in futex_requeue() and what will be done for the FUTEX_WAIT_MULTIPLE command. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>

This is a new futex operation, called FUTEX_WAIT_MULTIPLE, which allows a thread to wait on several futexes at the same time, and be awoken by any of them. In a sense, it implements one of the features that was supported by pooling on the old FUTEX_FD interface. My use case for this operation lies in Wine, where we want to implement a similar interface available in Windows, used mainly for event handling. The wine folks have an implementation that uses eventfd, but it suffers from FD exhaustion (I was told they have application that go to the order of multi-milion FDs), and higher CPU utilization. In time, we are also proposing modifications to glibc and libpthread to make this feature available for Linux native multithreaded applications using libpthread, which can benefit from the behavior of waiting on any of a group of futexes. In particular, using futexes in our Wine use case reduced the CPU utilization by 4% for the game Beat Saber and by 1.5% for the game Shadow of Tomb Raider, both running over Proton (a wine based solution for Windows emulation), when compared to the eventfd interface. This implementation also doesn't rely of file descriptors, so it doesn't risk overflowing the resource. Technically, the existing FUTEX_WAIT implementation can be easily reworked by using do_futex_wait_multiple with a count of one, and I have a patch showing how it works. I'm not proposing it, since futex is such a tricky code, that I'd be more confortable to have FUTEX_WAIT_MULTIPLE running upstream for a couple development cycles, before considering modifying FUTEX_WAIT. From an implementation perspective, the futex list is passed as an array of (pointer,value,bitset) to the kernel, which will enqueue all of them and sleep if none was already triggered. It returns a hint of which futex caused the wake up event to userspace, but the hint doesn't guarantee that is the only futex triggered. Before calling the syscall again, userspace should traverse the list, trying to re-acquire any of the other futexes, to prevent an immediate -EWOULDBLOCK return code from the kernel. This was tested using three mechanisms: 1) By reimplementing FUTEX_WAIT in terms of FUTEX_WAIT_MULTIPLE and running the unmodified tools/testing/selftests/futex and a full linux distro on top of this kernel. 2) By an example code that exercises the FUTEX_WAIT_MULTIPLE path on a multi-threaded, event-handling setup. 3) By running the Wine fsync implementation and executing multi-threaded applications, in particular the modern games mentioned above, on top of this implementation. Signed-off-by: Zebediah Figura <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Noonan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Loup A. Griffais <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bd024e8 ] Although mmiowb() is concerned only with serialising MMIO writes occuring in contexts where a spinlock is held, the call to mmiowb_set_pending() from the MMIO write accessors can occur in preemptible contexts, such as during driver probe() functions where ordering between CPUs is not usually a concern, assuming that the task migration path provides the necessary ordering guarantees. Unfortunately, the default implementation of mmiowb_set_pending() is not preempt-safe, as it makes use of a a per-cpu variable to track its internal state. This has been reported to generate the following splat on riscv: | BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 | caller is regmap_mmio_write32le+0x1c/0x46 | CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3-hfu+ #1 | Call Trace: | walk_stackframe+0x0/0x7a | dump_stack+0x6e/0x88 | regmap_mmio_write32le+0x18/0x46 | check_preemption_disabled+0xa4/0xaa | regmap_mmio_write32le+0x18/0x46 | regmap_mmio_write+0x26/0x44 | regmap_write+0x28/0x48 | sifive_gpio_probe+0xc0/0x1da Although it's possible to fix the driver in this case, other splats have been seen from other drivers, including the infamous 8250 UART, and so it's better to address this problem in the mmiowb core itself. Fix mmiowb_set_pending() by using the raw_cpu_ptr() to get at the mmiowb state and then only updating the 'mmiowb_pending' field if we are not preemptible (i.e. we have a non-zero nesting count). Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]> Cc: Guo Ren <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Reported-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> Reported-by: Emil Renner Berthing <[email protected]> Tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit f4c23a1 upstream. I got null-ptr-deref in serial8250_start_tx(): [ 78.114630] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 78.123778] Mem abort info: [ 78.126560] ESR = 0x86000007 [ 78.129603] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 78.134891] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 78.137933] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 78.141064] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000027d41a8600 [ 78.147562] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000027893f0003, p4d=00000027893f0003, pud=00000027893f0003, pmd=00000027c9a20003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 78.160029] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP [ 78.164886] Modules linked in: sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce ses enclosure sg sbsa_gwdt ipmi_ssif spi_dw_mmio sch_fq_codel vhost_net tun vhost vhost_iotlb tap ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 ahci hisi_sas_v3_hw libahci hisi_sas_main libsas hns3 scsi_transport_sas hclge libata megaraid_sas ipmi_si hnae3 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvme nvme_core xt_sctp sctp libcrc32c dm_mod nbd [ 78.207383] CPU: 11 PID: 23258 Comm: null-ptr Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ torvalds#48 [ 78.214056] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B210.01 03/12/2020 [ 78.222888] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) [ 78.228435] pc : 0x0 [ 78.230618] lr : serial8250_start_tx+0x160/0x260 [ 78.235215] sp : ffff800062eefb80 [ 78.238517] x29: ffff800062eefb80 x28: 0000000000000fff [ 78.243807] x27: ffff800062eefd80 x26: ffff202fd83b3000 [ 78.249098] x25: ffff800062eefd80 x24: ffff202fd83b3000 [ 78.254388] x23: ffff002fc5e50be8 x22: 0000000000000002 [ 78.259679] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 78.264969] x19: ffffa688827eecc8 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 78.270259] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 78.275550] x15: ffffa68881bc67a8 x14: 00000000000002e6 [ 78.280841] x13: ffffa68881bc67a8 x12: 000000000000c539 [ 78.286131] x11: d37a6f4de9bd37a7 x10: ffffa68881cccff0 [ 78.291421] x9 : ffffa68881bc6000 x8 : ffffa688819daa88 [ 78.296711] x7 : ffffa688822a0f20 x6 : ffffa688819e0000 [ 78.302002] x5 : ffff800062eef9d0 x4 : ffffa68881e707a8 [ 78.307292] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002 [ 78.312582] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffa688827eecc8 [ 78.317873] Call trace: [ 78.320312] 0x0 [ 78.322147] __uart_start.isra.9+0x64/0x78 [ 78.326229] uart_start+0xb8/0x1c8 [ 78.329620] uart_flush_chars+0x24/0x30 [ 78.333442] n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x7b0/0xc30 [ 78.338128] n_tty_receive_buf+0x44/0x2c8 [ 78.342122] tty_ioctl+0x348/0x11f8 [ 78.345599] ksys_ioctl+0xd8/0xf8 [ 78.348903] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x2c/0xc8 [ 78.352812] el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x88/0x1b0 [ 78.357583] do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0 [ 78.360887] el0_sync_handler+0x14c/0x1d0 [ 78.364880] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 [ 78.368185] Code: bad PC value SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is not defined on each arch, if it's not defined, serial8250_set_defaults() won't be called in serial8250_isa_init_ports(), so the p->serial_in pointer won't be initialized, and it leads a null-ptr-deref. Fix this problem by calling serial8250_set_defaults() after init uart port. Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 594cced upstream. khugepaged has to drop mmap lock several times while collapsing a page. The situation can change while the lock is dropped and we need to re-validate that the VMA is still in place and the PMD is still subject for collapse. But we miss one corner case: while collapsing an anonymous pages the VMA could be replaced with file VMA. If the file VMA doesn't have any private pages we get NULL pointer dereference: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] anon_vma_lock_write include/linux/rmap.h:120 [inline] collapse_huge_page mm/khugepaged.c:1110 [inline] khugepaged_scan_pmd mm/khugepaged.c:1349 [inline] khugepaged_scan_mm_slot mm/khugepaged.c:2110 [inline] khugepaged_do_scan mm/khugepaged.c:2193 [inline] khugepaged+0x3bba/0x5a10 mm/khugepaged.c:2238 The fix is to make sure that the VMA is anonymous in hugepage_vma_revalidate(). The helper is only used for collapsing anonymous pages. Fixes: 99cb0db ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem) FS") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit e0b3e0b upstream. The !ATOMIC_IOMAP version of io_maping_init_wc will always return success, even when the ioremap fails. Since the ATOMIC_IOMAP version returns NULL when the init fails, and callers check for a NULL return on error this is unexpected. During a device probe, where the ioremap failed, a crash can look like this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000210000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: RIP: 0010:fill_page_dma [i915] gen8_ppgtt_create [i915] i915_ppgtt_create [i915] intel_gt_init [i915] i915_gem_init [i915] i915_driver_probe [i915] pci_device_probe really_probe driver_probe_device The remap failure occurred much earlier in the probe. If it had been propagated, the driver would have exited with an error. Return NULL on ioremap failure. [[email protected]: detect ioremap_wc() errors earlier] Fixes: cafaf14 ("io-mapping: Always create a struct to hold metadata about the io-mapping") Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 2bbcaae upstream. In ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb interface number is assumed to be 0. usb_ifnum_to_if(urb->dev, 0) But it isn't always true. The case reported by syzbot: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected] usb 2-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd usb 2-1: config 1 has an invalid interface number: 2 but max is 0 usb 2-1: config 1 has no interface number 0 usb 2-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0cf3, idProduct=9271, bcdDevice= 1.08 usb 2-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000015: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Call Trace __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x29a/0x550 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1650 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1716 dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966 call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786 __do_softirq+0x21e/0x950 kernel/softirq.c:292 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline] irq_exit+0x178/0x1a0 kernel/softirq.c:413 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:546 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x141/0x540 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1146 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829 Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: Viktor Jägersküpper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit fde9f39 upstream. This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially, this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens: 1. Non-blocking commit #1 is requested w/ a new dm_state #1 and is deferred to the workqueue. 2. Non-blocking commit #2 is requested w/ a new dm_state #2 and is deferred to the workqueue. 3. Commit #2 starts before commit #1, dm_state #1 is used in the commit_tail and commit #2 completes, freeing dm_state #1. 4. Commit #1 starts after commit #2 completes, uses the freed dm_state 1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context. Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found, removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates. This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa6 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is dereferenced). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383 Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates") Reported-by: Duncan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 350a632 ] After the cited commit, function 'mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_vlan' started to acquire esw->state_lock. However, esw is not defined for VF devices, hence attempting to set vf VLANID on a VF dev will cause a kernel panic. Fix it by moving up the (redundant) esw validation from function '__mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_vlan' since the rest of the callers now have and use a valid esw. For example with vf device eth4: # ip link set dev eth4 vf 0 vlan 0 Trace of the panic: [ 411.409842] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000011b8 [ 411.449745] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 411.452348] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 411.454938] PGD 80000004189c9067 P4D 80000004189c9067 PUD 41899a067 PMD 0 [ 411.458382] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 411.460268] CPU: 4 PID: 5711 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4_for_upstream_min_debug_2020_07_08_22_04 #1 [ 411.462447] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 411.464158] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x4e/0x940 [ 411.464928] Code: fd 41 54 49 89 f4 41 52 53 89 d3 48 83 ec 70 44 8b 1d ee 03 b0 01 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 45 85 db 75 0a <48> 3b 7f 60 0f 85 7e 05 00 00 49 8d 45 68 41 56 41 b8 01 00 00 00 [ 411.467678] RSP: 0018:ffff88841fcd74b0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 411.468562] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 411.469715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000001158 [ 411.470812] RBP: ffff88841fcd7550 R08: ffffffffa00fa1ce R09: 0000000000000000 [ 411.471835] R10: ffff88841fcd7570 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 411.472862] R13: 0000000000001158 R14: ffffffffa00fa1ce R15: 0000000000000000 [ 411.474004] FS: 00007faee7ca6b80(0000) GS:ffff88846fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 411.475237] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 411.476129] CR2: 00000000000011b8 CR3: 000000041909c006 CR4: 0000000000360ea0 [ 411.477260] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 411.478340] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 411.479332] Call Trace: [ 411.479760] ? __nla_validate_parse.part.6+0x57/0x8f0 [ 411.482825] ? mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_vlan+0x3e/0xa0 [mlx5_core] [ 411.483804] mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_vlan+0x3e/0xa0 [mlx5_core] [ 411.484733] mlx5e_set_vf_vlan+0x41/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 411.485545] do_setlink+0x613/0x1000 [ 411.486165] __rtnl_newlink+0x53d/0x8c0 [ 411.486791] ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 [ 411.487429] ? __lock_acquire+0x8fe/0x1eb0 [ 411.488085] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 [ 411.488998] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x16d/0x2d0 [ 411.489759] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 [ 411.490357] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x24e/0x450 [ 411.490978] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x92/0x3d0 [ 411.491631] ? validate_linkmsg+0x330/0x330 [ 411.492262] netlink_rcv_skb+0x47/0x110 [ 411.492852] netlink_unicast+0x1ac/0x270 [ 411.493551] netlink_sendmsg+0x336/0x450 [ 411.494209] sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40 [ 411.494779] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1dd/0x1f0 [ 411.495378] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90 [ 411.496082] ___sys_sendmsg+0x87/0xd0 [ 411.496683] ? lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3a0 [ 411.497322] ? lru_cache_add+0x5/0x170 [ 411.497944] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 [ 411.498568] ? handle_mm_fault+0xe46/0x18c0 [ 411.499205] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 411.499784] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 411.500341] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x2e0 [ 411.500938] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 411.501609] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 [ 411.502350] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 411.503093] RIP: 0033:0x7faee73b85a7 [ 411.503654] Code: Bad RIP value. Fixes: 0e18134 ("net/mlx5e: Eswitch, use state_lock to synchronize vlan change") Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3cab8c6 ] It appears that not disabling a PCI device on .shutdown may lead to a Hardware Error with particular (perhaps buggy) BIOS versions: mlx4_en: eth0: Close port called mlx4_en 0000:04:00.0: removed PHC reboot: Restarting system {1}[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 1 {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: fatal {1}[Hardware Error]: Error 0, type: fatal {1}[Hardware Error]: section_type: PCIe error {1}[Hardware Error]: port_type: 4, root port {1}[Hardware Error]: version: 1.16 {1}[Hardware Error]: command: 0x4010, status: 0x0143 {1}[Hardware Error]: device_id: 0000:00:02.2 {1}[Hardware Error]: slot: 0 {1}[Hardware Error]: secondary_bus: 0x04 {1}[Hardware Error]: vendor_id: 0x8086, device_id: 0x2f06 {1}[Hardware Error]: class_code: 000604 {1}[Hardware Error]: bridge: secondary_status: 0x2000, control: 0x0003 {1}[Hardware Error]: aer_uncor_status: 0x00100000, aer_uncor_mask: 0x00000000 {1}[Hardware Error]: aer_uncor_severity: 0x00062030 {1}[Hardware Error]: TLP Header: 40000018 040000ff 791f4080 00000000 [hw error repeats] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal hardware error! CPU: 0 PID: 2189 Comm: reboot Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.6.x-blabla #1 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 05/05/2017 Fix the mlx4 driver. This is a very similar problem to what had been fixed in: commit 0d98ba8 ("scsi: hpsa: disable device during shutdown") to address https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199779. Fixes: 2ba5fbd ("net/mlx4_core: Handle AER flow properly") Reported-by: Jake Lawrence <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a2ec905 ] Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes. This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below. This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt. With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary. general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic torvalds#41-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth] Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75 RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28 RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 Call Trace: process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth] hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth] hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth] hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 kthread+0x104/0x140 Fixes: c215e93 ("Bluetooth: Process extended ADV report event") Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Reported-by: Balakrishna Godavarthi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e24c644 ] I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 torvalds#13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bad8e64 ] On commit 6ac9311 ("blktrace: use existing disk debugfs directory") merged on v4.12 Omar fixed the original blktrace code for request-based drivers (multiqueue). This however left in place a possible crash, if you happen to abuse blktrace while racing to remove / add a device. We used to use asynchronous removal of the request_queue, and with that the issue was easier to reproduce. Now that we have reverted to synchronous removal of the request_queue, the issue is still possible to reproduce, its however just a bit more difficult. We essentially run two instances of break-blktrace which add/remove a loop device, and setup a blktrace and just never tear the blktrace down. We do this twice in parallel. This is easily reproduced with the script run_0004.sh from break-blktrace [0]. We can end up with two types of panics each reflecting where we race, one a failed blktrace setup: [ 252.426751] debugfs: Directory 'loop0' with parent 'block' already present! [ 252.432265] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0 [ 252.436592] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 252.439822] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 252.442967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 252.444656] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 252.446972] CPU: 10 PID: 1153 Comm: break-blktrace Tainted: G E 5.7.0-rc2-next-20200420+ torvalds#164 [ 252.452673] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 252.456343] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x15/0x40 [ 252.458146] Code: eb ca e8 ae 22 8d ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 fd e8 52 db ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 55 00 75 0f 48 8b 04 25 c0 8b 01 00 48 89 45 08 5d [ 252.463638] RSP: 0018:ffffa626415abcc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 252.464950] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff958c25f0f5c0 RCX: ffffff8100000000 [ 252.466727] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffff8100000000 RDI: 00000000000000a0 [ 252.468482] RBP: 00000000000000a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 252.470014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff958d1f9227ff R12: 0000000000000000 [ 252.471473] R13: ffff958c25ea5380 R14: ffffffff8cce15f1 R15: 00000000000000a0 [ 252.473346] FS: 00007f2e69dee540(0000) GS:ffff958c2fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 252.475225] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 252.476267] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000427d10004 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 [ 252.477526] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 252.478776] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 252.479866] Call Trace: [ 252.480322] simple_recursive_removal+0x4e/0x2e0 [ 252.481078] ? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60 [ 252.481725] ? relay_destroy_buf+0x77/0xb0 [ 252.482662] debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 [ 252.483518] blk_remove_buf_file_callback+0x5/0x10 [ 252.484328] relay_close_buf+0x2e/0x60 [ 252.484930] relay_open+0x1ce/0x2c0 [ 252.485520] do_blk_trace_setup+0x14f/0x2b0 [ 252.486187] __blk_trace_setup+0x54/0xb0 [ 252.486803] blk_trace_ioctl+0x90/0x140 [ 252.487423] ? do_sys_openat2+0x1ab/0x2d0 [ 252.488053] blkdev_ioctl+0x4d/0x260 [ 252.488636] block_ioctl+0x39/0x40 [ 252.489139] ksys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 [ 252.489675] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 252.490380] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x180 [ 252.491032] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 And the other on the device removal: [ 128.528940] debugfs: Directory 'loop0' with parent 'block' already present! [ 128.615325] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a0 [ 128.619537] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 128.622700] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 128.625842] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 128.627585] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 128.629871] CPU: 12 PID: 544 Comm: break-blktrace Tainted: G E 5.7.0-rc2-next-20200420+ torvalds#164 [ 128.635595] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 128.640471] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x15/0x40 [ 128.643041] Code: eb ca e8 ae 22 8d ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 fd e8 52 db ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 55 00 75 0f 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 8b 01 00 48 89 45 08 5d [ 128.650180] RSP: 0018:ffffa9c3c05ebd78 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 128.651820] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ae9a6370240 RCX: ffffff8100000000 [ 128.653942] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffff8100000000 RDI: 00000000000000a0 [ 128.655720] RBP: 00000000000000a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffff8ae9afd2d3d0 [ 128.657400] R10: 0000000000000056 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 128.659099] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000000000a0 [ 128.660500] FS: 00007febfd995540(0000) GS:ffff8ae9afd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 128.662204] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 128.663426] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 0000000420042003 CR4: 0000000000360ee0 [ 128.664776] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 128.666022] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 128.667282] Call Trace: [ 128.667801] simple_recursive_removal+0x4e/0x2e0 [ 128.668663] ? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60 [ 128.669368] debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 [ 128.669985] blk_trace_free+0xd/0x50 [ 128.670593] __blk_trace_remove+0x27/0x40 [ 128.671274] blk_trace_shutdown+0x30/0x40 [ 128.671935] blk_release_queue+0x95/0xf0 [ 128.672589] kobject_put+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 128.673188] disk_release+0xa2/0xc0 [ 128.673786] device_release+0x28/0x80 [ 128.674376] kobject_put+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 128.674915] loop_remove+0x39/0x50 [loop] [ 128.675511] loop_control_ioctl+0x113/0x130 [loop] [ 128.676199] ksys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 [ 128.676708] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 128.677274] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x180 [ 128.677823] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The common theme here is: debugfs: Directory 'loop0' with parent 'block' already present This crash happens because of how blktrace uses the debugfs directory where it places its files. Upon init we always create the same directory which would be needed by blktrace but we only do this for make_request drivers (multiqueue) block drivers. When you race a removal of these devices with a blktrace setup you end up in a situation where the make_request recursive debugfs removal will sweep away the blktrace files and then later blktrace will also try to remove individual dentries which are already NULL. The inverse is also possible and hence the two types of use after frees. We don't create the block debugfs directory on init for these types of block devices: * request-based block driver block devices * every possible partition * scsi-generic And so, this race should in theory only be possible with make_request drivers. We can fix the UAF by simply re-using the debugfs directory for make_request drivers (multiqueue) and only creating the ephemeral directory for the other type of block devices. The new clarifications on relying on the q->blk_trace_mutex *and* also checking for q->blk_trace *prior* to processing a blktrace ensures the debugfs directories are only created if no possible directory name clashes are possible. This goes tested with: o nvme partitions o ISCSI with tgt, and blktracing against scsi-generic with: o block o tape o cdrom o media changer o blktests This patch is part of the work which disputes the severity of CVE-2019-19770 which shows this issue is not a core debugfs issue, but a misuse of debugfs within blktace. Fixes: 6ac9311 ("blktrace: use existing disk debugfs directory") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Cc: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Cc: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <[email protected]> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]> Cc: yu kuai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0f1a30 ] When, at probe time, an SCMI communication failure inhibits the capacity to query power domains states, such domains should be skipped. Registering partially initialized SCMI power domains with genpd will causes kernel panic. arm-scmi timed out in resp(caller: scmi_power_state_get+0xa4/0xd0) scmi-power-domain scmi_dev.2: failed to get state for domain 9 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000009f3691000 [0000000000000000] pgd=00000009f1ca0003, p4d=00000009f1ca0003, pud=00000009f35ea003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 2 PID: 381 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1-00011-gebd118c2cca8 #2 Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Jan 3 2020 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) pc : of_genpd_add_provider_onecell+0x98/0x1f8 lr : of_genpd_add_provider_onecell+0x48/0x1f8 Call trace: of_genpd_add_provider_onecell+0x98/0x1f8 scmi_pm_domain_probe+0x174/0x1e8 scmi_dev_probe+0x90/0xe0 really_probe+0xe4/0x448 driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x168 device_driver_attach+0x7c/0x88 bind_store+0xe8/0x128 drv_attr_store+0x2c/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x60 kernfs_fop_write+0x114/0x230 __vfs_write+0x24/0x50 vfs_write+0xbc/0x1e0 ksys_write+0x70/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0x94/0x160 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x98 el0_sync_handler+0x148/0x1a8 el0_sync+0x158/0x180 Do not register any power domain that failed to be queried with genpd. Fixes: 898216c ("firmware: arm_scmi: add device power domain support using genpd") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 60f80d6 ] reproduction steps: ``` node1 # mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb node2 # mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb node1 # mdadm -G /dev/md0 -b none mdadm: failed to remove clustered bitmap. node1 # mdadm -S --scan ^C <==== mdadm hung & kernel crash ``` kernel stack: ``` [ 335.230657] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 335.230848] Call Trace: [ 335.230873] ? unlock_all_bitmaps+0x5/0x70 [md_cluster] [ 335.230886] unlock_all_bitmaps+0x3d/0x70 [md_cluster] [ 335.230899] leave+0x10f/0x190 [md_cluster] [ 335.230932] ? md_super_wait+0x93/0xa0 [md_mod] [ 335.230947] ? leave+0x5/0x190 [md_cluster] [ 335.230973] md_cluster_stop+0x1a/0x30 [md_mod] [ 335.230999] md_bitmap_free+0x142/0x150 [md_mod] [ 335.231013] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40 [ 335.231025] ? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30 [ 335.231056] __md_stop+0x1c/0xa0 [md_mod] [ 335.231083] do_md_stop+0x160/0x580 [md_mod] [ 335.231119] ? 0xffffffffc05fb078 [ 335.231148] md_ioctl+0xa04/0x1930 [md_mod] [ 335.231165] ? filename_lookup+0xf2/0x190 [ 335.231179] blkdev_ioctl+0x93c/0xa10 [ 335.231205] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40 [ 335.231214] ? __check_object_size+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 335.231224] block_ioctl+0x39/0x40 [ 335.231243] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x680 [ 335.231253] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 [ 335.231261] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 335.231271] do_syscall_64+0x65/0x1f0 [ 335.231278] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ``` Signed-off-by: Zhao Heming <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab0db04 ] When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3cbdc8d ] Adding an msm_gem_object object to the inactive_list before completing its initialization is a bad idea because shrinker may pick it up from the inactive_list. Fix this by making sure that the initialization is complete before moving the msm_obj object to the inactive list. This patch fixes the below error: [10027.553044] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000068 [10027.573305] Mem abort info: [10027.590160] ESR = 0x96000006 [10027.597905] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [10027.614430] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [10027.624427] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [10027.632722] Data abort info: [10027.638039] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 [10027.647459] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [10027.654345] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001e3a6a000 [10027.672681] [0000000000000068] pgd=0000000198c31003, pud=0000000198c31003, pmd=0000000000000000 [10027.693900] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [10027.738261] CPU: 3 PID: 214 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G S 5.4.40 #1 [10027.745766] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SC7180 IDP (DT) [10027.752472] pstate: 80c00009 (Nzcv daif +PAN +UAO) [10027.757409] pc : mutex_is_locked+0x14/0x2c [10027.761626] lr : msm_gem_shrinker_count+0x70/0xec [10027.766454] sp : ffffffc011323ad0 [10027.769867] x29: ffffffc011323ad0 x28: ffffffe677e4b878 [10027.775324] x27: 0000000000000cc0 x26: 0000000000000000 [10027.780783] x25: ffffff817114a708 x24: 0000000000000008 [10027.786242] x23: ffffff8023ab7170 x22: 0000000000000001 [10027.791701] x21: ffffff817114a080 x20: 0000000000000119 [10027.797160] x19: 0000000000000068 x18: 00000000000003bc [10027.802621] x17: 0000000004a34210 x16: 00000000000000c0 [10027.808083] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [10027.813542] x13: ffffffe677e0a3c0 x12: 0000000000000000 [10027.819000] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffff8174b94340 [10027.824461] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [10027.829919] x7 : 00000000000001fc x6 : ffffffc011323c88 [10027.835373] x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : ffffffc011323d80 [10027.840832] x3 : ffffffff0477b348 x2 : 0000000000000000 [10027.846290] x1 : ffffffc011323b68 x0 : 0000000000000068 [10027.851748] Call trace: [10027.854264] mutex_is_locked+0x14/0x2c [10027.858121] msm_gem_shrinker_count+0x70/0xec [10027.862603] shrink_slab+0xc0/0x4b4 [10027.866187] shrink_node+0x4a8/0x818 [10027.869860] kswapd+0x624/0x890 [10027.873097] kthread+0x11c/0x12c [10027.876424] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [10027.880102] Code: f9000bf3 910003fd aa0003f3 d503201f (f9400268) [10027.886362] ---[ end trace df5849a1a3543251 ]--- [10027.891518] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Signed-off-by: Akhil P Oommen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6eeb997 ] This driver may take a regular spinlock when a raw spinlock (irq_desc->lock) is already taken which results in the following lockdep splat: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 5.7.0-rc7 #1 Not tainted ----------------------------- swapper/0/0 is trying to lock: ffffff800303b798 (&chip_data->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: mtk_sysirq_set_type+0x48/0xc0 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: ffffff800302ee68 (&desc->request_mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x8a0 #1: ffffff800302ecf0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xe4/0x8a0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7 #1 Hardware name: Pumpkin MT8516 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x180 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xd0/0x118 __lock_acquire+0x8c8/0x2270 lock_acquire+0xf8/0x470 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x78 mtk_sysirq_set_type+0x48/0xc0 __irq_set_trigger+0x58/0x170 __setup_irq+0x420/0x8a0 request_threaded_irq+0xd8/0x190 timer_of_init+0x1e8/0x2c4 mtk_gpt_init+0x5c/0x1dc timer_probe+0x74/0xf4 time_init+0x14/0x44 start_kernel+0x394/0x4f0 Replace the spinlock_t with raw_spinlock_t to avoid this warning. Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a3b3c2 ] A large process running on a heavily loaded system can encounter the following RCU CPU stall warning: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 3-....: (20998 ticks this GP) idle=4ea/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=556558/556558 fqs=5190 (t=21013 jiffies g=1005461 q=132576) NMI backtrace for cpu 3 CPU: 3 PID: 501900 Comm: aio-free-ring-w Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.9-108_fbk12_rc3_3858_gb83b75af7909 #1 Hardware name: Wiwynn HoneyBadger/PantherPlus, BIOS HBM6.71 02/03/2016 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x46/0x60 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold.3+0x13/0x50 ? lapic_can_unplug_cpu.cold.27+0x34/0x34 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0xba/0xca rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x99/0xc7 rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold.87+0x1aa/0x397 ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x60/0x60 update_process_times+0x28/0x60 tick_sched_timer+0x37/0x70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0xfe/0x270 hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x210 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x120 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_free+0x223/0x300 Code: 88 00 00 00 0f 85 ca 00 00 00 41 8b 55 18 31 f6 f7 da 41 f6 45 0a 02 40 0f 94 c6 83 c6 05 9c 41 5e fa e8 a0 a7 01 00 41 56 9d <49> 8b 47 08 a8 03 0f 85 87 00 00 00 65 48 ff 08 e9 3d fe ff ff 65 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e8e3da8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: ffff88861b9de960 RCX: 0000000000000030 RDX: fffffffffffe41e8 RSI: 000060777fe3a100 RDI: 000000000001be18 RBP: ffffea00186e7780 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffffffffffffff R10: ffff88861b9dea28 R11: ffff88887ffde000 R12: ffffffff81230a1f R13: ffff888854684dc0 R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff8888547dbc00 ? remove_vma+0x4f/0x60 remove_vma+0x4f/0x60 exit_mmap+0xd6/0x160 mmput+0x4a/0x110 do_exit+0x278/0xae0 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d3/0x2b0 ? handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1c0 do_group_exit+0x3a/0xa0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x42/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 And on a PREEMPT=n kernel, the "while (vma)" loop in exit_mmap() can run for a very long time given a large process. This commit therefore adds a cond_resched() to this loop, providing RCU any needed quiescent states. Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 33a06f1 ] When gadget registration fails, one should not call usb_del_gadget_udc(). Ensure this by setting gadget->udc to NULL. Also in case of a failure there is no need to disable low-level hardware, so return immiedetly instead of jumping to error_init label. This fixes the following kernel NULL ptr dereference on gadget failure (can be easily triggered with g_mass_storage without any module parameters): dwc2 12480000.hsotg: dwc2_check_params: Invalid parameter besl=1 dwc2 12480000.hsotg: dwc2_check_params: Invalid parameter g_np_tx_fifo_size=1024 dwc2 12480000.hsotg: EPs: 16, dedicated fifos, 7808 entries in SPRAM Mass Storage Function, version: 2009/09/11 LUN: removable file: (no medium) no file given for LUN0 g_mass_storage 12480000.hsotg: failed to start g_mass_storage: -22 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000104 pgd = (ptrval) [00000104] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 805 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc5 #3133 Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree) Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func PC is at usb_del_gadget_udc+0x38/0xc4 LR is at __mutex_lock+0x31c/0xb18 ... Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 12, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) Stack: (0xef121db0 to 0xef122000) ... [<c076bf3c>] (usb_del_gadget_udc) from [<c0726bec>] (dwc2_hsotg_remove+0x10/0x20) [<c0726bec>] (dwc2_hsotg_remove) from [<c0711208>] (dwc2_driver_probe+0x57c/0x69c) [<c0711208>] (dwc2_driver_probe) from [<c06247c0>] (platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xa4) [<c06247c0>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c0621df4>] (really_probe+0x200/0x48c) [<c0621df4>] (really_probe) from [<c06221e8>] (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1fc) [<c06221e8>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c061fcd4>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x74/0xb8) [<c061fcd4>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c0621b54>] (__device_attach+0xd4/0x16c) [<c0621b54>] (__device_attach) from [<c0620c98>] (bus_probe_device+0x88/0x90) [<c0620c98>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c06211b0>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x3c/0xd0) [<c06211b0>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c0149280>] (process_one_work+0x234/0x7dc) [<c0149280>] (process_one_work) from [<c014986c>] (worker_thread+0x44/0x51c) [<c014986c>] (worker_thread) from [<c0150b1c>] (kthread+0x158/0x1a0) [<c0150b1c>] (kthread) from [<c0100114>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) Exception stack(0xef121fb0 to 0xef121ff8) ... ---[ end trace 9724c2fc7cc9c982 ]--- While fixing this also fix the double call to dwc2_lowlevel_hw_disable() if dr_mode is set to USB_DR_MODE_PERIPHERAL. In such case low-level hardware is already disabled before calling usb_add_gadget_udc(). That function correctly preserves low-level hardware state, there is no need for the second unconditional dwc2_lowlevel_hw_disable() call. Fixes: 207324a ("usb: dwc2: Postponed gadget registration to the udc class driver") Acked-by: Minas Harutyunyan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit edd7dd2 ] Booting Linux with a Conner CP3200 drive attached to the MESH SCSI bus results in EH measures and a panic: [ 25.499838] mesh: configured for synchronous 5 MB/s [ 25.787154] mesh: performing initial bus reset... [ 29.867115] scsi host0: MESH [ 29.929527] mesh: target 0 synchronous at 3.6 MB/s [ 29.998763] scsi 0:0:0:0: Direct-Access CONNER CP3200-200mb-3.5 4040 PQ: 0 ANSI: 1 CCS [ 31.989975] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] 415872 512-byte logical blocks: (213 MB/203 MiB) [ 32.070975] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write Protect is off [ 32.137197] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Mode Sense: 5b 00 00 08 [ 32.209661] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA [ 32.332708] sda: [mac] sda1 sda2 sda3 [ 32.417733] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Attached SCSI disk ... snip ... [ 76.687067] mesh_abort((ptrval)) [ 76.743606] mesh: state at (ptrval), regs at (ptrval), dma at (ptrval) [ 76.810798] ct=6000 seq=86 bs=4017 fc= 0 exc= 0 err= 0 im= 7 int= 0 sp=85 [ 76.880720] dma stat=84e0 cmdptr=1f73d000 [ 76.941387] phase=4 msgphase=0 conn_tgt=0 data_ptr=24576 [ 77.005567] dma_st=1 dma_ct=0 n_msgout=0 [ 77.065456] target 0: req=(ptrval) goes_out=0 saved_ptr=0 [ 77.130512] mesh_abort((ptrval)) [ 77.187670] mesh: state at (ptrval), regs at (ptrval), dma at (ptrval) [ 77.255594] ct=6000 seq=86 bs=4017 fc= 0 exc= 0 err= 0 im= 7 int= 0 sp=85 [ 77.325778] dma stat=84e0 cmdptr=1f73d000 [ 77.387239] phase=4 msgphase=0 conn_tgt=0 data_ptr=24576 [ 77.453665] dma_st=1 dma_ct=0 n_msgout=0 [ 77.515900] target 0: req=(ptrval) goes_out=0 saved_ptr=0 [ 77.582902] mesh_host_reset [ 88.187083] Kernel panic - not syncing: mesh: double DMA start ! [ 88.254510] CPU: 0 PID: 358 Comm: scsi_eh_0 Not tainted 5.6.13-pmac #1 [ 88.323302] Call Trace: [ 88.378854] [e16ddc58] [c0027080] panic+0x13c/0x308 (unreliable) [ 88.446221] [e16ddcb8] [c02b2478] mesh_start.part.12+0x130/0x414 [ 88.513298] [e16ddcf8] [c02b2fc8] mesh_queue+0x54/0x70 [ 88.577097] [e16ddd18] [c02a1848] scsi_send_eh_cmnd+0x374/0x384 [ 88.643476] [e16dddc8] [c02a1938] scsi_eh_tur+0x5c/0xb8 [ 88.707878] [e16dddf8] [c02a1ab] scsi_eh_test_devices+0x124/0x178 [ 88.775663] [e16dde28] [c02a2094] scsi_eh_ready_devs+0x588/0x8a8 [ 88.843124] [e16dde98] [c02a31d8] scsi_error_handler+0x344/0x520 [ 88.910697] [e16ddf08] [c00409c8] kthread+0xe4/0xe8 [ 88.975166] [e16ddf38] [c000f234] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 89.044112] Rebooting in 180 seconds.. In theory, a panic can happen after a bus or host reset with dma_started flag set. Fix this by halting the DMA before reinitializing the host. Don't assume that ms->current_req is set when halt_dma() is invoked as it may not hold for bus or host reset. BTW, this particular Conner drive can be made to work by inhibiting disconnect/reselect with 'mesh.resel_targets=0'. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3952bc691e150a7128b29120999b6092071b039a.1595460351.git.fthain@telegraphics.com.au Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Stan Johnson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1055b7 ] A VF's mailbox mutex is not getting initialized by nicvf_probe() until after it is first used. And such usage is resulting in... [ 28.270927] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 28.270934] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) [ 28.270980] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 675 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:938 __mutex_lock+0xdac/0x12f0 [ 28.270985] Modules linked in: ast(+) nicvf(+) i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm nicpf(+) drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ixgbe(+) sg thunder_bgx mdio i2c_thunderx mdio_thunder thunder_xcv mdio_cavium dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 28.271064] CPU: 9 PID: 675 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.18.0+ #1 [ 28.271070] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R120-T34-00/MT30-GS2-00, BIOS F02 08/06/2019 [ 28.271078] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 28.271086] pc : __mutex_lock+0xdac/0x12f0 [ 28.271092] lr : __mutex_lock+0xdac/0x12f0 [ 28.271097] sp : ffff800d42146fb0 [ 28.271103] x29: ffff800d42146fb0 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 28.271113] x27: ffff800d24361180 x26: dfff200000000000 [ 28.271122] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000002 [ 28.271132] x23: ffff20001597cc80 x22: ffff2000139e9848 [ 28.271141] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 1ffff001a8428e0c [ 28.271151] x19: ffff200015d5d000 x18: 1ffff001ae0f2184 [ 28.271160] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 28.271170] x15: ffff800d70790c38 x14: ffff20001597c000 [ 28.271179] x13: ffff20001597cc80 x12: ffff040002b2f779 [ 28.271189] x11: 1fffe40002b2f778 x10: ffff040002b2f778 [ 28.271199] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 00000000f1f1f1f1 [ 28.271208] x7 : 00000000f2f2f2f2 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 28.271217] x5 : 1ffff001ae0f2186 x4 : 1fffe400027eb03c [ 28.271227] x3 : dfff200000000000 x2 : ffff1001a8428dbe [ 28.271237] x1 : c87fdfac7ea11d00 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 28.271246] Call trace: [ 28.271254] __mutex_lock+0xdac/0x12f0 [ 28.271261] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x50 [ 28.271297] nicvf_send_msg_to_pf+0x40/0x3a0 [nicvf] [ 28.271316] nicvf_register_misc_interrupt+0x20c/0x328 [nicvf] [ 28.271334] nicvf_probe+0x508/0xda0 [nicvf] [ 28.271344] local_pci_probe+0xc4/0x180 [ 28.271352] pci_device_probe+0x3ec/0x528 [ 28.271363] driver_probe_device+0x21c/0xb98 [ 28.271371] device_driver_attach+0xe8/0x120 [ 28.271379] __driver_attach+0xe0/0x2a0 [ 28.271386] bus_for_each_dev+0x118/0x190 [ 28.271394] driver_attach+0x48/0x60 [ 28.271401] bus_add_driver+0x328/0x558 [ 28.271409] driver_register+0x148/0x398 [ 28.271416] __pci_register_driver+0x14c/0x1b0 [ 28.271437] nicvf_init_module+0x54/0x10000 [nicvf] [ 28.271447] do_one_initcall+0x18c/0xc18 [ 28.271457] do_init_module+0x18c/0x618 [ 28.271464] load_module+0x2bc0/0x4088 [ 28.271472] __se_sys_finit_module+0x110/0x188 [ 28.271479] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x70/0xa0 [ 28.271490] el0_svc_handler+0x15c/0x380 [ 28.271496] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 28.271502] irq event stamp: 52649 [ 28.271513] hardirqs last enabled at (52649): [<ffff200011b4d790>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xc0/0xd8 [ 28.271522] hardirqs last disabled at (52648): [<ffff200011b4d3c4>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3c/0xf0 [ 28.271530] softirqs last enabled at (52330): [<ffff200010082af4>] __do_softirq+0xacc/0x117c [ 28.271540] softirqs last disabled at (52313): [<ffff20001019b354>] irq_exit+0x3cc/0x500 [ 28.271545] ---[ end trace a9b90324c8a0d4ee ]--- This problem is resolved by moving the call to mutex_init() up earlier in nicvf_probe(). Fixes: 609ea65 ("net: thunderx: add mutex to protect mailbox from concurrent calls for same VF") Signed-off-by: Dean Nelson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 18c850f upstream. There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 01d01ca upstream. We are currently getting this lockdep splat in btrfs/161: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ mount/678048 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9b769f15b6e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 btrfs_init_new_device+0x2d2/0x1240 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x2d20 [btrfs] ksys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by mount/678048: #0: ffff9b75ff5fb0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#63/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffffffc0c2fbc8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x54/0x800 [btrfs] #2: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 678048 Comm: mount Tainted: G E 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20 ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x14/0x40 ? __module_address+0x28/0xf0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? static_obj+0x4f/0x60 ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x43/0x200 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x84/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? kfree+0x2b5/0x310 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] ? cred_has_capability+0x7c/0x120 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 ? memdup_user+0x4e/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because btrfs_read_chunk_tree() can come upon DEV_EXTENT's and then read the device, which takes the device_list_mutex. The device_list_mutex needs to be taken before the chunk_mutex, so this is a problem. We only really need the chunk mutex around adding the chunk, so move the mutex around read_one_chunk. An argument could be made that we don't even need the chunk_mutex here as it's during mount, and we are protected by various other locks. However we already have special rules for ->device_list_mutex, and I'd rather not have another special case for ->chunk_mutex. CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a47bd78 upstream. Dave hit this splat during testing btrfs/078: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc6-default+ torvalds#1191 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/75 is trying to acquire lock: ffffa040e9d04ff8 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8b0c8040 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x25/0x30 __kmalloc_track_caller+0x49/0x330 kstrdup+0x2e/0x60 __kernfs_new_node.constprop.0+0x44/0x250 kernfs_new_node+0x25/0x50 kernfs_create_link+0x34/0xa0 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x65/0x100 [btrfs] btrfs_init_new_device+0x44c/0x12b0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xc3c/0x25c0 [btrfs] ksys_ioctl+0x68/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x137/0x3e0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0xb44/0xfb0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x350 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x143/0x7a0 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x15f/0x310 [btrfs] push_leaf_right+0x150/0x240 [btrfs] split_leaf+0x3cd/0x6d0 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xd14/0xf70 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xc0 [btrfs] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xb2/0x840 [btrfs] btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x10e/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0x2f9/0x650 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x22c/0x600 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x98/0xa20 validate_chain+0xa8c/0x2a00 __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3bf/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x175/0x420 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x192/0x600 balance_pgdat+0x31f/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x510 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> &fs_info->chunk_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/75: #0: ffffffff8b0c8040 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8b0b50b8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x54/0x2e0 #2: ffffa040e057c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#26){++++}-{3:3}, at: trylock_super+0x16/0x50 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 75 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6-default+ torvalds#1191 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x16f/0x190 check_prev_add+0x98/0xa20 validate_chain+0xa8c/0x2a00 __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] ? __lock_acquire+0x56f/0xaa0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xa3/0x440 ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x138/0x560 [btrfs] ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x2fe/0x560 [btrfs] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x310 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3bf/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x175/0x420 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x192/0x600 balance_pgdat+0x31f/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x510 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x50 ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 ? balance_pgdat+0x750/0x750 kthread+0x137/0x150 ? kthread_stop+0x2a0/0x2a0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is because we're holding the chunk_mutex while adding this device and adding its sysfs entries. We actually hold different locks in different places when calling this function, the dev_replace semaphore for instance in dev replace, so instead of moving this call around simply wrap it's operations in NOFS. CC: [email protected] # 4.14+ Reported-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…ression commit 1e6e238 upstream. [BUG] There is a bug report of NULL pointer dereference caused in compress_file_extent(): Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_delalloc_helper [btrfs] NIP [c008000006dd4d34] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x75c/0x8a0 [btrfs] LR [c008000006dd4d1c] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x744/0x8a0 [btrfs] Call Trace: [c000000c69093b00] [c008000006dd4d1c] compress_file_range.constprop.41+0x744/0x8a0 [btrfs] (unreliable) [c000000c69093bd0] [c008000006dd4ebc] async_cow_start+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [c000000c69093c10] [c008000006e14824] normal_work_helper+0xdc/0x598 [btrfs] [c000000c69093c80] [c0000000001608c0] process_one_work+0x2c0/0x5b0 [c000000c69093d10] [c000000000160c38] worker_thread+0x88/0x660 [c000000c69093db0] [c00000000016b55c] kthread+0x1ac/0x1c0 [c000000c69093e20] [c00000000000b660] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x7c ---[ end trace f16954aa20d822f6 ]--- [CAUSE] For the following execution route of compress_file_range(), it's possible to hit NULL pointer dereference: compress_file_extent() |- pages = NULL; |- start = async_chunk->start = 0; |- end = async_chunk = 4095; |- nr_pages = 1; |- inode_need_compress() == false; <<< Possible, see later explanation | Now, we have nr_pages = 1, pages = NULL |- cont: |- ret = cow_file_range_inline(); |- if (ret <= 0) { |- for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { |- WARN_ON(pages[i]->mapping); <<< Crash To enter above call execution branch, we need the following race: Thread 1 (chattr) | Thread 2 (writeback) --------------------------+------------------------------ | btrfs_run_delalloc_range | |- inode_need_compress = true | |- cow_file_range_async() btrfs_ioctl_set_flag() | |- binode_flags |= | BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS | | compress_file_range() | |- inode_need_compress = false | |- nr_page = 1 while pages = NULL | | Then hit the crash [FIX] This patch will fix it by checking @pages before doing accessing it. This patch is only designed as a hot fix and easy to backport. More elegant fix may make btrfs only check inode_need_compress() once to avoid such race, but that would be another story. Reported-by: Luciano Chavez <[email protected]> Fixes: 4d3a800 ("btrfs: merge nr_pages input and output parameter in compress_pages") CC: [email protected] # 4.14.x: cecc8d9: btrfs: Move free_pages_out label in inline extent handling branch in compress_file_range CC: [email protected] # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit c92d30e upstream. In commit f3b98e3 ("media: vsp1: Provide support for extended command pools"), the vsp pointer used for referencing the VSP1 device structure from a command pool during vsp1_dl_ext_cmd_pool_destroy() was not populated. Correctly assign the pointer to prevent the following null-pointer-dereference when removing the device: [*] h3ulcb-kf #> echo fea28000.vsp > /sys/bus/platform/devices/fea28000.vsp/driver/unbind Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000028 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000007318be000 [0000000000000028] pgd=00000007333a1003, pud=00000007333a6003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 486 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-arm64-renesas-00118-ge644645abf47 torvalds#185 Hardware name: Renesas H3ULCB Kingfisher board based on r8a77951 (DT) pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : vsp1_dlm_destroy+0xe4/0x11c lr : vsp1_dlm_destroy+0xc8/0x11c sp : ffff800012963b60 x29: ffff800012963b60 x28: ffff0006f83fc440 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff0006f5e13e80 x25: ffff0006f5e13ed0 x24: ffff0006f5e13ed0 x23: ffff0006f5e13ed0 x22: dead000000000122 x21: ffff0006f5e3a080 x20: ffff0006f5df2938 x19: ffff0006f5df2980 x18: 0000000000000003 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000016 x15: 0000000000000003 x14: 00000000000393c0 x13: ffff800011a5ec18 x12: ffff800011d8d000 x11: ffff0006f83fcc68 x10: ffff800011a53d70 x9 : ffff8000111f3000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000210d00 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff800010872e60 x4 : 0000000000000004 x3 : 0000000078068000 x2 : ffff800012781000 x1 : 0000000000002c00 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: vsp1_dlm_destroy+0xe4/0x11c vsp1_wpf_destroy+0x10/0x20 vsp1_entity_destroy+0x24/0x4c vsp1_destroy_entities+0x54/0x130 vsp1_remove+0x1c/0x40 platform_drv_remove+0x28/0x50 __device_release_driver+0x178/0x220 device_driver_detach+0x44/0xc0 unbind_store+0xe0/0x104 drv_attr_store+0x20/0x30 sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x70 kernfs_fop_write+0x148/0x230 __vfs_write+0x18/0x40 vfs_write+0xdc/0x1c4 ksys_write+0x68/0xf0 __arm64_sys_write+0x18/0x20 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x170 do_el0_svc+0x20/0x80 el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x1b0 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 Code: b40000c2 f9403a60 d2800084 a9400663 (f9401400) ---[ end trace 3875369841fb288a ]--- Fixes: f3b98e3 ("media: vsp1: Provide support for extended command pools") Cc: [email protected] # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kieran Bingham <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb36e29 ] When watchdog device is being registered, it calls misc_register that makes watchdog available for systemd to open. This is a data race scenario, because when device is open it may still have device struct not initialized - this in turn causes a crash. This patch moves device initialization before misc_register call and it solves the problem printed below. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:612 kobject_get+0x50/0x54 kobject: '(null)' ((ptrval)): is not initialized, yet kobject_get() is being called. Modules linked in: k2_reset_status(O) davinci_wdt(+) sfn_platform_hwbcn(O) fsmddg_sfn(O) clk_misc_mmap(O) clk_sw_bcn(O) fsp_reset(O) cma_mod(O) slave_sup_notif(O) fpga_master(O) latency(O+) evnotify(O) enable_arm_pmu(O) xge(O) rio_mport_cdev br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvrd_checksum(O) ipv6 CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G O 4.19.113-g2579778-fsm4_k2 #1 Hardware name: Keystone [<c02126c4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c020da94>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [<c020da94>] (show_stack) from [<c07f87d8>] (dump_stack+0xb4/0xe8) [<c07f87d8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0221f70>] (__warn+0xfc/0x114) [<c0221f70>] (__warn) from [<c0221fd8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x50/0x74) [<c0221fd8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c07fd394>] (kobject_get+0x50/0x54) [<c07fd394>] (kobject_get) from [<c0602ce8>] (get_device+0x1c/0x24) [<c0602ce8>] (get_device) from [<c06961e0>] (watchdog_open+0x90/0xf0) [<c06961e0>] (watchdog_open) from [<c06001dc>] (misc_open+0x130/0x17c) [<c06001dc>] (misc_open) from [<c0388228>] (chrdev_open+0xec/0x1a8) [<c0388228>] (chrdev_open) from [<c037fa98>] (do_dentry_open+0x204/0x3cc) [<c037fa98>] (do_dentry_open) from [<c0391e2c>] (path_openat+0x330/0x1148) [<c0391e2c>] (path_openat) from [<c0394518>] (do_filp_open+0x78/0xec) [<c0394518>] (do_filp_open) from [<c0381100>] (do_sys_open+0x130/0x1f4) [<c0381100>] (do_sys_open) from [<c0201000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28) Exception stack(0xd2ceffa8 to 0xd2cefff0) ffa0: b6f69968 00000000 ffffff9c b6ebd210 000a0001 00000000 ffc0: b6f69968 00000000 00000000 00000142 fffffff ffffffff 00b65530 bed7bb78 ffe0: 00000142 bed7ba70 b6cc2503 b6cc41d6 ---[ end trace 7b16eb105513974f ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at lib/refcount.c:153 kobject_get+0x24/0x54 refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: k2_reset_status(O) davinci_wdt(+) sfn_platform_hwbcn(O) fsmddg_sfn(O) clk_misc_mmap(O) clk_sw_bcn(O) fsp_reset(O) cma_mod(O) slave_sup_notif(O) fpga_master(O) latency(O+) evnotify(O) enable_arm_pmu(O) xge(O) rio_mport_cdev br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvrd_checksum(O) ipv6 CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G W O 4.19.113-g2579778-fsm4_k2 #1 Hardware name: Keystone [<c02126c4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c020da94>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [<c020da94>] (show_stack) from [<c07f87d8>] (dump_stack+0xb4/0xe8) [<c07f87d8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0221f70>] (__warn+0xfc/0x114) [<c0221f70>] (__warn) from [<c0221fd8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x50/0x74) [<c0221fd8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c07fd368>] (kobject_get+0x24/0x54) [<c07fd368>] (kobject_get) from [<c0602ce8>] (get_device+0x1c/0x24) [<c0602ce8>] (get_device) from [<c06961e0>] (watchdog_open+0x90/0xf0) [<c06961e0>] (watchdog_open) from [<c06001dc>] (misc_open+0x130/0x17c) [<c06001dc>] (misc_open) from [<c0388228>] (chrdev_open+0xec/0x1a8) [<c0388228>] (chrdev_open) from [<c037fa98>] (do_dentry_open+0x204/0x3cc) [<c037fa98>] (do_dentry_open) from [<c0391e2c>] (path_openat+0x330/0x1148) [<c0391e2c>] (path_openat) from [<c0394518>] (do_filp_open+0x78/0xec) [<c0394518>] (do_filp_open) from [<c0381100>] (do_sys_open+0x130/0x1f4) [<c0381100>] (do_sys_open) from [<c0201000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28) Exception stack(0xd2ceffa8 to 0xd2cefff0) ffa0: b6f69968 00000000 ffffff9c b6ebd210 000a0001 00000000 ffc0: b6f69968 00000000 00000000 00000142 fffffff ffffffff 00b65530 bed7bb78 ffe0: 00000142 bed7ba70 b6cc2503 b6cc41d6 ---[ end trace 7b16eb1055139750 ]--- Fixes: 72139df ("watchdog: Fix the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev") Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Sobota <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b6d4a7 ] Fix the reason of crashing system by add waiting time to finish reset recovery process before starting remove driver procedure. Now VSI is releasing if VSI is not in reset recovery mode. Without this fix it was possible to start remove driver if other processing command need reset recovery procedure which resulted in null pointer dereference. VSI used by the ethtool process has been cleared by remove driver process. [ 6731.508665] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 6731.508668] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 6731.508670] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 6731.508671] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 6731.508674] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 6731.508679] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2R/S2600WT2R, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0021.032120170601 03/21/2017 [ 6731.508694] RIP: 0010:i40e_down+0x252/0x310 [i40e] [ 6731.508696] Code: c7 78 de fa c0 e8 61 02 3a c1 66 83 bb f6 0c 00 00 00 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 45 31 e4 45 31 ff eb 03 41 89 c7 48 8b 83 98 0c 00 00 <4a> 8b 3c 20 e8 a5 79 02 00 48 83 bb d0 0c 00 00 00 74 10 48 8b 83 [ 6731.508698] RSP: 0018:ffffb75ac7b3faf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6731.508700] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9c9874bd5000 RCX: 0000000000000007 [ 6731.508701] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff9c987f4d9780 [ 6731.508703] RBP: ffffb75ac7b3fb30 R08: 0000000000005b60 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 6731.508704] R10: ffffb75ac64fbd90 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 6731.508706] R13: ffff9c97a08e0000 R14: ffff9c97a08e0a68 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 6731.508708] FS: 00007f2617cd2740(0000) GS:ffff9c987f4c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6731.508710] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6731.508711] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001e765c4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 6731.508713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6731.508714] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6731.508715] Call Trace: [ 6731.508734] i40e_vsi_close+0x84/0x90 [i40e] [ 6731.508742] i40e_quiesce_vsi.part.98+0x3c/0x40 [i40e] [ 6731.508749] i40e_pf_quiesce_all_vsi+0x55/0x60 [i40e] [ 6731.508757] i40e_prep_for_reset+0x59/0x130 [i40e] [ 6731.508765] i40e_reconfig_rss_queues+0x5a/0x120 [i40e] [ 6731.508774] i40e_set_channels+0xda/0x170 [i40e] [ 6731.508778] ethtool_set_channels+0xe9/0x150 [ 6731.508781] dev_ethtool+0x1b94/0x2920 [ 6731.508805] dev_ioctl+0xc2/0x590 [ 6731.508811] sock_do_ioctl+0xae/0x150 [ 6731.508813] sock_ioctl+0x34f/0x3c0 [ 6731.508821] ksys_ioctl+0x98/0xb0 [ 6731.508828] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 [ 6731.508831] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x1c0 [ 6731.508835] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: 4b81644 ("i40e: Add common function for finding VSI by type") Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Szczurek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Aaron Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b27055a ] struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes. However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic, further achieve heap out-of-bounds read. One example crash log is like below: [ 3.905425] ================================================================== [ 3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177 [ 3.906646] [ 3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3.907784] Call Trace: [ 3.907925] <TASK> [ 3.908048] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 3.908258] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 3.909151] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 3.909539] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 3.909794] memcpy+0x1f/0x60 [ 3.909968] nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.910147] tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0 [ 3.911536] tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340 [ 3.912436] tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180 [ 3.912689] tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0 [ 3.912905] fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0 [ 3.913483] tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460 [ 3.914778] tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180 [ 3.915208] tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0 [ 3.918615] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560 [ 3.919118] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200 [ 3.919787] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 3.921032] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 3.921987] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 3.922220] __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240 [ 3.922682] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90 [ 3.922906] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 3.923814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407 [ 3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407 [ 3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c [ 3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0 [ 3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8 Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related policies. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Fixes: 4ece477 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve") Fixes: 0ed5269 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key") Fixes: 0a6e777 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 8977752 upstream. Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2. Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are enabled on the system. Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced, and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have device-exclusive PTEs. The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM. Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out (proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about failed migration of a page that should be movable. # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # ./hmm-swap & ... wait until everything is device-exclusive # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state [ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a [ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000 [ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate| dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure [ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774 [ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0 [ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280 [ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740 [ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540 [ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340 [ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0 [ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0 [ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0 ... This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send out separately once this landed and I get to it. I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed. With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day. I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW, so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected. <program> #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> #define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd) struct hmm_dmirror_cmd { __u64 addr; __u64 ptr; __u64 npages; __u64 cpages; __u64 faults; }; const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul; const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul; int main(void) { struct hmm_dmirror_cmd cmd; size_t cur_size; int fd, ret; char *addr, *mirror; fd = open("/dev/hmm_dmirror1", O_RDWR, 0); if (fd < 0) { perror("open failed\n"); exit(1); } addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap failed\n"); exit(1); } madvise(addr, size, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE); memset(addr, 1, size); mirror = malloc(chunk_size); for (cur_size = 0; cur_size < size; cur_size += chunk_size) { cmd.addr = (uintptr_t)addr + cur_size; cmd.ptr = (uintptr_t)mirror; cmd.npages = chunk_size / getpagesize(); ret = ioctl(fd, HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE, &cmd); if (ret) { perror("ioctl failed\n"); exit(1); } } pause(); return 0; } </program> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] This patch (of 17): We only have two FOLL_SPLIT_PMD users. While uprobe refuses hugetlb early, make_device_exclusive_range() can end up getting called on hugetlb VMAs. Right now, this means that with a PMD-sized hugetlb page, we can end up calling split_huge_pmd(), because pmd_trans_huge() also succeeds with hugetlb PMDs. For example, using a modified hmm-test selftest one can trigger: [ 207.017134][T14945] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 207.018614][T14945] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:87! [ 207.019716][T14945] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 207.021072][T14945] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: ... [ 207.023036][T14945] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 [ 207.024834][T14945] RIP: 0010:page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.026128][T14945] Code: ... [ 207.029965][T14945] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cb8f348 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 207.031139][T14945] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff8249a0cd [ 207.032649][T14945] RDX: ffff88811e883c80 RSI: ffffffff8249a357 RDI: ffff88811e883c80 [ 207.034183][T14945] RBP: ffff888105c0a050 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 207.035688][T14945] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 207.037203][T14945] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 207.038711][T14945] FS: 00007f2783275740(0000) GS:ffff8881f4980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 207.040407][T14945] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 207.041660][T14945] CR2: 00007f2782c00000 CR3: 0000000132356000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 207.043196][T14945] PKRU: 55555554 [ 207.043880][T14945] Call Trace: [ 207.044506][T14945] <TASK> [ 207.045086][T14945] ? __die+0x51/0x92 [ 207.045864][T14945] ? die+0x29/0x50 [ 207.046596][T14945] ? do_trap+0x250/0x320 [ 207.047430][T14945] ? do_error_trap+0xe7/0x220 [ 207.048346][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.049535][T14945] ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 [ 207.050494][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.051681][T14945] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2e/0x50 [ 207.052589][T14945] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 207.053596][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x1fd/0x510 [ 207.054790][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.055993][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.057195][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.058384][T14945] __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x34b/0x5a0 [ 207.059524][T14945] ? __pfx___page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x10/0x10 [ 207.060775][T14945] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 207.061940][T14945] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 207.062967][T14945] pmdp_huge_clear_flush+0x279/0x360 [ 207.064024][T14945] split_huge_pmd_locked+0x82b/0x3750 ... Before commit 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code"), we would have ignored the flag; instead, let's simply refuse the combination completely in check_vma_flags(): the caller is likely not prepared to handle any hugetlb folios. We'll teach make_device_exclusive_range() separately to ignore any hugetlb folios as a future-proof safety net. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Jerome Glisse <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Karol Herbst <[email protected]> Cc: Liam Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]> Cc: Lyude <[email protected]> Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <[email protected]> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: SeongJae Park <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]> Cc: Simona Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: Barry Song <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit c28f31d upstream. do_alignment_t32_to_handler() only fixes up alignment faults for specific instructions; it returns NULL otherwise (e.g. LDREX). When that's the case, signal to the caller that it needs to proceed with the regular alignment fault handling (i.e. SIGBUS). Without this patch, the kernel panics: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000006 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800164aa000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800081fdbd22003, p4d=0800081fdbd22003, pud=08000815d51c6003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill xt_nat xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter veth nvme_fa> libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid0 multipath linear dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod xhci_pci nvme xhci_hcd nvme_core t10_pi usbcore igb crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_ce crct10dif_common usb_common i2c_algo_bit i2c> CPU: 2 PID: 3932954 Comm: WPEWebProcess Not tainted 6.1.0-31-arm64 #1 Debian 6.1.128-1 Hardware name: GIGABYTE MP32-AR1-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021 pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : do_compat_alignment_fixup+0xd8/0x3dc sp : ffff80000f973dd0 x29: ffff80000f973dd0 x28: ffff081b42526180 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 00000000e8551f00 x19: ffff80000f973eb0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffaebc949bc488 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000400000 x4 : 0000fffffffffffe x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000f973eb0 x1 : 00000000e8551f00 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: 0x0 do_alignment_fault+0x40/0x50 do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa0 el0_da+0x48/0xf0 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x110/0x140 el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <[email protected]> Fixes: 3fc24ef ("arm64: compat: Implement misalignment fixups for multiword loads") Cc: <[email protected]> # 6.1.x Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit adc3fd2 upstream. Address a kernel panic caused by a null pointer dereference in the `mt792x_rx_get_wcid` function. The issue arises because the `deflink` structure is not properly initialized with the `sta` context. This patch ensures that the `deflink` structure is correctly linked to the `sta` context, preventing the null pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000400 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 470 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Not tainted 6.12.13-gentoo-dist #1 Hardware name: /AMD HUDSON-M1, BIOS 4.6.4 11/15/2011 RIP: 0010:mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] RSP: 0018:ffffa147c055fd98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e9ecb652000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e9ecb652000 RBP: 0000000000000685 R08: ffff8e9ec6570000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8e9ecd2ca000 R11: ffff8e9f22a217c0 R12: 0000000038010119 R13: 0000000080843801 R14: ffff8e9ec6570000 R15: ffff8e9ecb652000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9f22a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000400 CR3: 000000000d2ea000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] mt7921_queue_rx_skb+0x1c6/0xaa0 [mt7921_common] mt76u_alloc_queues+0x784/0x810 [mt76_usb] ? __pfx___mt76_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [mt76] __mt76_worker_fn+0x4f/0x80 [mt76] kthread+0xd2/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Reported-by: Nick Morrow <[email protected]> Closes: morrownr/USB-WiFi#577 Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 90c1028 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: Update mt792x_rx_get_wcid for per-link STA") Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Salah Coronya <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d5e2067 upstream. Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later on, when the corrupted directory is removed). ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.' and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry() and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the same data block. If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer which results in out-of-bounds mem access. Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero). Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is really an OOB read. This issue was found by syzkaller tool. Call Trace: [ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375 [ 38.595158] [ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1 [ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 38.595304] Call Trace: [ 38.595308] <TASK> [ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0 [ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0 [ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250 [ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90 [ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 [ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990 [ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10 [ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0 [ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140 [ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140 [ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670 [ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190 [ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0 [ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0 [ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 [ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: ac27a0e ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <[email protected]> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Cc: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Mahmoud Adam <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit c11bcbc upstream. Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Tested-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Murphy <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ee6bd5 ] Commit 8284066 ("ublk: grab request reference when the request is handled by userspace") doesn't grab request reference in case of recovery reissue. Then the request can be requeued & re-dispatch & failed when canceling uring command. If it is one zc request, the request can be freed before io_uring returns the zc buffer back, then cause kernel panic: [ 126.773061] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8 [ 126.773657] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 126.774052] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 126.774455] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 126.774698] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 126.775034] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 1612 Comm: kworker/u64:55 Not tainted 6.14.0_blk+ torvalds#182 PREEMPT(full) [ 126.775676] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 [ 126.776275] Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work [ 126.776651] RIP: 0010:ublk_io_release+0x14/0x130 [ublk_drv] Fixes it by always grabbing request reference for aborting the request. Reported-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CADUfDZodKfOGUeWrnAxcZiLT+puaZX8jDHoj_sfHZCOZwhzz6A@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 8284066 ("ublk: grab request reference when the request is handled by userspace") Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e3ea2ea ] HuC delayed loading fence, introduced with commit 27536e0 ("drm/i915/huc: track delayed HuC load with a fence"), is registered with object tracker early on driver probe but unregistered only from driver remove, which is not called on early probe errors. Since its memory is allocated under devres, then released anyway, it may happen to be allocated again to the fence and reused on future driver probes, resulting in kernel warnings that taint the kernel: <4> [309.731371] ------------[ cut here ]------------ <3> [309.731373] ODEBUG: init destroyed (active state 0) object: ffff88813d7dd2e0 object type: i915_sw_fence hint: sw_fence_dummy_notify+0x0/0x20 [i915] <4> [309.731575] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3161 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0 ... <4> [309.731693] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3161 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.14.0-CI_DRM_16362-gf0fd77956987+ #1 ... <4> [309.731700] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0 ... <4> [309.731728] Call Trace: <4> [309.731730] <TASK> ... <4> [309.731949] __debug_object_init+0x17b/0x1c0 <4> [309.731957] debug_object_init+0x34/0x50 <4> [309.732126] __i915_sw_fence_init+0x34/0x60 [i915] <4> [309.732256] intel_huc_init_early+0x4b/0x1d0 [i915] <4> [309.732468] intel_uc_init_early+0x61/0x680 [i915] <4> [309.732667] intel_gt_common_init_early+0x105/0x130 [i915] <4> [309.732804] intel_root_gt_init_early+0x63/0x80 [i915] <4> [309.732938] i915_driver_probe+0x1fa/0xeb0 [i915] <4> [309.733075] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] <4> [309.733198] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xb0 <4> [309.733203] pci_device_probe+0xf4/0x270 <4> [309.733209] really_probe+0xee/0x3c0 <4> [309.733215] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 <4> [309.733219] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 <4> [309.733223] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 <4> [309.733230] bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 <4> [309.733236] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 <4> [309.733239] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 <4> [309.733244] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 <4> [309.733247] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 <4> [309.733251] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] <4> [309.733413] i915_init+0x34/0x120 [i915] <4> [309.733655] do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 <4> [309.733667] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 <4> [309.733671] load_module+0x25ff/0x2890 <4> [309.733688] init_module_from_file+0x97/0xe0 <4> [309.733701] idempotent_init_module+0x118/0x330 <4> [309.733711] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 <4> [309.733715] x64_sys_call+0x1f37/0x2650 <4> [309.733719] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 <4> [309.733763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e <4> [309.733792] </TASK> ... <4> [309.733806] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- That scenario is most easily reproducible with igt@i915_module_load@reload-with-fault-injection. Fix the issue by moving the cleanup step to driver release path. Fixes: 27536e0 ("drm/i915/huc: track delayed HuC load with a fence") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/13592 Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Cc: Alan Previn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 795dbde) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9502dd5 ] After commit f7025d8 ("smb: client: allocate crypto only for primary server") and commit b0abcd6 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption"), the channels started reusing AEAD TFM from primary channel to perform synchronous decryption, but that can't done as there could be multiple cifsd threads (one per channel) simultaneously accessing it to perform decryption. This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstest generic/249 with 'vers=3.1.1,multichannel,max_channels=4,seal' against Windows Server 2022: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881046c18a0 by task cifsd/986 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 986 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_report+0x156/0x528 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 ghash_update+0x189/0x210 shash_ahash_update+0x295/0x370 ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_extract_iter_to_sg+0x10/0x10 ? ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10e/0x180 ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 crypto_ahash_update+0x3c/0xc0 gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x93/0xc0 crypt_message+0xe09/0xec0 [cifs] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40 ? __pfx_cifs_readv_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs] decrypt_raw_data+0x229/0x380 [cifs] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_read_iter_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs] smb3_receive_transform+0x837/0xc80 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_receive_transform+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_smb3_is_transform_hdr+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x692/0x1570 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x62/0xb0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xa8/0xe0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x1fe/0x380 ? kthread+0x10f/0x380 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x60 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Tested-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reported-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAH2r5mu6Yc0-RJXM3kFyBYUB09XmXBrNodOiCVR4EDrmxq5Szg@mail.gmail.com Fixes: f7025d8 ("smb: client: allocate crypto only for primary server") Fixes: b0abcd6 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 52323ed ] syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below). The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor" conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock. To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and return -EBUSY when it fails. Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user space. syzbot report: syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline] ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline] rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline] ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015 ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558 init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910 do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257 do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568 kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline] wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64 notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452 param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588 module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924 sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline] vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679 ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(param_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(param_lock); lock(system_transition_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913 Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b61e69b ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 27b9180 ] With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock: [ 1.211455] ============================================ [ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted [ 1.211823] -------------------------------------------- [ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 [ 1.212207] [ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock: [ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.212487] [ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1.212626] [ 1.212751] CPU0 [ 1.212815] ---- [ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.213016] [ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1.213016] [ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1.213143] [ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184: [ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0 [ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0 [ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.213895] [ 1.213895] stack backtrace: [ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 [ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 1.213994] Call Trace: [ 1.213995] <TASK> [ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0 [ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0 [ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0 [ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40 [ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI [ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev [ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270 [ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0 [ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev [ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info [ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120 [ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90 [ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0 [ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230 [ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0 [ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80 [ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490 [ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120 [ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320 [ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0 [ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0 [ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220 [ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0 [ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140 [ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0 [ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56 Device setup: netdevsim0 (down) ^ ^ bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down) When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes (re)locking on of the real_dev. Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues. Reproducer: echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*) dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev) ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0 ip link set dev netdevsim0 up ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100 ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allmulticast on down ip link add name bond1 type bond mode 802.3ad ip link set dev netdevsim0 down ip link set dev netdevsim0 master bond1 ip link set dev bond1 up ip link show Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z9CfXjLMKn6VLG5d@mini-arch/T/#m15ba130f53227c883e79fb969687d69d670337a0 Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 93ae6e6 upstream. We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 0bb2f7a upstream. When I ran the repro [0] and waited a few seconds, I observed two LOCKDEP splats: a warning immediately followed by a null-ptr-deref. [1] Reproduction Steps: 1) Mount CIFS 2) Add an iptables rule to drop incoming FIN packets for CIFS 3) Unmount CIFS 4) Unload the CIFS module 5) Remove the iptables rule At step 3), the CIFS module calls sock_release() for the underlying TCP socket, and it returns quickly. However, the socket remains in FIN_WAIT_1 because incoming FIN packets are dropped. At this point, the module's refcnt is 0 while the socket is still alive, so the following rmmod command succeeds. # ss -tan State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port FIN-WAIT-1 0 477 10.0.2.15:51062 10.0.0.137:445 # lsmod | grep cifs cifs 1159168 0 This highlights a discrepancy between the lifetime of the CIFS module and the underlying TCP socket. Even after CIFS calls sock_release() and it returns, the TCP socket does not die immediately in order to close the connection gracefully. While this is generally fine, it causes an issue with LOCKDEP because CIFS assigns a different lock class to the TCP socket's sk->sk_lock using sock_lock_init_class_and_name(). Once an incoming packet is processed for the socket or a timer fires, sk->sk_lock is acquired. Then, LOCKDEP checks the lock context in check_wait_context(), where hlock_class() is called to retrieve the lock class. However, since the module has already been unloaded, hlock_class() logs a warning and returns NULL, triggering the null-ptr-deref. If LOCKDEP is enabled, we must ensure that a module calling sock_lock_init_class_and_name() (CIFS, NFS, etc) cannot be unloaded while such a socket is still alive to prevent this issue. Let's hold the module reference in sock_lock_init_class_and_name() and release it when the socket is freed in sk_prot_free(). Note that sock_lock_init() clears sk->sk_owner for svc_create_socket() that calls sock_lock_init_class_and_name() for a listening socket, which clones a socket by sk_clone_lock() without GFP_ZERO. [0]: CIFS_SERVER="10.0.0.137" CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_SERVER}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST" DEV="enp0s3" CRED="/root/WindowsCredential.txt" MNT=$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXX) mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${MNT} -o vers=3.0,credentials=${CRED},cache=none,echo_interval=1 iptables -A INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP for i in $(seq 10); do umount ${MNT} rmmod cifs sleep 1 done rm -r ${MNT} iptables -D INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP [1]: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223) Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Not tainted 6.14.0 #36 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223) ... Call Trace: <IRQ> __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178) lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816) _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379) tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350) ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c4 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Tainted: G W 6.14.0 #36 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4852 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178) Code: 15 41 09 c7 41 8b 44 24 20 25 ff 1f 00 00 41 09 c7 8b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 45 89 7c 24 20 41 89 44 24 24 e8 e1 bc ff ff 4c 89 e7 <44> 0f b6 b8 c4 00 00 00 e8 d1 bc ff ff 0f b6 80 c5 00 00 00 88 44 RSP: 0018:ffa0000000468a10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1100010091cc38 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ff1100081f09ca48 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ff1100010091cc88 RBP: ff1100010091c200 R08: ff1100083fe6e228 R09: 00000000ffffbfff R10: ff1100081eca0000 R11: ff1100083fe10dc0 R12: ff1100010091cc88 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000424b1 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1100081f080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c4 CR3: 0000000002c4a003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816) _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379) tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 (discriminator 1)) ip_local_deliver_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:878 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234) ip_sublist_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:576) ip_list_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:628) ip_list_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:670) __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5939 net/core/dev.c:5986) netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:6040 net/core/dev.c:6129) napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37 ./include/net/gro.h:519 ./include/net/gro.h:514 net/core/dev.c:6496) e1000_clean (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3815) __napi_poll.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:7191) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7262 net/core/dev.c:7382) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:596 kernel/softirq.c:435 kernel/softirq.c:662) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:680) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:280 (discriminator 14)) </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693) RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:744) Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa eb 07 0f 00 2d c3 2b 15 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffa00000000ffee8 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 000000000000640b RBX: ff1100010091c200 RCX: 0000000000061aa4 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff812f30c5 RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ? do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325) default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:422 (discriminator 1)) start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:315) common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:421) </TASK> Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs] CR2: 00000000000000c4 Fixes: ed07536 ("[PATCH] lockdep: annotate nfs/nfsd in-kernel sockets") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 691ee97 upstream. Patch series "Fix lazy mmu mode", v2. I'm planning to implement lazy mmu mode for arm64 to optimize vmalloc. As part of that, I will extend lazy mmu mode to cover kernel mappings in vmalloc table walkers. While lazy mmu mode is already used for kernel mappings in a few places, this will extend it's use significantly. Having reviewed the existing lazy mmu implementations in powerpc, sparc and x86, it looks like there are a bunch of bugs, some of which may be more likely to trigger once I extend the use of lazy mmu. So this series attempts to clarify the requirements and fix all the bugs in advance of that series. See patch #1 commit log for all the details. This patch (of 5): The docs, implementations and use of arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() is a bit of a mess (to put it politely). There are a number of issues related to nesting of lazy mmu regions and confusion over whether the task, when in a lazy mmu region, is preemptible or not. Fix all the issues relating to the core-mm. Follow up commits will fix the arch-specific implementations. 3 arches implement lazy mmu; powerpc, sparc and x86. When arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() was first introduced by commit 6606c3e ("[PATCH] paravirt: lazy mmu mode hooks.patch"), it was expected that lazy mmu regions would never nest and that the appropriate page table lock(s) would be held while in the region, thus ensuring the region is non-preemptible. Additionally lazy mmu regions were only used during manipulation of user mappings. Commit 38e0edb ("mm/apply_to_range: call pte function with lazy updates") started invoking the lazy mmu mode in apply_to_pte_range(), which is used for both user and kernel mappings. For kernel mappings the region is no longer protected by any lock so there is no longer any guarantee about non-preemptibility. Additionally, for RT configs, the holding the PTL only implies no CPU migration, it doesn't prevent preemption. Commit bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()") added arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() to the default implementation of set_ptes(), used by x86. So after this commit, lazy mmu regions can be nested. Additionally commit 1a10a44 ("sparc64: implement the new page table range API") and commit 9fee28b ("powerpc: implement the new page table range API") did the same for the sparc and powerpc set_ptes() overrides. powerpc couldn't deal with preemption so avoids it in commit b9ef323 ("powerpc/64s: Disable preemption in hash lazy mmu mode"), which explicitly disables preemption for the whole region in its implementation. x86 can support preemption (or at least it could until it tried to add support nesting; more on this below). Sparc looks to be totally broken in the face of preemption, as far as I can tell. powerpc can't deal with nesting, so avoids it in commit 47b8def ("powerpc/mm: Avoid calling arch_enter/leave_lazy_mmu() in set_ptes"), which removes the lazy mmu calls from its implementation of set_ptes(). x86 attempted to support nesting in commit 49147be ("x86/xen: allow nesting of same lazy mode") but as far as I can tell, this breaks its support for preemption. In short, it's all a mess; the semantics for arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() are not clearly defined and as a result the implementations all have different expectations, sticking plasters and bugs. arm64 is aiming to start using these hooks, so let's clean everything up before adding an arm64 implementation. Update the documentation to state that lazy mmu regions can never be nested, must not be called in interrupt context and preemption may or may not be enabled for the duration of the region. And fix the generic implementation of set_ptes() to avoid nesting. arch-specific fixes to conform to the new spec will proceed this one. These issues were spotted by code review and I have no evidence of issues being reported in the wild. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()") Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: Andreas Larsson <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Juegren Gross <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcow (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit aa1ac98 upstream. In PMU event initialization functions - cpumsf_pmu_event_init() - cpumf_pmu_event_init() - cfdiag_event_init() the partially created event had to be removed when an error was detected. The event::event_init() member function had to release all resources it allocated in case of error. event::destroy() had to be called on freeing an event after it was successfully created and event::event_init() returned success. With commit c70ca29 ("perf/core: Simplify the perf_event_alloc() error path") this is not necessary anymore. The performance subsystem common code now always calls event::destroy() to clean up the allocated resources created during event initialization. Remove the event::destroy() invocation in PMU event initialization or that function is called twice for each event that runs into an error condition in event creation. This is the kernel log entry which shows up without the fix: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43388 at lib/refcount.c:87 refcount_dec_not_one+0x74/0x90 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 43388 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.15.0-20250407.rc1.git0.300.fc41.s390x+git #1 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 00000209cb2c1b88 (refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000020900000027 0000020900000023 0000000000000026 0000018900000000 00000004a2200a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000057 ffffffffffffffea 00000002b386c600 00000002b3f5b3e0 00000209cc51f140 00000209cc7fc550 0000000001449d38 ffffffffffffffff 00000209cb2c1b84 00000189d67dfb80 Krnl Code: 00000209cb2c1b78: c02000506727 larl %r2,00000209cbcce9c6 00000209cb2c1b7e: c0e5ffbd4431 brasl %r14,00000209caa6a3e0 #00000209cb2c1b84: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000209cb2c1b88: a7480001 lhi %r4,1 00000209cb2c1b8c: ebeff0a00004 lmg %r14,%r15,160(%r15) 00000209cb2c1b92: ec243fbf0055 risbg %r2,%r4,63,191,0 00000209cb2c1b98: 07fe bcr 15,%r14 00000209cb2c1b9a: 47000700 bc 0,1792 Call Trace: [<00000209cb2c1b88>] refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90 [<00000209cb2c1dc4>] refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x24/0x90 [<00000209caa3c29e>] hw_perf_event_destroy+0x2e/0x80 [<00000209cacaf8b4>] __free_event+0x74/0x270 [<00000209cacb47c4>] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0x4a4/0x730 [<00000209cacbf3e8>] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x248/0xc20 [<00000209cacc14a4>] __s390x_sys_perf_event_open+0x44/0x50 [<00000209cb8114de>] __do_syscall+0x12e/0x260 [<00000209cb81ce34>] system_call+0x74/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<00000209caa6a4d2>] __warn_printk+0xf2/0x100 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: c70ca29 ("perf/core: Simplify the perf_event_alloc() error path") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sumanth Korikkar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit ab680dc upstream. Fix deadlock in job submission and abort handling. When a thread aborts currently executing jobs due to a fault, it first locks the global lock protecting submitted_jobs (#1). After the last job is destroyed, it proceeds to release the related context and locks file_priv (#2). Meanwhile, in the job submission thread, the file_priv lock (#2) is taken first, and then the submitted_jobs lock (#1) is obtained when a job is added to the submitted jobs list. CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- (for example due to a fault) (jobs submissions keep coming) lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1 ivpu_jobs_abort_all() job_destroy() lock(&file_priv->lock) #2 lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1 file_priv_release() lock(&vdev->context_list_lock) lock(&file_priv->lock) #2 This order of locking causes a deadlock. To resolve this issue, change the order of locking in ivpu_job_submit(). Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] [ This backport required small adjustments to ivpu_job_submit(), which lacks support for explicit command queue creation added in 6.15. ] Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f1aff4b upstream. The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv, instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from past the old_argv allocated memory. Following BUG_ON was hit: [ 3.038929][ T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040! [ 3.039147][ T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ... [ 3.056489][ T1] Call trace: [ 3.056591][ T1] __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P) [ 3.056773][ T1] dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210 [ 3.056942][ T1] dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360 [ 3.057132][ T1] table_load+0x110/0x3ac [ 3.057292][ T1] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c [ 3.057457][ T1] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec [ 3.057634][ T1] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c [ 3.057804][ T1] el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc [ 3.057970][ T1] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 3.058123][ T1] el0_svc+0x50/0xac [ 3.058266][ T1] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4 [ 3.058452][ T1] el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4 [ 3.058620][ T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000) [ 3.058897][ T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 3.059083][ T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was. Fixes: 5a2a6c4 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c457dc1 ] When memory is insufficient, the allocation of nfs_lock_context in nfs_get_lock_context() fails and returns -ENOMEM. If we mistakenly treat an nfs4_unlockdata structure (whose l_ctx member has been set to -ENOMEM) as valid and proceed to execute rpc_run_task(), this will trigger a NULL pointer dereference in nfs4_locku_prepare. For example: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u64:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-dirty torvalds#60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule RIP: 0010:nfs4_locku_prepare+0x35/0xc2 Code: 89 f2 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 68 69 ef b5 53 48 8b 8e 90 00 00 00 48 89 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffbbafc006bdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000004b RBX: ffff9b964fc1fa00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: fffffffffffffff4 RDI: ffff9ba53fddbf40 RBP: ffff9ba539934000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbbafc006bc38 R10: ffffffffb6b689c8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9ba539934030 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000004248060 R15: ffffffffb56d1c30 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ba5881f0000(0000) knlGS:00000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000093f244000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __rpc_execute+0xbc/0x480 rpc_async_schedule+0x2f/0x40 process_one_work+0x232/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x1da/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x10d/0x240 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 000000000000000c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Free the allocated nfs4_unlockdata when nfs_get_lock_context() fails and return NULL to terminate subsequent rpc_run_task, preventing NULL pointer dereference. Fixes: f30cb75 ("NFS: Always wait for I/O completion before unlock") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5884314 ] MACsec offload is not supported in switchdev mode for uplink representors. When switching to the uplink representor profile, the MACsec offload feature must be cleared from the netdevice's features. If left enabled, attempts to add offloads result in a null pointer dereference, as the uplink representor does not support MACsec offload even though the feature bit remains set. Clear NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC in mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features(). Kernel log: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 4714 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_02_17_35 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 Code: d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ad 15 00 00 8b 35 91 5c fe 03 85 f6 75 29 49 8d 7e 60 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a6 15 00 00 4d 3b 76 60 0f 85 fd 0b 00 00 65 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888147a4f160 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000078 RBP: ffff888147a4f2e0 R08: ffffffffa05d2c19 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff888152de0000 FS: 00007f855e27d800(0000) GS:ffff88881ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004e5768 CR3: 000000013ae7c005 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? __mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1ae0/0x1ae0 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? macsec_upd_offload+0x145/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x249/0x6b0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0xb5/0x240 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsa+0x11a0/0x11a0 [mlx5_core] macsec_update_offload+0x26c/0x820 ? macsec_set_mac_address+0x4b0/0x4b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 macsec_upd_offload+0x2c8/0x380 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x30 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x15e/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240 ? cap_capable+0xd4/0x330 genl_rcv_msg+0x3ea/0x670 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12b/0x390 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? netlink_ack+0xd80/0xd80 ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0xf90/0xf90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xac0 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x155/0xac0 ? _copy_from_iter+0x1bb/0x12c0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x440/0x700 ? netlink_attachskb+0x760/0x760 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 netlink_sendmsg+0x749/0xc10 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53f/0x760 ? import_iovec+0x7/0x10 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 ? __copy_msghdr+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x90/0x90 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x28/0xa30 ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x110/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x116/0x3b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1da/0x3b0 ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 ? __delete_object+0x21/0x50 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 ? kmem_cache_free+0x14c/0x4e0 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f855e113367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd15e90c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f855e113367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd15e90cf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd15e90dbc R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 000000000045d100 R10: 00007f855e011dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000019 R13: 0000000067c6b785 R14: 00000000004a1e80 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_dpll mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 8ff0ac5 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shahar Shitrit <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 54db6d1 upstream. If the discard worker is running and there's currently only one block group, that block group is a data block group, it's in the unused block groups discard list and is being used (it got an extent allocated from it after becoming unused), the worker can end up in an infinite loop if a transaction abort happens or the async discard is disabled (during remount or unmount for example). This happens like this: 1) Task A, the discard worker, is at peek_discard_list() and find_next_block_group() returns block group X; 2) Block group X is in the unused block groups discard list (its discard index is BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED) since at some point in the past it become an unused block group and was added to that list, but then later it got an extent allocated from it, so its ->used counter is not zero anymore; 3) The current transaction is aborted by task B and we end up at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() in the transaction abort path, where we call btrfs_discard_stop(), which clears BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING from fs_info, and then at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() we set the fs to RO mode (setting SB_RDONLY in the super block's s_flags field); 4) Task A calls __add_to_discard_list() with the goal of moving the block group from the unused block groups discard list into another discard list, but at __add_to_discard_list() we end up doing nothing because btrfs_run_discard_work() returns false, since the super block has SB_RDONLY set in its flags and BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING is not set anymore in fs_info->flags. So block group X remains in the unused block groups discard list; 5) Task A then does a goto into the 'again' label, calls find_next_block_group() again we gets block group X again. Then it repeats the previous steps over and over since there are not other block groups in the discard lists and block group X is never moved out of the unused block groups discard list since btrfs_run_discard_work() keeps returning false and therefore __add_to_discard_list() doesn't move block group X out of that discard list. When this happens we can get a soft lockup report like this: [71.957] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 27s! [kworker/u4:3:97] [71.957] Modules linked in: xfs af_packet rfkill (...) [71.957] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.957] Tainted: [W]=WARN [71.957] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.957] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.957] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [71.957] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [71.957] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [71.957] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [71.957] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [71.957] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [71.957] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [71.957] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [71.957] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89707bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [71.957] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [71.957] CR2: 00005605bcc8d2f0 CR3: 000000010376a001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [71.957] PKRU: 55555554 [71.957] Call Trace: [71.957] <TASK> [71.957] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [71.957] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [71.957] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] kthread+0xef/0x220 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [71.957] </TASK> [71.957] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [71.987] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W L 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.989] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP [71.989] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.991] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.992] Call Trace: [71.993] <IRQ> [71.994] dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x80 [71.994] panic+0x10b/0x2da [71.995] watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x9a/0xa1 [71.996] ? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 [71.997] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x132/0x2a0 [71.997] hrtimer_interrupt+0xff/0x230 [71.998] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x55/0x100 [71.999] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x90 [72.000] </IRQ> [72.000] <TASK> [72.001] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [72.002] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [72.002] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [72.005] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [72.006] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [72.006] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [72.007] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [72.008] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [72.009] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [72.010] ? btrfs_discard_workfn+0x51/0x400 [btrfs 23b01089228eb964071fb7ca156eee8cd3bf996f] [72.011] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [72.012] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [72.013] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [72.014] kthread+0xef/0x220 [72.014] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.015] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [72.015] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.016] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [72.017] </TASK> [72.017] Kernel Offset: 0x15000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [72.019] Rebooting in 90 seconds.. So fix this by making sure we move a block group out of the unused block groups discard list when calling __add_to_discard_list(). Fixes: 2bee7eb ("btrfs: discard one region at a time in async discard") Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1242012 CC: [email protected] # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 1f77c05 upstream. This fixes a kernel panic seen during release FW in a stress test scenario where WLAN and BT FW download occurs simultaneously, and due to a HW bug, chip sends out only 1 bootloader signatures. When driver receives the bootloader signature, it enters FW download mode, but since no consequtive bootloader signatures seen, FW file is not requested. After 60 seconds, when FW download times out, release_firmware causes a kernel panic. [ 2601.949184] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000312e6f006573 [ 2601.992076] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000111802000 [ 2601.992080] [0000312e6f006573] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 2601.992087] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2601.992091] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg btnxpuart(O) pciexxx(O) mlan(O) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce snd_soc_fsl_easrc snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card imx8_media_dev(C) snd_soc_fsl_micfil polyval_generic snd_soc_fsl_xcvr snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_fsl_asrc snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_imx_hdmi snd_soc_fsl_aud2htx snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma dw_hdmi_cec flexcan can_dev [ 2602.001825] CPU: 2 PID: 20060 Comm: hciconfig Tainted: G C O 6.6.23-lts-next-06236-gb586a521770e #1 [ 2602.010182] Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) [ 2602.010185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2602.010191] pc : _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68 [ 2602.010201] lr : free_fw_priv+0x20/0xfc [ 2602.020561] sp : ffff800089363b30 [ 2602.020563] x29: ffff800089363b30 x28: ffff0000d0eb5880 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.020570] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000d728b330 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.020577] x23: ffff0000dc856f38 [ 2602.033797] x22: ffff800089363b70 x21: ffff0000dc856000 [ 2602.033802] x20: ff00312e6f006573 x19: ffff0000d0d9ea80 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.033809] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaad80dd480 [ 2602.083320] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000001b9 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 2602.083326] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff800089363a30 [ 2602.083333] x8 : ffff0001793d75c0 x7 : ffff0000d6dbc400 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 2602.083339] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 2602.083346] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ff00312e6f006573 [ 2602.083354] Call trace: [ 2602.083356] _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68 [ 2602.083364] release_firmware+0x48/0x6c [ 2602.083370] nxp_setup+0x3c4/0x540 [btnxpuart] [ 2602.083383] hci_dev_open_sync+0xf0/0xa34 [ 2602.083391] hci_dev_open+0xd8/0x178 [ 2602.083399] hci_sock_ioctl+0x3b0/0x590 [ 2602.083405] sock_do_ioctl+0x60/0x118 [ 2602.083413] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x374 [ 2602.091430] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf0 [ 2602.091437] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 2602.091445] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 [ 2602.091452] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 2602.091457] el0_svc+0x40/0xe4 [ 2602.091465] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 2602.091470] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: e3c4891 ("Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Handle FW Download Abort scenario") Fixes: 689ca16 ("Bluetooth: NXP: Add protocol support for NXP Bluetooth chipsets") Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef1d345 ] If a faulty CXL memory device returns a broken zero LSA size in its memory device information (Identify Memory Device (Opcode 4000h), CXL spec. 3.1, 8.2.9.9.1.1), a divide error occurs in the libnvdimm driver: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:nd_label_data_init+0x10e/0x800 [libnvdimm] Code and flow: 1) CXL Command 4000h returns LSA size = 0 2) config_size is assigned to zero LSA size (CXL pmem driver): drivers/cxl/pmem.c: .config_size = mds->lsa_size, 3) max_xfer is set to zero (nvdimm driver): drivers/nvdimm/label.c: max_xfer = min_t(size_t, ndd->nsarea.max_xfer, config_size); 4) A subsequent DIV_ROUND_UP() causes a division by zero: drivers/nvdimm/label.c: /* Make our initial read size a multiple of max_xfer size */ drivers/nvdimm/label.c: read_size = min(DIV_ROUND_UP(read_size, max_xfer) * max_xfer, drivers/nvdimm/label.c- config_size); Fix this by checking the config size parameter by extending an existing check. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5da692e ] A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object. Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading cache mappings into the incomplete policy object. Reproduce steps: 1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks, with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata. cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml <superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \ policy="smq" hint_width="4"> <mappings> <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/> </mappings> </superblock> EOF dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2 dmsetup remove cmeta 2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate data degradations. mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock 3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail due to the broken array block. dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dmsetup create cache --notable dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" dmsetup resume cache 4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered while loading cache mappings. dmsetup resume cache Kernel logs: (snip) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 #3 RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570 Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the initial attempt. Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b9366c ] If waiting for gpu reset done in KFD release_work, thers is WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected #2 kfd_create_process kfd_process_mutex flush kfd release work #1 kfd release work wait for amdgpu reset work #0 amdgpu_device_gpu_reset kgd2kfd_pre_reset kfd_process_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work)); lock((wq_completion)kfd_process_wq); lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work)); lock((wq_completion)amdgpu-reset-dev); To fix this, KFD create process move flush release work outside kfd_process_mutex. Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] torvalds#13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46d22b4 ] queue->state_change is set as part of nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock(), but if the TCP connection isn't established when nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() is called then queue->state_change isn't set and sock->sk->sk_state_change isn't replaced. As such we don't need to restore sock->sk->sk_state_change if queue->state_change is NULL. This avoids NULL pointer dereferences such as this: [ 286.462026][ C0] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 286.462814][ C0] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 286.463796][ C0] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 286.464392][ C0] PGD 8000000140620067 P4D 8000000140620067 PUD 114201067 PMD 0 [ 286.465086][ C0] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 286.465559][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1628 Comm: nvme Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #11 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 286.466393][ C0] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [ 286.467147][ C0] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 286.467420][ C0] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. [ 286.467977][ C0] RSP: 0018:ffff8883ae008580 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 286.468425][ C0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88813fd34100 RCX: ffffffffa386cc43 [ 286.469019][ C0] RDX: 1ffff11027fa68b6 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88813fd34100 [ 286.469545][ C0] RBP: ffff88813fd34160 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027fa682c [ 286.470072][ C0] R10: ffff88813fd34167 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813fd344c3 [ 286.470585][ C0] R13: ffff88813fd34112 R14: ffff88813fd34aec R15: ffff888132cdd268 [ 286.471070][ C0] FS: 00007fe3c04c7d80(0000) GS:ffff88840743f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 286.471644][ C0] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 286.472543][ C0] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000012daca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 286.473500][ C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 286.474467][ C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 286.475453][ C0] Call Trace: [ 286.476102][ C0] <IRQ> [ 286.476719][ C0] tcp_fin+0x2bb/0x440 [ 286.477429][ C0] tcp_data_queue+0x190f/0x4e60 [ 286.478174][ C0] ? __build_skb_around+0x234/0x330 [ 286.478940][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.479659][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_data_queue+0x10/0x10 [ 286.480431][ C0] ? tcp_try_undo_loss+0x640/0x6c0 [ 286.481196][ C0] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 286.482046][ C0] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 286.482769][ C0] ? ktime_get+0x66/0x150 [ 286.483433][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.484146][ C0] tcp_rcv_established+0x6e4/0x2050 [ 286.484857][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.485523][ C0] ? ipv4_dst_check+0x160/0x2b0 [ 286.486203][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_rcv_established+0x10/0x10 [ 286.486917][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.487595][ C0] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d6/0x9b0 [ 286.488279][ C0] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2af8/0x3e30 [ 286.488904][ C0] ? raw_local_deliver+0x51b/0xad0 [ 286.489551][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.490198][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_v4_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.490813][ C0] ? __pfx_raw_local_deliver+0x10/0x10 [ 286.491487][ C0] ? __pfx_nf_confirm+0x10/0x10 [nf_conntrack] [ 286.492275][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.492900][ C0] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x8f/0x370 [ 286.493579][ C0] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x297/0x420 [ 286.494268][ C0] ip_local_deliver+0x168/0x430 [ 286.494867][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver+0x10/0x10 [ 286.495498][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10 [ 286.496204][ C0] ? ip_rcv_finish_core+0x19a/0x1f20 [ 286.496806][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.497414][ C0] ip_rcv+0x455/0x6e0 [ 286.497945][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.498550][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.499137][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10 [ 286.499763][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.500327][ C0] ? dl_scaled_delta_exec+0xd1/0x2c0 [ 286.500922][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.501480][ C0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0 [ 286.502173][ C0] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 [ 286.502903][ C0] ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310 [ 286.503487][ C0] ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350 [ 286.504087][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.504642][ C0] process_backlog+0x3b9/0x1350 [ 286.505214][ C0] ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350 [ 286.505779][ C0] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa6/0x490 [ 286.506363][ C0] net_rx_action+0x92e/0xe10 [ 286.506889][ C0] ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 [ 286.507437][ C0] ? timerqueue_add+0x1f0/0x320 [ 286.507977][ C0] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x68/0x540 [ 286.508492][ C0] ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310 [ 286.509043][ C0] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 [ 286.509607][ C0] ? handle_softirqs+0x1aa/0x7d0 [ 286.510187][ C0] handle_softirqs+0x1f2/0x7d0 [ 286.510754][ C0] ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 [ 286.511348][ C0] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x181/0x290 [ 286.511937][ C0] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450 [ 286.512510][ C0] do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 [ 286.513100][ C0] </IRQ> [ 286.513548][ C0] <TASK> [ 286.513953][ C0] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x112/0x140 [ 286.514522][ C0] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450 [ 286.515072][ C0] __dev_queue_xmit+0x872/0x3450 [ 286.515619][ C0] ? nft_do_chain+0xe16/0x15b0 [nf_tables] [ 286.516252][ C0] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 286.516817][ C0] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x43c/0xc50 [ 286.517433][ C0] ? __pfx_selinux_ip_postroute+0x10/0x10 [ 286.518061][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.518606][ C0] ? ip_output+0x164/0x4a0 [ 286.519149][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.519671][ C0] ? ip_finish_output2+0x17d5/0x1fb0 [ 286.520258][ C0] ip_finish_output2+0xb4b/0x1fb0 [ 286.520787][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 286.521355][ C0] ? __ip_finish_output+0x15d/0x750 [ 286.521890][ C0] ip_output+0x164/0x4a0 [ 286.522372][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 286.522872][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.523402][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60 [ 286.524031][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 286.524605][ C0] ? __ip_queue_xmit+0x999/0x2260 [ 286.525200][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.525744][ C0] ? ipv4_dst_check+0x16a/0x2b0 [ 286.526279][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.526793][ C0] __ip_queue_xmit+0x1883/0x2260 [ 286.527324][ C0] ? __skb_clone+0x54c/0x730 [ 286.527827][ C0] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x209b/0x37a0 [ 286.528374][ C0] ? __pfx___tcp_transmit_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 286.528952][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.529472][ C0] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 286.530152][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120 [ 286.530691][ C0] tcp_write_xmit+0xb81/0x88b0 [ 286.531224][ C0] ? mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x60 [ 286.531736][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.532253][ C0] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x90/0x320 [ 286.532826][ C0] tcp_send_fin+0x141/0xb50 [ 286.533352][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_send_fin+0x10/0x10 [ 286.533908][ C0] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xab/0x140 [ 286.534495][ C0] inet_shutdown+0x243/0x320 [ 286.535077][ C0] nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0xb3b/0x2590 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.535709][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260 [ 286.536314][ C0] ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.536996][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x1e0 [ 286.537550][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 [ 286.538127][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260 [ 286.538664][ C0] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 286.539249][ C0] ? nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.539892][ C0] ? __wake_up+0x40/0x60 [ 286.540392][ C0] nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.541047][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.541589][ C0] nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x8b/0x7a0 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.542254][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60 [ 286.542887][ C0] ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.543568][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120 [ 286.544166][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 [ 286.544792][ C0] ? nvme_change_ctrl_state+0x196/0x2e0 [nvme_core] [ 286.545477][ C0] nvme_tcp_create_ctrl+0x839/0xb90 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.546126][ C0] nvmf_dev_write+0x3db/0x7e0 [nvme_fabrics] [ 286.546775][ C0] ? rw_verify_area+0x69/0x520 [ 286.547334][ C0] vfs_write+0x218/0xe90 [ 286.547854][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190 [ 286.548408][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.549037][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.549659][ C0] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 [ 286.550259][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190 [ 286.550840][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x8e/0x280 [ 286.551516][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.552180][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.552834][ C0] ? ksys_read+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 286.553386][ C0] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [ 286.553964][ C0] ksys_write+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 286.554499][ C0] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 [ 286.555072][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.555698][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.556319][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x54/0x190 [ 286.556866][ C0] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x190 [ 286.557420][ C0] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x60 [ 286.557986][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.558526][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.559087][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.559659][ C0] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x4a/0x60 [ 286.560476][ C0] ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 [ 286.561064][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.561647][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.562257][ C0] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x171/0xa00 [ 286.562839][ C0] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a2/0xa00 [ 286.563453][ C0] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270 [ 286.564112][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.564677][ C0] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270 [ 286.565317][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.565922][ C0] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 286.566542][ C0] RIP: 0033:0x7fe3c05e6504 [ 286.567102][ C0] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 286.568931][ C0] RSP: 002b:00007fff76444f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 286.569807][ C0] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b40d930 RCX: 00007fe3c05e6504 [ 286.570621][ C0] RDX: 00000000000000cf RSI: 000000003b40d930 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 286.571443][ C0] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00000000000000cf R09: 000000003b40d930 [ 286.572246][ C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000003b40cd60 [ 286.573069][ C0] R13: 00000000000000cf R14: 00007fe3c07417f8 R15: 00007fe3c073502e [ 286.573886][ C0] </TASK> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/5hdonndzoqa265oq3bj6iarwtfk5dewxxjtbjvn5uqnwclpwt6@a2n6w3taxxex/ Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc7e097 ] btrfs_prelim_ref() calls the old and new reference variables in the incorrect order. This causes a NULL pointer dereference because oldref is passed as NULL to trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert(). Note, trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert() is being called with newref as oldref (and oldref as NULL) on purpose in order to print out the values of newref. To reproduce: echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/btrfs/btrfs_prelim_ref_insert/enable Perform some writeback operations. Backtrace: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 115949067 P4D 115949067 PUD 11594a067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1188 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-tester+ torvalds#47 PREEMPT(voluntary) 7ca2cef72d5e9c600f0c7718adb6462de8149622 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_btrfs__prelim_ref+0x72/0x130 Code: e8 43 81 9f ff 48 85 c0 74 78 4d 85 e4 0f 84 8f 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 0a 48 89 48 08 48 8b 52 08 48 89 50 10 <49> 8b 55 18 48 89 50 18 49 8b 55 20 48 89 50 20 41 0f b6 55 28 88 RSP: 0018:ffffce44820077a0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff8c6b403f9014 RBX: ffff8c6b55825730 RCX: 304994edf9cf506b RDX: d8b11eb7f0fdb699 RSI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RDI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8c6b4e8fb000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffce44820077a8 R15: ffff8c6b4abd1540 FS: 00007f4dc6813740(0000) GS:ffff8c6c1d378000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000010eb42000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prelim_ref_insert+0x1c1/0x270 find_parent_nodes+0x12a6/0x1ee0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f06/0x101f09 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0x167/0x640 ? fiemap_process_hole+0xd0/0x2c0 extent_fiemap+0xa5c/0xbc0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f05/0x101f09 btrfs_fiemap+0x7e/0xd0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x425/0x9d0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x75/0xc0 Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5595c31 ] Calling core::fmt::write() from rust code while FineIBT is enabled results in a kernel panic: [ 4614.199779] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/cet.c:132! [ 4614.205343] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 4614.211781] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6057 Comm: dmabuf_dump Tainted: G U O 6.12.17-android16-0-g6ab38c534a43 #1 9da040f27673ec3945e23b998a0f8bd64c846599 [ 4614.227832] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE [ 4614.241247] RIP: 0010:do_kernel_cp_fault+0xea/0xf0 ... [ 4614.398144] RIP: 0010:_RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x0/0x20 [ 4614.407792] Code: 48 f7 df 48 0f 48 f9 48 89 f2 89 c6 5d e9 18 fd ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 81 ea 14 61 af 2c 74 03 0f 0b 90 <66> 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 89 f2 48 8b 3f be 01 00 00 00 5d e9 e7 [ 4614.428775] RSP: 0018:ffffb95acfa4ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 4614.434609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 4614.442587] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffb95acfa4ba70 RDI: ffffb95acfa4bc88 [ 4614.450557] RBP: ffffb95acfa4bae0 R08: ffff0a00ffffff05 R09: 0000000000000070 [ 4614.458527] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffab67eaf0 R12: ffffb95acfa4bcc8 [ 4614.466493] R13: ffffffffac5d50f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 4614.474473] ? __cfi__RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x10/0x10 [ 4614.484118] ? _RNvNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt5write+0x1d2/0x250 This happens because core::fmt::write() calls core::fmt::rt::Argument::fmt(), which currently has CFI disabled: library/core/src/fmt/rt.rs: 171 // FIXME: Transmuting formatter in new and indirectly branching to/calling 172 // it here is an explicit CFI violation. 173 #[allow(inline_no_sanitize)] 174 #[no_sanitize(cfi, kcfi)] 175 #[inline] 176 pub(super) unsafe fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result { This causes a Control Protection exception, because FineIBT has sealed off the original function's endbr64. This makes rust currently incompatible with FineIBT. Add a Kconfig dependency that prevents FineIBT from getting turned on by default if rust is enabled. [ Rust 1.88.0 (scheduled for 2025-06-26) should have this fixed [1], and thus we relaxed the condition with Rust >= 1.88. When `objtool` lands checking for this with e.g. [2], the plan is to ideally run that in upstream Rust's CI to prevent regressions early [3], since we do not control `core`'s source code. Alice tested the Rust PR backported to an older compiler. Peter would like that Rust provides a stable `core` which can be pulled into the kernel: "Relying on that much out of tree code is 'unfortunate'". - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Paweł Anikiel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/[email protected]/ [2] Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 (comment) [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/att0-CANiq72kjDM0cKALVy4POEzhfdT4nO7tqz0Pm7xM+3=_0+L1t=A@mail.gmail.com [ Reduced splat. - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

krisman-at-collabora added 3 commits December 28, 2019 14:22

futex: Change WAIT_MULTIPLE opcode to 31

341938d

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>

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