Broken package on Ubuntu with /boot on FAT32 #2

elthariel · 2022-03-28T11:55:49Z

Hi,

I'm running ubuntu focal on a tuxedo pulse 15 and the kernel package tomte is install fails installing because it tries to chmod a file on /boot, which is a fat32 partition:

$> mount  | grep boot 
/dev/nvme0n1p1 on /boot type vfat (rw,relatime,fmask=0022,dmask=0022,codepage=437,iocharset=ascii,shortname=mixed,utf8,errors=remount-ro)

Here's the trace of the install error:

Preparing to unpack .../linux-image-5.13.0-10037-tuxedo_5.13.0-10037.42~20.04.1tux2_amd64.deb ...
Unpacking linux-image-5.13.0-10037-tuxedo (5.13.0-10037.42~20.04.1tux2) ...
dpkg: error processing archive /var/cache/apt/archives/linux-image-5.13.0-10037-tuxedo_5.13.0-10037.42~20.04.1tux2_amd64.deb (--unpack):
 error setting ownership of './boot/vmlinuz-5.13.0-10037-tuxedo': Operation not permitted
dpkg-deb: error: paste subprocess was killed by signal (Broken pipe)
Errors were encountered while processing:
 /var/cache/apt/archives/linux-image-5.13.0-10037-tuxedo_5.13.0-10037.42~20.04.1tux2_amd64.deb
E: Sub-process /usr/bin/dpkg returned an error code (1)

The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:

…_work BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1962230 [ Upstream commit ed05c7c ] When enable debug config, it print below warning while shut down wlan interface shuh as run "ifconfig wlan0 down". The reason is because ar->regd_update_work is ran once, and it is will call wiphy_lock(ar->hw->wiphy) in function ath11k_regd_update() which is running in workqueue of ieee80211_local queued by ieee80211_queue_work(). Another thread from "ifconfig wlan0 down" will also accuqire the lock by wiphy_lock(sdata->local->hw.wiphy) in function ieee80211_stop(), and then it call ieee80211_stop_device() to flush_workqueue(local->workqueue), this will wait the workqueue of ieee80211_local finished. Then deadlock will happen easily if the two thread run meanwhile. Below warning disappeared after this change. [ 914.088798] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: mac remove interface (vdev 0) [ 914.088806] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: mac stop 11d scan [ 914.088810] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: mac stop 11d vdev id 0 [ 914.088827] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc ep 2 consumed 1 credits (total 0) [ 914.088841] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: send 11d scan stop vdev id 0 [ 914.088849] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc insufficient credits ep 2 required 1 available 0 [ 914.088856] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc insufficient credits ep 2 required 1 available 0 [ 914.096434] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: rx ce pipe 2 len 16 [ 914.096442] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc ep 2 got 1 credits (total 1) [ 914.096481] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc ep 2 consumed 1 credits (total 0) [ 914.096491] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: WMI vdev delete id 0 [ 914.111598] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: rx ce pipe 2 len 16 [ 914.111628] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc ep 2 got 1 credits (total 1) [ 914.114659] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: rx ce pipe 2 len 20 [ 914.114742] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: htc rx completion ep 2 skb pK-error [ 914.115977] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: vdev delete resp for vdev id 0 [ 914.116685] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: vdev 00:03:7f:29:61:11 deleted, vdev_id 0 [ 914.117583] ====================================================== [ 914.117592] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 914.117600] 5.16.0-rc1-wt-ath+ #1 Tainted: G OE [ 914.117611] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 914.117618] ifconfig/2805 is trying to acquire lock: [ 914.117628] ffff9c00a62bb548 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x87/0x470 [ 914.117674] but task is already holding lock: [ 914.117682] ffff9c00baea07d0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ieee80211_stop+0x38/0x180 [mac80211] [ 914.117872] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 914.117880] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 914.117888] -> #3 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 914.117910] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0x9c0 [ 914.117930] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 914.117944] reg_process_self_managed_hints+0x3a/0xb0 [cfg80211] [ 914.118093] wiphy_regulatory_register+0x47/0x80 [cfg80211] [ 914.118229] wiphy_register+0x84f/0x9c0 [cfg80211] [ 914.118353] ieee80211_register_hw+0x6b1/0xd90 [mac80211] [ 914.118486] ath11k_mac_register+0x6af/0xb60 [ath11k] [ 914.118550] ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready+0x383/0x4a0 [ath11k] [ 914.118598] ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0x347/0x4a0 [ath11k] [ 914.118656] process_one_work+0x228/0x670 [ 914.118669] worker_thread+0x4d/0x440 [ 914.118680] kthread+0x16d/0x1b0 [ 914.118697] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 914.118714] -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 914.118736] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0x9c0 [ 914.118751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 914.118767] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 914.118783] ath11k_regd_update+0x15a/0x260 [ath11k] [ 914.118841] ath11k_regd_update_work+0x15/0x20 [ath11k] [ 914.118897] process_one_work+0x228/0x670 [ 914.118909] worker_thread+0x4d/0x440 [ 914.118920] kthread+0x16d/0x1b0 [ 914.118934] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 914.118948] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&ar->regd_update_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 914.118972] process_one_work+0x1fa/0x670 [ 914.118984] worker_thread+0x4d/0x440 [ 914.118996] kthread+0x16d/0x1b0 [ 914.119010] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 914.119023] -> #0 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 914.119045] __lock_acquire+0x146d/0x1cf0 [ 914.119057] lock_acquire+0x19b/0x360 [ 914.119067] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x470 [ 914.119084] ieee80211_stop_device+0x3b/0x50 [mac80211] [ 914.119260] ieee80211_do_stop+0x5d7/0x830 [mac80211] [ 914.119409] ieee80211_stop+0x45/0x180 [mac80211] [ 914.119557] __dev_close_many+0xb3/0x120 [ 914.119573] __dev_change_flags+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 914.119590] dev_change_flags+0x29/0x70 [ 914.119605] devinet_ioctl+0x653/0x810 [ 914.119620] inet_ioctl+0x193/0x1e0 [ 914.119631] sock_do_ioctl+0x4d/0xf0 [ 914.119649] sock_ioctl+0x262/0x340 [ 914.119665] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xd0 [ 914.119678] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xd0 [ 914.119694] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 914.119709] other info that might help us debug this: [ 914.119717] Chain exists of: (wq_completion)phy0 --> rtnl_mutex --> &rdev->wiphy.mtx [ 914.119745] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 914.119752] CPU0 CPU1 [ 914.119758] ---- ---- [ 914.119765] lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx); [ 914.119778] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 914.119792] lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx); [ 914.119807] lock((wq_completion)phy0); [ 914.119819] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 914.119827] 2 locks held by ifconfig/2805: [ 914.119837] #0: ffffffffba3dc010 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 914.119872] #1: ffff9c00baea07d0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ieee80211_stop+0x38/0x180 [mac80211] [ 914.120039] stack backtrace: [ 914.120048] CPU: 0 PID: 2805 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-rc1-wt-ath+ #1 [ 914.120064] Hardware name: LENOVO 418065C/418065C, BIOS 83ET63WW (1.33 ) 07/29/2011 [ 914.120074] Call Trace: [ 914.120084] <TASK> [ 914.120094] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa4 [ 914.120119] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 914.120135] print_circular_bug.isra.44+0x221/0x2e0 [ 914.120165] check_noncircular+0x106/0x150 [ 914.120203] __lock_acquire+0x146d/0x1cf0 [ 914.120215] ? __lock_acquire+0x146d/0x1cf0 [ 914.120245] lock_acquire+0x19b/0x360 [ 914.120259] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x470 [ 914.120286] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x6b/0x250 [ 914.120310] flush_workqueue+0xae/0x470 [ 914.120327] ? flush_workqueue+0x87/0x470 [ 914.120344] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xd7/0x150 [ 914.120391] ieee80211_stop_device+0x3b/0x50 [mac80211] [ 914.120565] ? ieee80211_stop_device+0x3b/0x50 [mac80211] [ 914.120736] ieee80211_do_stop+0x5d7/0x830 [mac80211] [ 914.120906] ieee80211_stop+0x45/0x180 [mac80211] [ 914.121060] __dev_close_many+0xb3/0x120 [ 914.121081] __dev_change_flags+0xc3/0x1d0 [ 914.121109] dev_change_flags+0x29/0x70 [ 914.121131] devinet_ioctl+0x653/0x810 [ 914.121149] ? __might_fault+0x77/0x80 [ 914.121179] inet_ioctl+0x193/0x1e0 [ 914.121194] ? inet_ioctl+0x193/0x1e0 [ 914.121218] ? __might_fault+0x77/0x80 [ 914.121238] ? _copy_to_user+0x68/0x80 [ 914.121266] sock_do_ioctl+0x4d/0xf0 [ 914.121283] ? inet_stream_connect+0x60/0x60 [ 914.121297] ? sock_do_ioctl+0x4d/0xf0 [ 914.121329] sock_ioctl+0x262/0x340 [ 914.121347] ? sock_ioctl+0x262/0x340 [ 914.121362] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13b/0x280 [ 914.121388] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x50 [ 914.121416] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xd0 [ 914.121430] ? br_ioctl_call+0x90/0x90 [ 914.121445] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xd0 [ 914.121465] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xd0 [ 914.121482] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 914.121497] RIP: 0033:0x7f0ed051737b [ 914.121513] Code: 0f 1e fa 48 8b 05 15 3b 0d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e5 3a 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 914.121527] RSP: 002b:00007fff7be38b98 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 914.121544] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff7be38ba0 RCX: 00007f0ed051737b [ 914.121555] RDX: 00007fff7be38ba0 RSI: 0000000000008914 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 914.121566] RBP: 00007fff7be38c60 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000001 [ 914.121576] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00000000fffffffe [ 914.121586] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 914.121620] </TASK> Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-01720.1-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-1 Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1962230 [ Upstream commit 767c94c ] With CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y, lockdep reports below warning: [ 166.059415] ============================================ [ 166.059416] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 166.059418] 5.15.0-wt-ath+ #10 Tainted: G W O [ 166.059420] -------------------------------------------- [ 166.059421] kworker/0:2/116 is trying to acquire lock: [ 166.059423] ffff9905f2083160 (&srng->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ath11k_hal_reo_cmd_send+0x20/0x490 [ath11k] [ 166.059440] but task is already holding lock: [ 166.059442] ffff9905f2083230 (&srng->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ath11k_dp_process_reo_status+0x95/0x2d0 [ath11k] [ 166.059491] other info that might help us debug this: [ 166.059492] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 166.059493] CPU0 [ 166.059494] ---- [ 166.059495] lock(&srng->lock); [ 166.059498] lock(&srng->lock); [ 166.059500] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 166.059501] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 166.059502] 3 locks held by kworker/0:2/116: [ 166.059504] #0: ffff9905c0081548 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f6/0x660 [ 166.059511] #1: ffff9d2400a5fe68 ((debug_obj_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f6/0x660 [ 166.059517] #2: ffff9905f2083230 (&srng->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ath11k_dp_process_reo_status+0x95/0x2d0 [ath11k] [ 166.059532] stack backtrace: [ 166.059534] CPU: 0 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/0:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W O 5.15.0-wt-ath+ #10 [ 166.059537] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0059.2019.1112.1124 11/12/2019 [ 166.059539] Workqueue: events free_obj_work [ 166.059543] Call Trace: [ 166.059545] <IRQ> [ 166.059547] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x7b [ 166.059552] __lock_acquire+0xb9a/0x1a50 [ 166.059556] lock_acquire+0x1e2/0x330 [ 166.059560] ? ath11k_hal_reo_cmd_send+0x20/0x490 [ath11k] [ 166.059571] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70 [ 166.059574] ? ath11k_hal_reo_cmd_send+0x20/0x490 [ath11k] [ 166.059584] ath11k_hal_reo_cmd_send+0x20/0x490 [ath11k] [ 166.059594] ath11k_dp_tx_send_reo_cmd+0x3f/0x130 [ath11k] [ 166.059605] ath11k_dp_rx_tid_del_func+0x221/0x370 [ath11k] [ 166.059618] ath11k_dp_process_reo_status+0x22f/0x2d0 [ath11k] [ 166.059632] ? ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x2ea/0x2f0 [ath11k] [ 166.059643] ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x2ea/0x2f0 [ath11k] [ 166.059655] ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x1c/0x70 [ath11k_pci] [ 166.059659] __napi_poll+0x28/0x230 [ 166.059664] net_rx_action+0x285/0x310 [ 166.059668] __do_softirq+0xe6/0x4d2 [ 166.059672] irq_exit_rcu+0xd2/0xf0 [ 166.059675] common_interrupt+0xa5/0xc0 [ 166.059678] </IRQ> [ 166.059679] <TASK> [ 166.059680] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 [ 166.059683] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x70 [ 166.059686] Code: 83 c7 18 e8 2a 95 43 ff 48 89 ef e8 22 d2 43 ff 81 e3 00 02 00 00 75 25 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2d 48 85 db 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 63 2e 40 ff 65 8b 05 8c 59 97 5c 85 c0 74 0a 5b 5d c3 e8 00 6a [ 166.059689] RSP: 0018:ffff9d2400a5fca0 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 166.059692] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000200 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 166.059694] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa404879b RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 166.059696] RBP: ffff9905c0053000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 166.059698] R10: ffff9d2400a5fc50 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffe186c41e2840 [ 166.059700] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9905c78a1c68 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 166.059704] free_debug_processing+0x257/0x3d0 [ 166.059708] ? free_obj_work+0x1f5/0x250 [ 166.059712] __slab_free+0x374/0x5a0 [ 166.059718] ? kmem_cache_free+0x2e1/0x370 [ 166.059721] ? free_obj_work+0x1f5/0x250 [ 166.059724] kmem_cache_free+0x2e1/0x370 [ 166.059727] free_obj_work+0x1f5/0x250 [ 166.059731] process_one_work+0x28b/0x660 [ 166.059735] ? process_one_work+0x660/0x660 [ 166.059738] worker_thread+0x37/0x390 [ 166.059741] ? process_one_work+0x660/0x660 [ 166.059743] kthread+0x176/0x1a0 [ 166.059746] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 [ 166.059749] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 166.059754] </TASK> Since these two lockes are both initialized in ath11k_hal_srng_setup, they are assigned with the same key. As a result lockdep suspects that the task is trying to acquire the same lock (due to same key) while already holding it, and thus reports the DEADLOCK warning. However as they are different spinlock instances, the warning is false positive. On the other hand, even no dead lock indeed, this is a major issue for upstream regression testing as it disables lockdep functionality. Fix it by assigning separate lock class key for each srng->lock. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-01720.1-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-1 Signed-off-by: Baochen Qiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…rors BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1962230 commit 085a9f4 upstream. Use down_read_nested() and down_write_nested() when taking the ctrl->reset_lock rw-sem, passing the number of PCIe hotplug controllers in the path to the PCI root bus as lock subclass parameter. This fixes the following false-positive lockdep report when unplugging a Lenovo X1C8 from a Lenovo 2nd gen TB3 dock: pcieport 0000:06:01.0: pciehp: Slot(1): Link Down pcieport 0000:06:01.0: pciehp: Slot(1): Card not present ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.16.0-rc2+ #621 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- irq/124-pciehp/86 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8e5ac4299ef8 (&ctrl->reset_lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: pciehp_check_presence+0x23/0x80 but task is already holding lock: ffff8e5ac4298af8 (&ctrl->reset_lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: pciehp_ist+0xf3/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&ctrl->reset_lock); lock(&ctrl->reset_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by irq/124-pciehp/86: #0: ffff8e5ac4298af8 (&ctrl->reset_lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: pciehp_ist+0xf3/0x180 #1: ffffffffa3b024e8 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x31/0x110 #2: ffff8e5ac1ee2248 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver+0x1c/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 86 Comm: irq/124-pciehp Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2+ #621 Hardware name: LENOVO 20U90SIT19/20U90SIT19, BIOS N2WET30W (1.20 ) 08/26/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 __lock_acquire.cold+0xc5/0x2c6 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 down_read+0x3e/0x50 pciehp_check_presence+0x23/0x80 pciehp_runtime_resume+0x5c/0xa0 device_for_each_child+0x45/0x70 pcie_port_device_runtime_resume+0x20/0x30 pci_pm_runtime_resume+0xa7/0xc0 __rpm_callback+0x41/0x110 rpm_callback+0x59/0x70 rpm_resume+0x512/0x7b0 __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x90 __device_release_driver+0x28/0x240 device_release_driver+0x26/0x40 pci_stop_bus_device+0x68/0x90 pci_stop_bus_device+0x2c/0x90 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20 pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x6c/0x110 pciehp_disable_slot+0x5b/0xe0 pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xc3/0x2f0 pciehp_ist+0x179/0x180 This lockdep warning is triggered because with Thunderbolt, hotplug ports are nested. When removing multiple devices in a daisy-chain, each hotplug port's reset_lock may be acquired recursively. It's never the same lock, so the lockdep splat is a false positive. Because locks at the same hierarchy level are never acquired recursively, a per-level lockdep class is sufficient to fix the lockdep warning. The choice to use one lockdep subclass per pcie-hotplug controller in the path to the root-bus was made to conserve class keys because their number is limited and the complexity grows quadratically with number of keys according to Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208855 Reported-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1962230 [ Upstream commit f79a609 ] log_max_qp in driver's default profile #2 was set to 18, but FW actually supports 17 at the most - a situation that led to the concerning print when the driver is loaded: "log_max_qp value in current profile is 18, changing to HCA capabaility limit (17)" The expected behavior from mlx5_profile #2 is to match the maximum FW capability in regards to log_max_qp. Thus, log_max_qp in profile #2 is initialized to a defined static value (0xff) - which basically means that when loading this profile, log_max_qp value will be what the currently installed FW supports at most. Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

… devices BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964422 commit 8c9db66 upstream. Suppose we have an environment with a number of non-NPIV FCP devices (virtual HBAs / FCP devices / zfcp "adapter"s) sharing the same physical FCP channel (HBA port) and its I_T nexus. Plus a number of storage target ports zoned to such shared channel. Now one target port logs out of the fabric causing an RSCN. Zfcp reacts with an ADISC ELS and subsequent port recovery depending on the ADISC result. This happens on all such FCP devices (in different Linux images) concurrently as they all receive a copy of this RSCN. In the following we look at one of those FCP devices. Requests other than FSF_QTCB_FCP_CMND can be slow until they get a response. Depending on which requests are affected by slow responses, there are different recovery outcomes. Here we want to fix failed recoveries on port or adapter level by avoiding recovery requests that can be slow. We need the cached N_Port_ID for the remote port "link" test with ADISC. Just before sending the ADISC, we now intentionally forget the old cached N_Port_ID. The idea is that on receiving an RSCN for a port, we have to assume that any cached information about this port is stale. This forces a fresh new GID_PN [FC-GS] nameserver lookup on any subsequent recovery for the same port. Since we typically can still communicate with the nameserver efficiently, we now reach steady state quicker: Either the nameserver still does not know about the port so we stop recovery, or the nameserver already knows the port potentially with a new N_Port_ID and we can successfully and quickly perform open port recovery. For the one case, where ADISC returns successfully, we re-initialize port->d_id because that case does not involve any port recovery. This also solves a problem if the storage WWPN quickly logs into the fabric again but with a different N_Port_ID. Such as on virtual WWPN takeover during target NPIV failover. [https://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/redp5477.html] In that case the RSCN from the storage FDISC was ignored by zfcp and we could not successfully recover the failover. On some later failback on the storage, we could have been lucky if the virtual WWPN got the same old N_Port_ID from the SAN switch as we still had cached. Then the related RSCN triggered a successful port reopen recovery. However, there is no guarantee to get the same N_Port_ID on NPIV FDISC. Even though NPIV-enabled FCP devices are not affected by this problem, this code change optimizes recovery time for gone remote ports as a side effect. The timely drop of cached N_Port_IDs prevents unnecessary slow open port attempts. While the problem might have been in code before v2.6.32 commit 799b76d ("[SCSI] zfcp: Decouple gid_pn requests from erp") this fix depends on the gid_pn_work introduced with that commit, so we mark it as culprit to satisfy fix dependencies. Note: Point-to-point remote port is already handled separately and gets its N_Port_ID from the cached peer_d_id. So resetting port->d_id in general does not affect PtP. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 799b76d ("[SCSI] zfcp: Decouple gid_pn requests from erp") Cc: <[email protected]> #2.6.32+ Suggested-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…y if PMI is pending BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964422 [ Upstream commit fb6433b ] Running selftest with CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG enabled in kernel triggered below warning: [ 172.851380] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 172.851391] WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 2901 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/hw_irq.h:246 power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280 [ 172.851402] Modules linked in: dm_mod bonding nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables rfkill nfnetlink sunrpc xfs libcrc32c pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto uio_pdrv_genirq uio sch_fq_codel ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvscsi ibmveth scsi_transport_srp fuse [ 172.851442] CPU: 8 PID: 2901 Comm: lost_exception_ Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598 #2 [ 172.851451] NIP: c00000000013d600 LR: c00000000013d5a4 CTR: c00000000013b180 [ 172.851458] REGS: c000000017687860 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.16.0-rc5-03218-g798527287598) [ 172.851465] MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48004884 XER: 20040000 [ 172.851482] CFAR: c00000000013d5b4 IRQMASK: 1 [ 172.851482] GPR00: c00000000013d5a4 c000000017687b00 c000000002a10600 0000000000000004 [ 172.851482] GPR04: 0000000082004000 c0000008ba08f0a8 0000000000000000 00000008b7ed0000 [ 172.851482] GPR08: 00000000446194f6 0000000000008000 c00000000013b118 c000000000d58e68 [ 172.851482] GPR12: c00000000013d390 c00000001ec54a80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 172.851482] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000015d5c708 c0000000025396d0 [ 172.851482] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c00000000a3bbf40 0000000000000003 [ 172.851482] GPR24: 0000000000000000 c0000008ba097400 c0000000161e0d00 c00000000a3bb600 [ 172.851482] GPR28: c000000015d5c700 0000000000000001 0000000082384090 c0000008ba0020d8 [ 172.851549] NIP [c00000000013d600] power_pmu_disable+0x270/0x280 [ 172.851557] LR [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280 [ 172.851565] Call Trace: [ 172.851568] [c000000017687b00] [c00000000013d5a4] power_pmu_disable+0x214/0x280 (unreliable) [ 172.851579] [c000000017687b40] [c0000000003403ac] perf_pmu_disable+0x4c/0x60 [ 172.851588] [c000000017687b60] [c0000000003445e4] __perf_event_task_sched_out+0x1d4/0x660 [ 172.851596] [c000000017687c50] [c000000000d1175c] __schedule+0xbcc/0x12a0 [ 172.851602] [c000000017687d60] [c000000000d11ea8] schedule+0x78/0x140 [ 172.851608] [c000000017687d90] [c0000000001a8080] sys_sched_yield+0x20/0x40 [ 172.851615] [c000000017687db0] [c0000000000334dc] system_call_exception+0x18c/0x380 [ 172.851622] [c000000017687e10] [c00000000000c74c] system_call_common+0xec/0x268 The warning indicates that MSR_EE being set(interrupt enabled) when there was an overflown PMC detected. This could happen in power_pmu_disable since it runs under interrupt soft disable condition ( local_irq_save ) and not with interrupts hard disabled. commit 2c9ac51 ("powerpc/perf: Fix PMU callbacks to clear pending PMI before resetting an overflown PMC") intended to clear PMI pending bit in Paca when disabling the PMU. It could happen that PMC gets overflown while code is in power_pmu_disable callback function. Hence add a check to see if PMI pending bit is set in Paca before clearing it via clear_pmi_pending. Fixes: 2c9ac51 ("powerpc/perf: Fix PMU callbacks to clear pending PMI before resetting an overflown PMC") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964422 commit 8b59b0a upstream. arm32 uses software to simulate the instruction replaced by kprobe. some instructions may be simulated by constructing assembly functions. therefore, before executing instruction simulation, it is necessary to construct assembly function execution environment in C language through binding registers. after kasan is enabled, the register binding relationship will be destroyed, resulting in instruction simulation errors and causing kernel panic. the kprobe emulate instruction function is distributed in three files: actions-common.c actions-arm.c actions-thumb.c, so disable KASAN when compiling these files. for example, use kprobe insert on cap_capable+20 after kasan enabled, the cap_capable assembly code is as follows: <cap_capable>: e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr} e1a05000 mov r5, r0 e280006c add r0, r0, #108 ; 0x6c e1a04001 mov r4, r1 e1a06002 mov r6, r2 e59fa090 ldr sl, [pc, #144] ; ebfc7bf8 bl c03aa4b4 <__asan_load4> e595706c ldr r7, [r5, #108] ; 0x6c e2859014 add r9, r5, #20 ...... The emulate_ldr assembly code after enabling kasan is as follows: c06f1384 <emulate_ldr>: e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr} e282803c add r8, r2, #60 ; 0x3c e1a05000 mov r5, r0 e7e37855 ubfx r7, r5, #16, #4 e1a00008 mov r0, r8 e1a09001 mov r9, r1 e1a04002 mov r4, r2 ebf35462 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4> e357000f cmp r7, #15 e7e36655 ubfx r6, r5, #12, #4 e205a00f and sl, r5, #15 0a000001 beq c06f13bc <emulate_ldr+0x38> e0840107 add r0, r4, r7, lsl #2 ebf3545c bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4> e084010a add r0, r4, sl, lsl #2 ebf3545a bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4> e2890010 add r0, r9, #16 ebf35458 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4> e5990010 ldr r0, [r9, #16] e12fff30 blx r0 e356000f cm r6, #15 1a000014 bne c06f1430 <emulate_ldr+0xac> e1a06000 mov r6, r0 e2840040 add r0, r4, #64 ; 0x40 ...... when running in emulate_ldr to simulate the ldr instruction, panic occurred, and the log is as follows: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000090 pgd = ecb46400 [00000090] *pgd=2e0fa003, *pmd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP ARM PC is at cap_capable+0x14/0xb0 LR is at emulate_ldr+0x50/0xc0 psr: 600d0293 sp : ecd63af8 ip : 00000004 fp : c0a7c30c r10: 00000000 r9 : c30897f4 r8 : ecd63cd4 r7 : 0000000f r6 : 0000000a r5 : e59fa090 r4 : ecd63c98 r3 : c06ae294 r2 : 00000000 r1 : b7611300 r0 : bf4ec008 Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 32c5387d Table: 2d546400 DAC: 55555555 Process bash (pid: 1643, stack limit = 0xecd60190) (cap_capable) from (kprobe_handler+0x218/0x340) (kprobe_handler) from (kprobe_trap_handler+0x24/0x48) (kprobe_trap_handler) from (do_undefinstr+0x13c/0x364) (do_undefinstr) from (__und_svc_finish+0x0/0x30) (__und_svc_finish) from (cap_capable+0x18/0xb0) (cap_capable) from (cap_vm_enough_memory+0x38/0x48) (cap_vm_enough_memory) from (security_vm_enough_memory_mm+0x48/0x6c) (security_vm_enough_memory_mm) from (copy_process.constprop.5+0x16b4/0x25c8) (copy_process.constprop.5) from (_do_fork+0xe8/0x55c) (_do_fork) from (SyS_clone+0x1c/0x24) (SyS_clone) from (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10) Code: 0050a0e1 6c0080e2 0140a0e1 0260a0e1 (f801f0e7) Fixes: 35aa1df ("ARM kprobes: instruction single-stepping support") Fixes: 4210157 ("ARM: 9017/2: Enable KASan for ARM") Signed-off-by: huangshaobo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1966021 commit e804861 upstream. Quota disable ioctl starts a transaction before waiting for the qgroup rescan worker completes. However, this wait can be infinite and results in deadlock because of circular dependency among the quota disable ioctl, the qgroup rescan worker and the other task with transaction such as block group relocation task. The deadlock happens with the steps following: 1) Task A calls ioctl to disable quota. It starts a transaction and waits for qgroup rescan worker completes. 2) Task B such as block group relocation task starts a transaction and joins to the transaction that task A started. Then task B commits to the transaction. In this commit, task B waits for a commit by task A. 3) Task C as the qgroup rescan worker starts its job and starts a transaction. In this transaction start, task C waits for completion of the transaction that task A started and task B committed. This deadlock was found with fstests test case btrfs/115 and a zoned null_blk device. The test case enables and disables quota, and the block group reclaim was triggered during the quota disable by chance. The deadlock was also observed by running quota enable and disable in parallel with 'btrfs balance' command on regular null_blk devices. An example report of the deadlock: [372.469894] INFO: task kworker/u16:6:103 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [372.479944] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.485067] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.493898] task:kworker/u16:6 state:D stack: 0 pid: 103 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.503285] Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [372.510782] Call Trace: [372.514092] <TASK> [372.521684] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.530104] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.538842] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.547092] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.555591] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.561894] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x18bb/0x2610 [btrfs] [372.570506] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [372.578875] ? free_unref_page+0x3f2/0x650 [372.585484] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.591594] ? release_extent_buffer+0x224/0x420 [btrfs] [372.599264] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xc13/0x10c0 [btrfs] [372.607157] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [372.613054] ? btrfs_qgroup_account_extent+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs] [372.620960] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [372.627137] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.633215] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [372.639404] btrfs_work_helper+0x1ae/0xa90 [btrfs] [372.646268] process_one_work+0x7e9/0x1320 [372.652321] ? lock_release+0x6d0/0x6d0 [372.658081] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 [372.664513] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [372.670529] worker_thread+0x59e/0xf90 [372.676172] ? process_one_work+0x1320/0x1320 [372.682440] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [372.687550] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [372.693811] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [372.700052] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [372.705517] </TASK> [372.709747] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:2347 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [372.729827] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [372.745907] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [372.767106] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid: 2347 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [372.787776] Call Trace: [372.801652] <TASK> [372.812961] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [372.830011] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [372.852547] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [372.871761] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [372.886792] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [372.901685] wait_current_trans+0x22c/0x310 [btrfs] [372.919743] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x3d0/0x3d0 [btrfs] [372.938923] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [372.959085] ? join_transaction+0xc75/0xe30 [btrfs] [372.977706] start_transaction+0x938/0x10a0 [btrfs] [372.997168] transaction_kthread+0x19d/0x3c0 [btrfs] [373.013021] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction.isra.0+0xfc0/0xfc0 [btrfs] [373.031678] kthread+0x3b9/0x490 [373.047420] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.064645] ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 [373.078571] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [373.091197] </TASK> [373.105611] INFO: task btrfs:3145 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.114147] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.120401] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.130393] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3145 ppid: 3141 flags:0x00004000 [373.140998] Call Trace: [373.145501] <TASK> [373.149654] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.155306] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.161965] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.168469] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3e/0x60 [373.175468] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.180814] wait_for_commit+0x104/0x150 [btrfs] [373.187643] ? test_and_set_bit+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.194772] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.201191] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x69/0x3d0 [btrfs] [373.208738] ? finish_wait+0x270/0x270 [373.214704] ? __btrfs_end_transaction+0x347/0x7b0 [btrfs] [373.222342] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x44d/0x2610 [btrfs] [373.230233] ? join_transaction+0x255/0xe30 [btrfs] [373.237334] ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] [373.245251] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x50/0x50 [btrfs] [373.253296] relocate_block_group+0x105/0xc20 [btrfs] [373.260533] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1270/0x1270 [373.267516] ? btrfs_wait_nocow_writers+0x85/0x180 [btrfs] [373.275155] ? merge_reloc_roots+0x710/0x710 [btrfs] [373.283602] ? btrfs_wait_ordered_extents+0xd30/0xd30 [btrfs] [373.291934] ? kmem_cache_free+0x124/0x550 [373.298180] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x35c/0x930 [btrfs] [373.306047] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x85/0x210 [btrfs] [373.313229] btrfs_balance+0x12f4/0x2d20 [btrfs] [373.320227] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.326206] ? btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x210/0x210 [btrfs] [373.333591] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.340031] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [373.346910] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x548/0x700 [btrfs] [373.354207] btrfs_ioctl+0x7f2/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.360774] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.367957] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [373.375327] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.383841] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.389993] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.395828] ? mntput_no_expire+0xf7/0xad0 [373.402083] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.408249] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.414486] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.420938] ? trace_raw_output_lock+0xb4/0xe0 [373.427442] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.434224] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.440660] ? force_qs_rnp+0x2a0/0x6b0 [373.446534] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9b/0x140 [373.452763] ? __blkcg_punt_bio_submit+0x1b0/0x1b0 [373.459732] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.466089] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.472022] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.477513] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.484823] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f4af7e2bb [373.490493] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbf936178 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.500197] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8f4af7e2bb [373.509451] RDX: 00007ffcbf936220 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.518659] RBP: 00007ffcbf93774a R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 00007f8f4b02d4e0 [373.527872] R10: 00007f8f4ae87740 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [373.537222] R13: 00007ffcbf936220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [373.546506] </TASK> [373.550878] INFO: task btrfs:3146 blocked for more than 123 seconds. [373.559383] Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8 #7 [373.565748] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [373.575748] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid: 3146 ppid: 2168 flags:0x00000000 [373.586314] Call Trace: [373.590846] <TASK> [373.595121] __schedule+0xb56/0x4850 [373.600901] ? __lock_acquire+0x23db/0x5030 [373.607176] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x190/0x190 [373.613954] schedule+0xe0/0x270 [373.619157] schedule_timeout+0x168/0x220 [373.625170] ? usleep_range_state+0x150/0x150 [373.631653] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 [373.637767] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x250 [373.643993] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x17b/0x410 [373.651267] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [373.657677] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [373.664103] wait_for_completion+0x163/0x250 [373.670437] ? bit_wait_timeout+0x160/0x160 [373.676585] btrfs_quota_disable+0x176/0x9a0 [btrfs] [373.683979] ? btrfs_quota_enable+0x12f0/0x12f0 [btrfs] [373.691340] ? down_write+0xd0/0x130 [373.696880] ? down_write_killable+0x150/0x150 [373.703352] btrfs_ioctl+0x3945/0x71b0 [btrfs] [373.710061] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 [373.716192] ? lock_release+0x3a9/0x6d0 [373.722047] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x23cd/0x3050 [373.728486] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x20/0x20 [btrfs] [373.737032] ? set_pte+0x6a/0x90 [373.742271] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x55/0x1f0 [373.748506] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [373.754792] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0 [373.761083] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x349/0x4e0 [373.767521] ? selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x80/0x80 [373.774247] ? __up_read+0x182/0x6e0 [373.780026] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x46/0x60 [373.787281] ? up_write+0x460/0x460 [373.792932] ? security_file_ioctl+0x50/0x90 [373.799232] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [373.805237] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [373.810947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [373.818102] RIP: 0033:0x7f1383ea02bb [373.823847] RSP: 002b:00007fffeb4d71f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [373.833641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1383ea02bb [373.842961] RDX: 00007fffeb4d7210 RSI: 00000000c0109428 RDI: 0000000000000003 [373.852179] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000078 [373.861408] R10: 00007f1383daec78 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fffeb4d874a [373.870647] R13: 0000000000493099 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 [373.879838] </TASK> [373.884018] Showing all locks held in the system: [373.894250] 3 locks held by kworker/4:1/58: [373.900356] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/63: [373.906333] #0: ffffffff8945ff60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 [373.917307] 3 locks held by kworker/u16:6/103: [373.923938] #0: ffff888127b4f138 ((wq_completion)btrfs-qgroup-rescan){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x712/0x1320 [373.936555] #1: ffff88810b817dd8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x73f/0x1320 [373.951109] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x1f6/0x10c0 [btrfs] [373.964027] 2 locks held by less/1803: [373.969982] #0: ffff88813ed56098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x24/0x80 [373.981295] #1: ffffc90000b3b2e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: n_tty_read+0x9e2/0x1060 [373.992969] 1 lock held by btrfs-transacti/2347: [373.999893] #0: ffff88813d4887a8 (&fs_info->transaction_kthread_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: transaction_kthread+0xe3/0x3c0 [btrfs] [374.015872] 3 locks held by btrfs/3145: [374.022298] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl_balance+0xc3/0x700 [btrfs] [374.034456] #1: ffff88813d48a0a0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0xfe5/0x2d20 [btrfs] [374.047646] #2: ffff88813d488838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x354/0x930 [btrfs] [374.063295] 4 locks held by btrfs/3146: [374.069647] #0: ffff888102dd4460 (sb_writers#18){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38b1/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.081601] #1: ffff88813d488bb8 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x38fd/0x71b0 [btrfs] [374.094283] #2: ffff888102dd4650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xc8/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.106885] #3: ffff88813d489800 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_disable+0xd5/0x9a0 [btrfs] [374.126780] ============================================= To avoid the deadlock, wait for the qgroup rescan worker to complete before starting the transaction for the quota disable ioctl. Clear BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag before the wait and the transaction to request the worker to complete. On transaction start failure, set the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag again. These BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag changes can be done safely since the function btrfs_quota_disable is not called concurrently because of fs_info->subvol_sem. Also check the BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLE flag in qgroup_rescan_init to avoid another qgroup rescan worker to start after the previous qgroup worker completed. CC: [email protected] # 5.4+ Suggested-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1966021 commit aad51ca upstream. Add a test that sends large udp packet (which is fragmented) via a stateless nft nat rule, i.e. 'ip saddr set 10.2.3.4' and check that the datagram is received by peer. On kernels without commit 4e1860a ("netfilter: nft_payload: do not update layer 4 checksum when mangling fragments")', this will fail with: cmp: EOF on /tmp/tmp.V1q0iXJyQF which is empty -rw------- 1 root root 4096 Jan 24 22:03 /tmp/tmp.Aaqnq4rBKS -rw------- 1 root root 0 Jan 24 22:03 /tmp/tmp.V1q0iXJyQF ERROR: in and output file mismatch when checking udp with stateless nat FAIL: nftables v1.0.0 (Fearless Fosdick #2) On patched kernels, this will show: PASS: IP statless for ns2-PFp89amx Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1967439 [ Upstream commit 6a0c617 ] Fix the following false positive warning: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.16.0-rc4+ #57 Not tainted ----------------------------- arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:484 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by fc_vcpu 0/330: #0: ffff8884835fc0b0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x88/0x6f0 [kvm] #1: ffffc90004c0bb68 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0x600/0x1860 [kvm] #2: ffffc90004c0c1d0 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_notify_acked_irq+0x36/0x180 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 26 PID: 330 Comm: fc_vcpu 0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57 kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x6b/0x70 [kvm] kvm_notify_acked_irq+0x8d/0x180 [kvm] kvm_ioapic_update_eoi+0x92/0x240 [kvm] kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated+0x2a/0xe0 [kvm] handle_apic_eoi_induced+0x3d/0x60 [kvm_intel] vmx_handle_exit+0x19c/0x6a0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x66e/0x1860 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x438/0x7f0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x38a/0x6f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x89/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Since kvm_unregister_irq_ack_notifier() does synchronize_srcu(&kvm->irq_srcu), kvm->irq_ack_notifier_list is protected by kvm->irq_srcu. In fact, kvm->irq_srcu SRCU read lock is held in kvm_notify_acked_irq(), making it a false positive warning. So use hlist_for_each_entry_srcu() instead of hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(). Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <[email protected]> Message-Id: <f98bac4f5052bad2c26df9ad50f7019e40434512.1643265976.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit 4ff2980 ] in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2(). According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2: if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 if packet is larger than 1280 bytes Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280 Drop packet else Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4 packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer on the encapsulator or by some router along the IPv4 path. endif else if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20) Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). Drop packet. else Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. endif endif Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it. After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation. No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized, then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer cannot decrypt it rightly. 48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) 49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44) 50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000) 51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request 52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below: 1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2] 2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50) 3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 189bdde30b55adbda077d3b8ef1046d8a595ae84) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit 7e0438f upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe66 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") Fixes: 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 662893b4f6bd466ff9e1cd454c44c26d32d554fe) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit c51abd9 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit fe8df44892407e301ed03027639b4d904f12694c) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit d6f5e35 upstream. When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array. This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init() which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them. Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4 [ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2 [ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs] [ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48 [ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0 [ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800 [ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8 [ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1832.132801] Call Trace: [ 1832.132962] <TASK> [ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df [ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df [ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e [ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48 [ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000 [ 1832.142851] </TASK> [ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 39a4bf7d1a23dd172526c2fb0db480c5d5c63bd6) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit aea0b9f upstream. Make the name of the anon inode fd "[landlock-ruleset]" instead of "landlock-ruleset". This is minor but most anon inode fds already carry square brackets around their name: [eventfd] [eventpoll] [fanotify] [fscontext] [io_uring] [pidfd] [signalfd] [timerfd] [userfaultfd] For the sake of consistency lets do the same for the landlock-ruleset anon inode fd that comes with landlock. We did the same in 1cdc415 ("uapi, fsopen: use square brackets around "fscontext" [ver #2]") for the new mount api. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 3d4b396a616d0d67bf95d6823ad1197f6247292e) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit 3886a86 upstream. A missing bounds check in vm_access() can lead to an out-of-bounds read or write in the adjacent memory area, since the len attribute is not validated before the memcpy later in the function, potentially hitting: [ 183.637831] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000c86000 [ 183.637934] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 183.637997] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 183.638059] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100258067 PMD 106341067 PTE 0 [ 183.638144] Oops: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 183.638201] CPU: 3 PID: 1790 Comm: poc Tainted: G D 5.17.0-rc6-ci-drm-11296+ #1 [ 183.638298] Hardware name: Intel Corporation CoffeeLake Client Platform/CoffeeLake H DDR4 RVP, BIOS CNLSFWR1.R00.X208.B00.1905301319 05/30/2019 [ 183.638430] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 183.640213] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001763d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 183.641117] RAX: ffff888109c14000 RBX: ffff888111bece40 RCX: 0000000000000ffc [ 183.642029] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffc90000c86000 RDI: ffff888109c14004 [ 183.642946] RBP: 0000000000000ffc R08: 800000000000016b R09: 0000000000000000 [ 183.643848] R10: ffffc90000c85000 R11: 0000000000000048 R12: 0000000000001000 [ 183.644742] R13: ffff888111bed190 R14: ffff888109c14000 R15: 0000000000001000 [ 183.645653] FS: 00007fe5ef807540(0000) GS:ffff88845b380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 183.646570] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 183.647481] CR2: ffffc90000c86000 CR3: 000000010ff02006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 183.648384] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 183.649271] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 183.650142] Call Trace: [ 183.650988] <TASK> [ 183.651793] vm_access+0x1f0/0x2a0 [i915] [ 183.652726] __access_remote_vm+0x224/0x380 [ 183.653561] mem_rw.isra.0+0xf9/0x190 [ 183.654402] vfs_read+0x9d/0x1b0 [ 183.655238] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0 [ 183.656065] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 [ 183.656882] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 183.657663] RIP: 0033:0x7fe5ef725142 [ 183.659351] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1e81c7e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 183.660227] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557055dfb780 RCX: 00007fe5ef725142 [ 183.661104] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffe1e81d880 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 183.661972] RBP: 00007ffe1e81e890 R08: 0000000000000030 R09: 0000000000000046 [ 183.662832] R10: 0000557055dfc2e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000557055dfb1c0 [ 183.663691] R13: 00007ffe1e81e980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Changes since v1: - Updated if condition with range_overflows_t [Chris Wilson] Fixes: 9f909e2 ("drm/i915: Implement vm_ops->access for gdb access into mmaps") Signed-off-by: Mastan Katragadda <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Adam Zabrocki <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jackson Cody <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Jon Bloomfield <[email protected]> Cc: Sudeep Dutt <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.8+ Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> [mauld: tidy up the commit message and add Cc: stable] Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 661412e) Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 312d3d4f49e12f97260bcf972c848c3562126a18) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit 18b1ab7 ] Fix a race in the xsk socket teardown code that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference splat. The current xsk unbind code in xsk_unbind_dev() starts by setting xs->state to XSK_UNBOUND, sets xs->dev to NULL and then waits for any NAPI processing to terminate using synchronize_net(). After that, the release code starts to tear down the socket state and free allocated memory. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 PGD 8000000932469067 P4D 8000000932469067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 25 PID: 69132 Comm: grpcpp_sync_ser Tainted: G I 5.16.0+ #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0599V5, BIOS 1.2.10 03/09/2015 RIP: 0010:__xsk_sendmsg+0x2c/0x690 [...] RSP: 0018:ffffa2348bd13d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffff8d5fc632d258 RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: ffffa2348bd13e10 RDI: ffff8d5fc5489800 RBP: ffffa2348bd13db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffffffff000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d5fc5489800 R13: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R14: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f991cff9400(0000) GS:ffff8d6f1f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000114888005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1b0 xsk_sendmsg+0xf0/0x110 sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x190 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x23/0x50 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa5/0x1d0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae There are two problems with the current code. First, setting xs->dev to NULL before waiting for all users to stop using the socket is not correct. The entry to the data plane functions xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), and xsk_recvmsg() are all guarded by a test that xs->state is in the state XSK_BOUND and if not, it returns right away. But one process might have passed this test but still have not gotten to the point in which it uses xs->dev in the code. In this interim, a second process executing xsk_unbind_dev() might have set xs->dev to NULL which will lead to a crash for the first process. The solution here is just to get rid of this NULL assignment since it is not used anymore. Before commit 42fddcc ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization"), xs->dev was the gatekeeper to admit processes into the data plane functions, but it was replaced with the state variable xs->state in the aforementioned commit. The second problem is that synchronize_net() does not wait for any process in xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() to complete, which means that the state they rely on might be cleaned up prematurely. This can happen when the notifier gets called (at driver unload for example) as it uses xsk_unbind_dev(). Solve this by extending the RCU critical region from just the ndo_xsk_wakeup to the whole functions mentioned above, so that both the test of xs->state == XSK_BOUND and the last use of any member of xs is covered by the RCU critical section. This will guarantee that when synchronize_net() completes, there will be no processes left executing xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() and state can be cleaned up safely. Note that we need to drop the RCU lock for the skb xmit path as it uses functions that might sleep. Due to this, we have to retest the xs->state after we grab the mutex that protects the skb xmit code from, among a number of things, an xsk_unbind_dev() being executed from the notifier at the same time. Fixes: 42fddcc ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization") Reported-by: Elza Mathew <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ad7219cd8751bd258b9d1e69ae0654ec00f71875) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit fe2640b ] In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed. Fixes: 2dd9c11 ("powerpc/pseries: use pci_host_bridge.release_fn() to kfree(phb)") Reported-by: David Dai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 33d39efb61a84e055ca2386157d39ebbdf6b7d31) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit 841aee4 ] Put NVMe/TCP sockets in their own class to avoid some lockdep warnings. Sockets created by nvme-tcp are not exposed to user-space, and will not trigger certain code paths that the general socket API exposes. Lockdep complains about a circular dependency between the socket and filesystem locks, because setsockopt can trigger a page fault with a socket lock held, but nvme-tcp sends requests on the socket while file system locks are held. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.0-rc3 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ fio/1496 is trying to acquire lock: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendpage+0x23/0x80 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xfs_ilock+0xcf/0x290 [xfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. other info that might help us debug this: chain exists of: sk_lock-AF_INET --> sb_internal --> &xfs_dir_ilock_class/5 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5); lock(sb_internal); lock(&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by fio/1496: #0: (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: path_openat+0x9fc/0xa20 #1: (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++}-{3:3}, at: path_openat+0x296/0xa20 #2: (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: xfs_trans_alloc_icreate+0x41/0xd0 [xfs] #3: (&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xfs_ilock+0xcf/0x290 [xfs] #4: (hctx->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: hctx_lock+0x51/0xd0 #5: (&queue->send_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0x33e/0x380 [nvme_tcp] This annotation lets lockdep analyze nvme-tcp controlled sockets independently of what the user-space sockets API does. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/CAHj4cs9MDYLJ+q+2_GXUK9HxFizv2pxUryUR0toX974M040z7g@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Chris Leech <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ffe0c4916795495e826ea2f209b48a2851ac3a43) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit a80ced6 upstream. As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 3fa2d747960521a646fc1aad7aea82e95e139a68) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969107 [ Upstream commit 447c799 ] Noticed the below warning while running a pytorch workload on vega10 GPUs. Change to trylock to avoid conflicts with already held reservation locks. [ +0.000003] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ +0.000003] 5.13.0-kfd-rajneesh #1030 Not tainted [ +0.000004] -------------------------------------------- [ +0.000002] python/4822 is trying to acquire lock: [ +0.000004] ffff932cd9a259f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000203] but task is already holding lock: [ +0.000003] ffff932cbb7181f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ttm_eu_reserve_buffers+0x270/0x470 [ttm] [ +0.000017] other info that might help us debug this: [ +0.000002] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ +0.000003] CPU0 [ +0.000002] ---- [ +0.000002] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ +0.000004] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ +0.000003] *** DEADLOCK *** [ +0.000002] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ +0.000003] 7 locks held by python/4822: [ +0.000003] #0: ffff932c4ac028d0 (&process->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kfd_ioctl_map_memory_to_gpu+0x10b/0x320 [amdgpu] [ +0.000232] #1: ffff932c55e830a8 (&info->lock#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x64/0xf60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000241] #2: ffff932cc45b5e68 (&(*mem)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0xdf/0xf60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000236] #3: ffffb2b35606fd28 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x232/0xf60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000235] #4: ffff932cbb7181f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ttm_eu_reserve_buffers+0x270/0x470 [ttm] [ +0.000015] #5: ffffffffc045f700 (*(sspp++)){....}-{0:0}, at: drm_dev_enter+0x5/0xa0 [drm] [ +0.000038] #6: ffff932c52da7078 (&vm->eviction_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_vm_bo_update_mapping+0xd5/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000195] stack backtrace: [ +0.000003] CPU: 11 PID: 4822 Comm: python Not tainted 5.13.0-kfd-rajneesh #1030 [ +0.000005] Hardware name: GIGABYTE MZ01-CE0-00/MZ01-CE0-00, BIOS F02 08/29/2018 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000003] dump_stack+0x6d/0x89 [ +0.000010] __lock_acquire+0xb93/0x1a90 [ +0.000009] lock_acquire+0x25d/0x2d0 [ +0.000005] ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000184] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa2/0x110 [ +0.000006] ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000184] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.17+0xca/0x1060 [ +0.000007] ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000183] ? lock_release+0x13f/0x270 [ +0.000005] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa2/0x110 [ +0.000006] ? amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000183] amdgpu_bo_release_notify+0xc4/0x160 [amdgpu] [ +0.000185] ttm_bo_release+0x4c6/0x580 [ttm] [ +0.000010] amdgpu_bo_unref+0x1a/0x30 [amdgpu] [ +0.000183] amdgpu_vm_free_table+0x76/0xa0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000189] amdgpu_vm_free_pts+0xb8/0xf0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000189] amdgpu_vm_update_ptes+0x411/0x770 [amdgpu] [ +0.000191] amdgpu_vm_bo_update_mapping+0x324/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000191] amdgpu_vm_bo_update+0x251/0x610 [amdgpu] [ +0.000191] update_gpuvm_pte+0xcc/0x290 [amdgpu] [ +0.000229] ? amdgpu_vm_bo_map+0xd7/0x130 [amdgpu] [ +0.000190] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu+0x912/0xf60 [amdgpu] [ +0.000234] kfd_ioctl_map_memory_to_gpu+0x182/0x320 [amdgpu] [ +0.000218] kfd_ioctl+0x2b9/0x600 [amdgpu] [ +0.000216] ? kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0x270/0x270 [amdgpu] [ +0.000216] ? lock_release+0x13f/0x270 [ +0.000006] ? __fget_files+0x107/0x1e0 [ +0.000007] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xd0 [ +0.000007] do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70 [ +0.000004] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ +0.000007] RIP: 0033:0x7fbff90a7317 [ +0.000004] Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 71 4b 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 41 4b 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ +0.000005] RSP: 002b:00007fbe301fe648 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ +0.000006] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbcc402d820 RCX: 00007fbff90a7317 [ +0.000003] RDX: 00007fbe301fe690 RSI: 00000000c0184b18 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ +0.000003] RBP: 00007fbe301fe690 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fbcc402d880 [ +0.000003] R10: 0000000002001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c0184b18 [ +0.000003] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007fbf689593a0 R15: 00007fbcc402d820 Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 0a922366d6d9b2532344b3763a54090ab9b50f59) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969107 [ Upstream commit 829cc0e ] The copy test uses the memcpy() to copy data between IO memory spaces. This can trigger an alignment fault error (pasted the error logs below) because memcpy() may use unaligned accesses on a mapped memory that is just IO, which does not support unaligned memory accesses. Fix it by using the correct memcpy API to copy from/to IO memory. Alignment fault error logs: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000101cd3c1 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000021 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021 CM = 0, WnR = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081773000 [ffff8000101cd3c1] pgd=1000000082410003, p4d=1000000082410003, pud=1000000082411003, pmd=1000000082412003, pte=0068004000001f13 Internal error: Oops: 96000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/0:0H Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-next-20210914-dirty #2 Hardware name: LS1012A RDB Board (DT) Workqueue: kpcitest pci_epf_test_cmd_handler pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __memcpy+0x168/0x230 lr : pci_epf_test_cmd_handler+0x6f0/0xa68 sp : ffff80001003bce0 x29: ffff80001003bce0 x28: ffff800010135000 x27: ffff8000101e5000 x26: ffff8000101cd000 x25: ffff6cda941cf6c8 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff6cda863f2000 x22: ffff6cda9096c800 x21: ffff800010135000 x20: ffff6cda941cf680 x19: ffffaf39fd999000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffaf39fd2b6000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 15f5c8fa2f984d57 x12: 604d132b60275454 x11: 065cee5e5fb428b6 x10: aae662eb17d0cf3e x9 : 1d97c9a1b4ddef37 x8 : 7541b65edebf928c x7 : e71937c4fc595de0 x6 : b8a0e09562430d1c x5 : ffff8000101e5401 x4 : ffff8000101cd401 x3 : ffff8000101e5380 x2 : fffffffffffffff1 x1 : ffff8000101cd3c0 x0 : ffff8000101e5000 Call trace: __memcpy+0x168/0x230 process_one_work+0x1ec/0x370 worker_thread+0x44/0x478 kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: a984346c a9c4342c f1010042 54fffee8 (a97c3c8e) ---[ end trace 568c28c7b6336335 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Hou Zhiqiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit bd21b9607bd76529b3cb8bc722f0beaa4aa508ae) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969857 [ Upstream commit 8b2c181 ] There is possible circular locking dependency detected on event_mutex (see below logs). This is due to set fail safe mode is done at dp_panel_read_sink_caps() within event_mutex scope. To break this possible circular locking, this patch move setting fail safe mode out of event_mutex scope. [ 23.958078] ====================================================== [ 23.964430] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 23.970777] 5.17.0-rc2-lockdep-00088-g05241de1f69e #148 Not tainted [ 23.977219] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 23.983570] DrmThread/1574 is trying to acquire lock: [ 23.988763] ffffff808423aab0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_dp_displ ay_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 23.997895] [ 23.997895] but task is already holding lock: [ 24.003895] ffffff808420b280 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_c rtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.012495] [ 24.012495] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 24.012495] [ 24.020886] [ 24.020886] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 24.028570] [ 24.028570] -> #5 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.035472] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.039695] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.044272] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.048222] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.053413] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.057452] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.062826] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.067403] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.072508] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.077086] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.081123] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.085602] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.090895] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.095294] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.100668] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.105242] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.109548] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.114381] el0t_32_sync+0x178 [ 24.118688] [ 24.118688] -> #4 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.125408] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.129628] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.134204] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.138155] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.143345] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.147382] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.152755] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.157323] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x68/0x90 [ 24.162869] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x394/0x648 [ 24.167535] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.172102] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.176135] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.180621] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.185904] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.190302] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.195673] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.200241] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.204544] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.209378] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 [ 24.213680] -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.220308] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.20+0xe8/0x878 [ 24.225951] ww_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd0 [ 24.230166] modeset_lock+0x190/0x19c [ 24.234467] drm_modeset_lock+0x34/0x54 [ 24.238953] drmm_mode_config_init+0x550/0x764 [ 24.244065] msm_drm_bind+0x170/0x59c [ 24.248374] try_to_bring_up_master+0x244/0x294 [ 24.253572] __component_add+0xf4/0x14c [ 24.258057] component_add+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.262273] dsi_dev_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.266575] dsi_host_attach+0xc4/0x120 [ 24.271060] mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x48 [ 24.275456] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x28/0x68 [ 24.280298] ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x2b4/0x2dc [ 24.285137] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x78/0x90 [ 24.289893] really_probe+0x1e4/0x3d8 [ 24.294194] __driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x164 [ 24.299298] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xf8 [ 24.304043] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x118 [ 24.309145] bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd4 [ 24.313628] __device_attach+0xcc/0x158 [ 24.318112] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [ 24.322954] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x9c [ 24.327439] deferred_probe_work_func+0xd4/0xf0 [ 24.332628] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.337289] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48 [ 24.342391] worker_thread+0x1e4/0x26c [ 24.346788] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.350470] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 24.361489] drm_modeset_acquire_init+0xe4/0x138 [ 24.366777] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x44/0x114 [ 24.372327] check_connector_changed+0xbc/0x198 [ 24.377517] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xcc/0x11c [ 24.382804] dsi_hpd_worker+0x24/0x30 [ 24.387104] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.391762] worker_thread+0x1d0/0x26c [ 24.396158] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.399840] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.404053] [ 24.404053] -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.411032] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.415247] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.419819] dp_panel_read_sink_caps+0x23c/0x26c [ 24.425108] dp_display_process_hpd_high+0x34/0xd4 [ 24.430570] dp_display_usbpd_configure_cb+0x30/0x3c [ 24.436205] hpd_event_thread+0x2ac/0x550 [ 24.440864] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.444544] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.448757] [ 24.448757] -> #0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.455116] __lock_acquire+0xe2c/0x10d8 [ 24.459690] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x2d0 [ 24.463988] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.468201] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.472773] msm_dp_display_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 24.477789] dp_bridge_enable+0x24/0x30 [ 24.482273] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x78/0x9c [ 24.488006] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1bc/0x244 [ 24.494801] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x248/0x3d0 [ 24.499992] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.504031] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.509404] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.513976] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.519079] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.523650] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.527689] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.532175] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.537463] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.541861] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.547235] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.551806] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.556106] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.560948] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 Changes in v2: -- add circular lockiing trace Fixes: d4aca42 ("drm/msm/dp: always add fail-safe mode into connector mode list") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481396/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit 4ff2980 ] in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2(). According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2: if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 if packet is larger than 1280 bytes Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280 Drop packet else Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4 packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer on the encapsulator or by some router along the IPv4 path. endif else if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20) Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). Drop packet. else Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. endif endif Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it. After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation. No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized, then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer cannot decrypt it rightly. 48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) 49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44) 50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000) 51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request 52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below: 1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2] 2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50) 3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 189bdde30b55adbda077d3b8ef1046d8a595ae84) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit 7e0438f upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe66 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") Fixes: 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 662893b4f6bd466ff9e1cd454c44c26d32d554fe) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit c51abd9 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit fe8df44892407e301ed03027639b4d904f12694c) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit d6f5e35 upstream. When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array. This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init() which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them. Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4 [ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2 [ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs] [ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48 [ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0 [ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800 [ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8 [ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1832.132801] Call Trace: [ 1832.132962] <TASK> [ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df [ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df [ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e [ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48 [ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000 [ 1832.142851] </TASK> [ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 39a4bf7d1a23dd172526c2fb0db480c5d5c63bd6) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit aea0b9f upstream. Make the name of the anon inode fd "[landlock-ruleset]" instead of "landlock-ruleset". This is minor but most anon inode fds already carry square brackets around their name: [eventfd] [eventpoll] [fanotify] [fscontext] [io_uring] [pidfd] [signalfd] [timerfd] [userfaultfd] For the sake of consistency lets do the same for the landlock-ruleset anon inode fd that comes with landlock. We did the same in 1cdc415 ("uapi, fsopen: use square brackets around "fscontext" [ver #2]") for the new mount api. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 3d4b396a616d0d67bf95d6823ad1197f6247292e) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 commit 3886a86 upstream. A missing bounds check in vm_access() can lead to an out-of-bounds read or write in the adjacent memory area, since the len attribute is not validated before the memcpy later in the function, potentially hitting: [ 183.637831] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000c86000 [ 183.637934] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 183.637997] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 183.638059] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100258067 PMD 106341067 PTE 0 [ 183.638144] Oops: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 183.638201] CPU: 3 PID: 1790 Comm: poc Tainted: G D 5.17.0-rc6-ci-drm-11296+ #1 [ 183.638298] Hardware name: Intel Corporation CoffeeLake Client Platform/CoffeeLake H DDR4 RVP, BIOS CNLSFWR1.R00.X208.B00.1905301319 05/30/2019 [ 183.638430] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 183.640213] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001763d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 183.641117] RAX: ffff888109c14000 RBX: ffff888111bece40 RCX: 0000000000000ffc [ 183.642029] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffc90000c86000 RDI: ffff888109c14004 [ 183.642946] RBP: 0000000000000ffc R08: 800000000000016b R09: 0000000000000000 [ 183.643848] R10: ffffc90000c85000 R11: 0000000000000048 R12: 0000000000001000 [ 183.644742] R13: ffff888111bed190 R14: ffff888109c14000 R15: 0000000000001000 [ 183.645653] FS: 00007fe5ef807540(0000) GS:ffff88845b380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 183.646570] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 183.647481] CR2: ffffc90000c86000 CR3: 000000010ff02006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 183.648384] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 183.649271] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 183.650142] Call Trace: [ 183.650988] <TASK> [ 183.651793] vm_access+0x1f0/0x2a0 [i915] [ 183.652726] __access_remote_vm+0x224/0x380 [ 183.653561] mem_rw.isra.0+0xf9/0x190 [ 183.654402] vfs_read+0x9d/0x1b0 [ 183.655238] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0 [ 183.656065] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 [ 183.656882] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 183.657663] RIP: 0033:0x7fe5ef725142 [ 183.659351] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1e81c7e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 183.660227] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557055dfb780 RCX: 00007fe5ef725142 [ 183.661104] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffe1e81d880 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 183.661972] RBP: 00007ffe1e81e890 R08: 0000000000000030 R09: 0000000000000046 [ 183.662832] R10: 0000557055dfc2e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000557055dfb1c0 [ 183.663691] R13: 00007ffe1e81e980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Changes since v1: - Updated if condition with range_overflows_t [Chris Wilson] Fixes: 9f909e2 ("drm/i915: Implement vm_ops->access for gdb access into mmaps") Signed-off-by: Mastan Katragadda <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Adam Zabrocki <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jackson Cody <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Jon Bloomfield <[email protected]> Cc: Sudeep Dutt <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.8+ Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> [mauld: tidy up the commit message and add Cc: stable] Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 661412e) Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 312d3d4f49e12f97260bcf972c848c3562126a18) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1969110 [ Upstream commit 18b1ab7 ] Fix a race in the xsk socket teardown code that can lead to a NULL pointer dereference splat. The current xsk unbind code in xsk_unbind_dev() starts by setting xs->state to XSK_UNBOUND, sets xs->dev to NULL and then waits for any NAPI processing to terminate using synchronize_net(). After that, the release code starts to tear down the socket state and free allocated memory. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 PGD 8000000932469067 P4D 8000000932469067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 25 PID: 69132 Comm: grpcpp_sync_ser Tainted: G I 5.16.0+ #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0599V5, BIOS 1.2.10 03/09/2015 RIP: 0010:__xsk_sendmsg+0x2c/0x690 [...] RSP: 0018:ffffa2348bd13d50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffff8d5fc632d258 RDX: 0000000000400000 RSI: ffffa2348bd13e10 RDI: ffff8d5fc5489800 RBP: ffffa2348bd13db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffffffff000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d5fc5489800 R13: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R14: ffff8d5fcb0f5140 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f991cff9400(0000) GS:ffff8d6f1f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000114888005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1b0 xsk_sendmsg+0xf0/0x110 sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x190 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x23/0x50 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xa5/0x1d0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae There are two problems with the current code. First, setting xs->dev to NULL before waiting for all users to stop using the socket is not correct. The entry to the data plane functions xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), and xsk_recvmsg() are all guarded by a test that xs->state is in the state XSK_BOUND and if not, it returns right away. But one process might have passed this test but still have not gotten to the point in which it uses xs->dev in the code. In this interim, a second process executing xsk_unbind_dev() might have set xs->dev to NULL which will lead to a crash for the first process. The solution here is just to get rid of this NULL assignment since it is not used anymore. Before commit 42fddcc ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization"), xs->dev was the gatekeeper to admit processes into the data plane functions, but it was replaced with the state variable xs->state in the aforementioned commit. The second problem is that synchronize_net() does not wait for any process in xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() to complete, which means that the state they rely on might be cleaned up prematurely. This can happen when the notifier gets called (at driver unload for example) as it uses xsk_unbind_dev(). Solve this by extending the RCU critical region from just the ndo_xsk_wakeup to the whole functions mentioned above, so that both the test of xs->state == XSK_BOUND and the last use of any member of xs is covered by the RCU critical section. This will guarantee that when synchronize_net() completes, there will be no processes left executing xsk_poll(), xsk_sendmsg(), or xsk_recvmsg() and state can be cleaned up safely. Note that we need to drop the RCU lock for the skb xmit path as it uses functions that might sleep. Due to this, we have to retest the xs->state after we grab the mutex that protects the skb xmit code from, among a number of things, an xsk_unbind_dev() being executed from the notifier at the same time. Fixes: 42fddcc ("xsk: use state member for socket synchronization") Reported-by: Elza Mathew <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ad7219cd8751bd258b9d1e69ae0654ec00f71875) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2104873 [ Upstream commit e4b6b66 ] When using touchscreen and framebuffer, Nokia 770 crashes easily with: BUG: scheduling while atomic: irq/144-ads7846/82/0x00010000 Modules linked in: usb_f_ecm g_ether usb_f_rndis u_ether libcomposite configfs omap_udc ohci_omap ohci_hcd CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: irq/144-ads7846 Not tainted 6.12.7-770 #2 Hardware name: Nokia 770 Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x5c dump_stack_lvl from __schedule_bug+0x50/0x70 __schedule_bug from __schedule+0x4d4/0x5bc __schedule from schedule+0x34/0xa0 schedule from schedule_preempt_disabled+0xc/0x10 schedule_preempt_disabled from __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x218/0x3b4 __mutex_lock.constprop.0 from clk_prepare_lock+0x38/0xe4 clk_prepare_lock from clk_set_rate+0x18/0x154 clk_set_rate from sossi_read_data+0x4c/0x168 sossi_read_data from hwa742_read_reg+0x5c/0x8c hwa742_read_reg from send_frame_handler+0xfc/0x300 send_frame_handler from process_pending_requests+0x74/0xd0 process_pending_requests from lcd_dma_irq_handler+0x50/0x74 lcd_dma_irq_handler from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x44/0x130 __handle_irq_event_percpu from handle_irq_event+0x28/0x68 handle_irq_event from handle_level_irq+0x9c/0x170 handle_level_irq from generic_handle_domain_irq+0x2c/0x3c generic_handle_domain_irq from omap1_handle_irq+0x40/0x8c omap1_handle_irq from generic_handle_arch_irq+0x28/0x3c generic_handle_arch_irq from call_with_stack+0x1c/0x24 call_with_stack from __irq_svc+0x94/0xa8 Exception stack(0xc5255da0 to 0xc5255de8) 5da0: 00000001 c22fc620 00000000 00000000 c08384a8 c106fc00 00000000 c240c248 5dc0: c113a600 c3f6ec30 00000001 00000000 c22fc620 c5255df0 c22fc620 c0279a94 5de0: 60000013 ffffffff __irq_svc from clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xe4 clk_prepare_lock from clk_get_rate+0x10/0x74 clk_get_rate from uwire_setup_transfer+0x40/0x180 uwire_setup_transfer from spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x2c/0x9c spi_bitbang_transfer_one from spi_transfer_one_message+0x2d0/0x664 spi_transfer_one_message from __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x29c/0x498 __spi_pump_transfer_message from __spi_sync+0x1f8/0x2e8 __spi_sync from spi_sync+0x24/0x40 spi_sync from ads7846_halfd_read_state+0x5c/0x1c0 ads7846_halfd_read_state from ads7846_irq+0x58/0x348 ads7846_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x120/0x228 irq_thread from kthread+0xc8/0xe8 kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 As a quick fix, switch to a threaded IRQ which provides a stable system. Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2104873 [ Upstream commit 6d00234 ] Function xen_pin_page calls xen_pte_lock, which in turn grab page table lock (ptlock). When locking, xen_pte_lock expect mm->page_table_lock to be held before grabbing ptlock, but this does not happen when pinning is caused by xen_mm_pin_all. This commit addresses lockdep warning below, which shows up when suspending a Xen VM. [ 3680.658422] Freezing user space processes [ 3680.660156] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds) [ 3680.660182] OOM killer disabled. [ 3680.660192] Freezing remaining freezable tasks [ 3680.661485] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds) [ 3680.685254] [ 3680.685265] ================================== [ 3680.685269] WARNING: Nested lock was not taken [ 3680.685274] 6.12.0+ #16 Tainted: G W [ 3680.685279] ---------------------------------- [ 3680.685283] migration/0/19 is trying to lock: [ 3680.685288] ffff88800bac33c0 (ptlock_ptr(ptdesc)#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685303] [ 3680.685303] but this task is not holding: [ 3680.685308] init_mm.page_table_lock [ 3680.685311] [ 3680.685311] stack backtrace: [ 3680.685316] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.0+ #16 [ 3680.685324] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3680.685328] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0 [ 3680.685339] Call Trace: [ 3680.685344] <TASK> [ 3680.685347] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 3680.685356] __lock_acquire+0x917/0x2310 [ 3680.685364] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0 [ 3680.685369] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685373] _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70 [ 3680.685381] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685386] xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685390] ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685394] __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0 [ 3680.685401] ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100 [ 3680.685405] __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250 [ 3680.685410] xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0 [ 3680.685415] xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280 [ 3680.685420] xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0 [ 3680.685428] multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120 [ 3680.685432] ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60 [ 3680.685439] ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685443] cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140 [ 3680.685448] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0 [ 3680.685454] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685458] smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0 [ 3680.685462] kthread+0xde/0x110 [ 3680.685467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685471] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 3680.685478] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685482] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3680.685489] </TASK> [ 3680.685491] [ 3680.685491] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3680.685497] 1 lock held by migration/0/19: [ 3680.685500] #0: ffffffff8284df38 (pgd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_mm_pin_all+0x14/0xa0 [ 3680.685512] [ 3680.685512] stack backtrace: [ 3680.685518] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.0+ #16 [ 3680.685528] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3680.685531] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0 [ 3680.685538] Call Trace: [ 3680.685541] <TASK> [ 3680.685544] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 3680.685549] __lock_acquire+0x93c/0x2310 [ 3680.685554] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0 [ 3680.685558] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685562] _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70 [ 3680.685568] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685572] xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685578] ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685582] __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0 [ 3680.685588] ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100 [ 3680.685592] __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250 [ 3680.685596] xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0 [ 3680.685600] xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280 [ 3680.685607] xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0 [ 3680.685611] multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120 [ 3680.685615] ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60 [ 3680.685620] ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685625] cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140 [ 3680.685629] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0 [ 3680.685634] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685638] smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0 [ 3680.685642] kthread+0xde/0x110 [ 3680.685645] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685649] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 3680.685654] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685657] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3680.685662] </TASK> [ 3680.685267] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout [ 3680.685921] OOM killer enabled. [ 3680.685934] Restarting tasks ... done. Signed-off-by: Maksym Planeta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

…ea as VM_ALLOC BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106494 [ Upstream commit d262a19 ] Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4 with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293 CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac Call Trace: [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable) [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504 [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108 [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478 [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14 [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4 [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890 [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420 [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274 NIP: 005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8 REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4) MSR: 0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004422 XER: 00000000 GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932 GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57 GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002 GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001 NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274 LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c --- interrupt: c00 The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at [f1000000, f1002000) created by: text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30 flags: 0x80000000(zone=2) raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 raw: 00000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ^ f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ================================================================== f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not initialised hence not supposed to be used yet. Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is never called for that area. That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault") The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/ Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 [ Upstream commit c7b87ce ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 [ Upstream commit 9860370 ] irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> CVE-2025-21684 Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 commit b0fce54 upstream. syz reports an out of bounds read: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline] ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078 ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981 ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003 ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline] path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984 do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014 do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000 </TASK> ================================================================== And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert: ================================================================== loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768 JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280 Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00 e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088 do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000103 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2dafda3a99 RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09: 000055555a6784c0 R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe336a6680 R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007f2dafdec03b </TASK> ================================================================== The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero. Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/[email protected]/T/#u Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/ Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 [ Upstream commit 6d00234 ] Function xen_pin_page calls xen_pte_lock, which in turn grab page table lock (ptlock). When locking, xen_pte_lock expect mm->page_table_lock to be held before grabbing ptlock, but this does not happen when pinning is caused by xen_mm_pin_all. This commit addresses lockdep warning below, which shows up when suspending a Xen VM. [ 3680.658422] Freezing user space processes [ 3680.660156] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds) [ 3680.660182] OOM killer disabled. [ 3680.660192] Freezing remaining freezable tasks [ 3680.661485] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds) [ 3680.685254] [ 3680.685265] ================================== [ 3680.685269] WARNING: Nested lock was not taken [ 3680.685274] 6.12.0+ #16 Tainted: G W [ 3680.685279] ---------------------------------- [ 3680.685283] migration/0/19 is trying to lock: [ 3680.685288] ffff88800bac33c0 (ptlock_ptr(ptdesc)#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685303] [ 3680.685303] but this task is not holding: [ 3680.685308] init_mm.page_table_lock [ 3680.685311] [ 3680.685311] stack backtrace: [ 3680.685316] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.0+ #16 [ 3680.685324] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3680.685328] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0 [ 3680.685339] Call Trace: [ 3680.685344] <TASK> [ 3680.685347] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 3680.685356] __lock_acquire+0x917/0x2310 [ 3680.685364] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0 [ 3680.685369] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685373] _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70 [ 3680.685381] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685386] xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685390] ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685394] __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0 [ 3680.685401] ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100 [ 3680.685405] __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250 [ 3680.685410] xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0 [ 3680.685415] xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280 [ 3680.685420] xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0 [ 3680.685428] multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120 [ 3680.685432] ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60 [ 3680.685439] ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685443] cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140 [ 3680.685448] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0 [ 3680.685454] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685458] smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0 [ 3680.685462] kthread+0xde/0x110 [ 3680.685467] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685471] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 3680.685478] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685482] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3680.685489] </TASK> [ 3680.685491] [ 3680.685491] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3680.685497] 1 lock held by migration/0/19: [ 3680.685500] #0: ffffffff8284df38 (pgd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_mm_pin_all+0x14/0xa0 [ 3680.685512] [ 3680.685512] stack backtrace: [ 3680.685518] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.0+ #16 [ 3680.685528] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3680.685531] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0 [ 3680.685538] Call Trace: [ 3680.685541] <TASK> [ 3680.685544] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 3680.685549] __lock_acquire+0x93c/0x2310 [ 3680.685554] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0 [ 3680.685558] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685562] _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70 [ 3680.685568] ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685572] xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0 [ 3680.685578] ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685582] __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0 [ 3680.685588] ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100 [ 3680.685592] __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250 [ 3680.685596] xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0 [ 3680.685600] xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280 [ 3680.685607] xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0 [ 3680.685611] multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120 [ 3680.685615] ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60 [ 3680.685620] ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685625] cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140 [ 3680.685629] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0 [ 3680.685634] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685638] smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0 [ 3680.685642] kthread+0xde/0x110 [ 3680.685645] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685649] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 3680.685654] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3680.685657] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3680.685662] </TASK> [ 3680.685267] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout [ 3680.685921] OOM killer enabled. [ 3680.685934] Restarting tasks ... done. Signed-off-by: Maksym Planeta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

…ea as VM_ALLOC BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 [ Upstream commit d262a19 ] Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4 with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293 CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac Call Trace: [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable) [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504 [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108 [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8 [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478 [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14 [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4 [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890 [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420 [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274 NIP: 005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8 REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4) MSR: 0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 24004422 XER: 00000000 GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932 GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57 GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002 GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001 NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274 LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c --- interrupt: c00 The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at [f1000000, f1002000) created by: text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30 flags: 0x80000000(zone=2) raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001 raw: 00000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ^ f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 ================================================================== f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not initialised hence not supposed to be used yet. Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is never called for that area. That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault") The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/ Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> CVE-2025-21866 Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2106026 commit f02c41f upstream. Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <[email protected]>

…cal section BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2109355 [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107437 commit f02c41f upstream. Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107522 [ Upstream commit 62531a1 ] A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event. In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1]. Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process(). Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain. Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in the future. Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process context and listeners are allowed to block. [1]: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by ip/52731: #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0 #1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0 #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 stack backtrace: ... ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0 switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0 ? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340 switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0 switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340 br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge] br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge] notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0 switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0 ... Fixes: f7a70d6 ("net: bridge: switchdev: Ensure deferred event delivery on unoffload") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Tested-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…ate_pagetables' BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173 [ Upstream commit fddc450 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Sierra <[email protected]> Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

…cal section BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173 [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173 [ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2110173 commit c11bcbc upstream. Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Tested-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Murphy <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noah Wager <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 [ Upstream commit 2d117e6 ] During a module removal, kvm_exit invokes arch specific disable call which disables AIA. However, we invoke aia_exit before kvm_exit resulting in the following warning. KVM kernel module can't be inserted afterwards due to inconsistent state of IRQ. [25469.031389] percpu IRQ 31 still enabled on CPU0! [25469.031732] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 943 at kernel/irq/manage.c:2476 __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150 [25469.031804] Modules linked in: kvm(-) [25469.031848] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 943 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-06947-g91c763118f47-dirty #2 [25469.031905] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [25469.031928] epc : __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150 [25469.031976] ra : __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150 [25469.032197] epc : ffffffff8007db1e ra : ffffffff8007db1e sp : ff2000000088bd50 [25469.032241] gp : ffffffff8131cef8 tp : ff60000080b96400 t0 : ff2000000088baf8 [25469.032285] t1 : fffffffffffffffc t2 : 5249207570637265 s0 : ff2000000088bd90 [25469.032329] s1 : ff60000098b21080 a0 : 037d527a15eb4f00 a1 : 037d527a15eb4f00 [25469.032372] a2 : 0000000000000023 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : ffffffff8122dbf8 [25469.032410] a5 : 0000000000000fff a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : ffffffff8122dc10 [25469.032448] s2 : ff60000080c22eb0 s3 : 0000000200000022 s4 : 000000000000001f [25469.032488] s5 : ff60000080c22e00 s6 : ffffffff80c351c0 s7 : 0000000000000000 [25469.032582] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : 000055556b7fb490 s10: 00007ffff0e12fa0 [25469.032621] s11: 00007ffff0e13e9a t3 : ffffffff81354ac7 t4 : ffffffff81354ac7 [25469.032664] t5 : ffffffff81354ac8 t6 : ffffffff81354ac7 [25469.032698] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff8007db1e cause: 0000000000000003 [25469.032738] [<ffffffff8007db1e>] __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150 [25469.032797] [<ffffffff8007dbfc>] free_percpu_irq+0x30/0x5e [25469.032856] [<ffffffff013a57dc>] kvm_riscv_aia_exit+0x40/0x42 [kvm] [25469.033947] [<ffffffff013b4e82>] cleanup_module+0x10/0x32 [kvm] [25469.035300] [<ffffffff8009b150>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x18e/0x1fc [25469.035374] [<ffffffff8000c1ca>] syscall_handler+0x3a/0x46 [25469.035456] [<ffffffff809ec9a4>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x72/0x134 [25469.035536] [<ffffffff809f5e18>] handle_exception+0x148/0x156 Invoke aia_exit and other arch specific cleanup functions after kvm_exit so that disable gets a chance to be called first before exit. Fixes: 54e4332 ("RISC-V: KVM: Initial skeletal support for AIA") Fixes: eded675 ("riscv: KVM: add basic support for host vs guest profiling") Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

…void Priority Inversion in SRIOV BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 [ Upstream commit dc0297f ] RLCG Register Access is a way for virtual functions to safely access GPU registers in a virtualized environment., including TLB flushes and register reads. When multiple threads or VFs try to access the same registers simultaneously, it can lead to race conditions. By using the RLCG interface, the driver can serialize access to the registers. This means that only one thread can access the registers at a time, preventing conflicts and ensuring that operations are performed correctly. Additionally, when a low-priority task holds a mutex that a high-priority task needs, ie., If a thread holding a spinlock tries to acquire a mutex, it can lead to priority inversion. register access in amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw especially in a fast code path is critical. The call stack shows that the function amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw is being called, which attempts to acquire the mutex. This function is invoked from amdgpu_sriov_wreg, which in turn is called from gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb. The [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] indicates that a thread is trying to acquire a mutex while it is in a context that does not allow it to sleep (like holding a spinlock). Fixes the below: [ 253.013423] ============================= [ 253.013434] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 253.013446] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 253.013464] ----------------------------- [ 253.013475] kworker/0:1/10 is trying to lock: [ 253.013487] ffff9f30542e3cf8 (&adev->virt.rlcg_reg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.013815] other info that might help us debug this: [ 253.013827] context-{4:4} [ 253.013835] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/10: [ 253.013847] #0: ffff9f3040050f58 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 253.013877] #1: ffffb789c008be40 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 253.013905] #2: ffff9f3054281838 (&adev->gmc.invalidate_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x198/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ 253.014154] stack backtrace: [ 253.014164] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 253.014189] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 253.014203] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/18/2024 [ 253.014224] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 253.014241] Call Trace: [ 253.014250] <TASK> [ 253.014260] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 253.014275] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 253.014287] __lock_acquire+0xa47/0x2810 [ 253.014303] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.014321] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 253.014333] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.014562] ? __lock_acquire+0xa6b/0x2810 [ 253.014578] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 253.014591] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.014782] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 253.014795] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.014808] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 253.014822] ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.015012] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.015029] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 253.015044] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 253.015057] amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu] [ 253.015249] amdgpu_sriov_wreg+0xc5/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015435] gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x44b/0x4f0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015667] gfx_v11_0_hw_init+0x499/0x29c0 [amdgpu] [ 253.015901] ? __pfx_smu_v13_0_update_pcie_parameters+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 253.016159] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 253.016173] ? smu_hw_init+0x18d/0x300 [amdgpu] [ 253.016403] amdgpu_device_init+0x29ad/0x36a0 [amdgpu] [ 253.016614] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0xc0 [amdgpu] [ 253.017057] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1c2/0x660 [amdgpu] [ 253.017493] local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0 [ 253.017746] work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30 [ 253.017995] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 253.018248] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 253.018500] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.018746] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 253.018988] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.019231] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 253.019468] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 253.019701] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 253.019939] </TASK> v2: s/spin_trylock/spin_lock_irqsave to be safe (Christian). Fixes: e864180 ("drm/amdgpu: Add lock around VF RLCG interface") Cc: lin cao <[email protected]> Cc: Jingwen Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Victor Skvortsov <[email protected]> Cc: Zhigang Luo <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

…ate_pagetables' BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 [ Upstream commit fddc450 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Sierra <[email protected]> Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 [ Upstream commit 888751e ] perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error # ./perf test -Fv 11 --- start --- ---- end ---- 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok --- start --- Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1' Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/ FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : FAILED! --- start --- Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/' FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : FAILED! # The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack: #0 hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623 #1 hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662 #2 0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519 #3 0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1545 #4 0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090, auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10) at util/parse-events.c:1508 #5 0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10, const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0) at util/parse-events.c:1592 #6 0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293 #7 0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8) at util/parse-events.c:1867 #8 0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0, err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true, fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136 #9 0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8) at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368 <suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23 where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000 in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c: attr->config = key.type_and_num; However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field: union hwmon_pmu_event_key { long type_and_num; struct { int num :16; enum hwmon_type type :8; }; }; s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture. The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10). On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of 0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above trace output. Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid endianess issues on all platforms. Output after: # ./perf test -F 11 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : Ok 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : Ok # Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 [ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2107212 commit c11bcbc upstream. Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Tested-by: Nhat Pham <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Murphy <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Timo Aaltonen <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2108854 [ Upstream commit 52323ed ] syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below). The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor" conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock. To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and return -EBUSY when it fails. Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user space. syzbot report: syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline] ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline] rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline] ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015 ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558 init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910 do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257 do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568 kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline] wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64 notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452 param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588 module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924 sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline] vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679 ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(param_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(param_lock); lock(system_transition_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913 Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2108854 [ Upstream commit b61e69b ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2108854 [ Upstream commit 27b9180 ] With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock: [ 1.211455] ============================================ [ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted [ 1.211823] -------------------------------------------- [ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 [ 1.212207] [ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock: [ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.212487] [ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1.212626] [ 1.212751] CPU0 [ 1.212815] ---- [ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.213016] [ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1.213016] [ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1.213143] [ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184: [ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0 [ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0 [ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.213895] [ 1.213895] stack backtrace: [ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 [ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 1.213994] Call Trace: [ 1.213995] <TASK> [ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0 [ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0 [ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0 [ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40 [ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI [ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev [ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270 [ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0 [ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev [ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info [ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120 [ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90 [ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0 [ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230 [ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0 [ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80 [ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490 [ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120 [ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320 [ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0 [ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0 [ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220 [ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0 [ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140 [ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0 [ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56 Device setup: netdevsim0 (down) ^ ^ bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down) When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes (re)locking on of the real_dev. Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues. Reproducer: echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*) dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev) ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0 ip link set dev netdevsim0 up ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100 ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allmulticast on down ip link add name bond1 type bond mode 802.3ad ip link set dev netdevsim0 down ip link set dev netdevsim0 master bond1 ip link set dev bond1 up ip link show Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z9CfXjLMKn6VLG5d@mini-arch/T/#m15ba130f53227c883e79fb969687d69d670337a0 Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2108854 commit 93ae6e6 upstream. We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2109367 [ Upstream commit a104042 ] The ieee80211 skb control block key (set when skb was queued) could have been removed before ieee80211_tx_dequeue() call. ieee80211_tx_dequeue() already called ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to get the current key, but the latter do not update the key in skb control block in case it is NULL. Because some drivers actually use this key in their TX callbacks (e.g. ath1{1,2}k_mac_op_tx()) this could lead to the use after free below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803083c248 by task kworker/u16:4/1440 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 6.13.0-ge128f627f404 #2 Hardware name: HW (DT) Workqueue: bat_events batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet Call trace: show_stack+0x14/0x1c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74 print_report+0x164/0x4c0 kasan_report+0xac/0xe8 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24 ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x12c/0x1c8 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xdcc/0x1b4c ieee80211_tx+0x1ec/0x2bc ieee80211_xmit+0x224/0x324 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x85c/0xcf8 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc0/0xec4 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x28c __dev_queue_xmit+0x6ac/0x318c batadv_send_skb_packet+0x38c/0x4b0 batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet+0x110/0x328 process_one_work+0x578/0xc10 worker_thread+0x4bc/0xc7c kthread+0x2f8/0x380 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 1906: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x4c __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1b4/0x380 ieee80211_key_alloc+0x3c/0xb64 ieee80211_add_key+0x1b4/0x71c nl80211_new_key+0x2b4/0x5d8 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x198/0x240 <...> Freed by task 1494: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x48/0x94 __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x60 kfree+0xc8/0x31c kfree_sensitive+0x70/0x80 ieee80211_key_free_common+0x10c/0x174 ieee80211_free_keys+0x188/0x46c ieee80211_stop_mesh+0x70/0x2cc ieee80211_leave_mesh+0x1c/0x60 cfg80211_leave_mesh+0xe0/0x280 cfg80211_leave+0x1e0/0x244 <...> Reset SKB control block key before calling ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to avoid that. Fixes: bb42f2d ("mac80211: Move reorder-sensitive TX handlers to after TXQ dequeue") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06aa507b853ca385ceded81c18b0a6dd0f081bc8.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2109367 [ Upstream commit 752e221 ] SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2109367 commit d54d610 upstream. Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # final submission Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2109367 commit afcdf51 upstream. Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said "All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2". However, dml2_init()/dml21_init() are not protected from their callers, causing such errors: do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 239 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #2 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn pc ffff80000319de80 ra ffff80000319de5c tp 900000010575c000 sp 900000010575f840 a0 0000000000000000 a1 900000012f210130 a2 900000012f000000 a3 ffff80000357e268 a4 ffff80000357e260 a5 900000012ea52cf0 a6 0000000400000004 a7 0000012c00001388 t0 00001900000015e0 t1 ffff80000379d000 t2 0000000010624dd3 t3 0000006400000014 t4 00000000000003e8 t5 0000005000000018 t6 0000000000000020 t7 0000000f00000064 t8 000000000000002f u0 5f5e9200f8901912 s9 900000012d380010 s0 900000012ea51fd8 s1 900000012f000000 s2 9000000109296000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000001fd8 s5 0000000000000001 s6 ffff800003415000 s7 900000012d390000 s8 ffff800003211f80 ra: ffff80000319de5c dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x3c/0x960 [amdgpu] ERA: ffff80000319de80 dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0) PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S) Process kworker/0:5 (pid: 239, threadinfo=00000000927eadc6, task=000000008fd31682) Stack : 00040dc000003164 0000000000000001 900000012f210130 900000012eabeeb8 900000012f000000 ffff80000319fe48 900000012f210000 900000012f210130 900000012f000000 900000012eabeeb8 0000000000000001 ffff8000031a0064 900000010575f9f0 900000012f210130 900000012eac0000 900000012ea80000 900000012f000000 ffff8000031cefc4 900000010575f9f0 ffff8000035859c0 ffff800003414000 900000010575fa78 900000012f000000 ffff8000031b4c50 0000000000000000 9000000101c9d700 9000000109c40000 5f5e9200f8901912 900000012d3c4bd0 900000012d3c5000 ffff8000034aed18 900000012d380010 900000012d3c4bd0 ffff800003414000 900000012d380000 ffff800002ea49dc 0000000000000001 900000012d3c6000 00000000ffffe423 0000000000010000 ... Call Trace: [<ffff80000319de80>] dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu] [<ffff80000319fe44>] dml21_init+0xa4/0x280 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031a0060>] dml21_create+0x40/0x80 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031cefc0>] dc_state_create+0x100/0x160 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031b4c4c>] dc_create+0x44c/0x640 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002ea49d8>] amdgpu_dm_init+0x3f8/0x2060 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002ea6658>] dm_hw_init+0x18/0x60 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b16738>] amdgpu_device_init+0x1938/0x27e0 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b18e80>] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x20/0xa0 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002b0c8f0>] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b0/0x580 [amdgpu] [<900000000448eae4>] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xc0 [<9000000003b02b18>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x18/0x40 [<9000000003b05da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300 [<9000000003b06718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440 [<9000000003b11b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220 [<9000000003ac1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4 Unfortunately, protecting dml2_init()/dml21_init() out of DML2 causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside. Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <[email protected]>

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Broken package on Ubuntu with /boot on FAT32 #2

Broken package on Ubuntu with /boot on FAT32 #2

elthariel commented Mar 28, 2022

Broken package on Ubuntu with /boot on FAT32 #2

Broken package on Ubuntu with /boot on FAT32 #2

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elthariel commented Mar 28, 2022